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Preface
In the summer of 1992 I was nishing my masters studies with an internship post at a
publishing house. It was during that period that I became attracted to the vast number
of open research problems concerning information management. The retrieval of relevant
information is just one problem, but one so interesting, complicated and diverse, that
it proved worth writing a thesis about. In essence, this thesis focuses on one single
question: how can we decide that some information is about other information. My
contribution to answering that question takes about two hundred pages and I can only
hope that it brings us a bit closer to a solution.
First of all, I wish to thank Peter Bruza, my masters thesis supervisor, and very soon
after, my initial Ph.D. supervisor, for bringing me into the eld of information retrieval
and research. He introduced me to the many enjoyable aspects of academic research.
It is a pity that he went back to Australia after a year, although this oered me the
possibility to visit him (and Brisbane) for a month in October of 1994.
During my rst year as a Ph.D. researcher, I became acquainted with the information
retrieval family. One of the family-meetings was the annual British Computer Society
Information Retrieval Colloquium. This was for me the opportunity to meet other young
researchers and to talk, discuss, explain, learn, and become involved in the topics of the
eld.
At my rst colloquium in 1993 I met Mounia Lalmas, who became my \logical in-
formation retrieval" companion. I am grateful that she was always prepared to help
and support me with my research in many ways.
In September 1993, my friend Bernd van Linder, whom I knew from my masters
studies at the University of Nijmegen, became a member of our department. His knowl-
edge of research, logic, politics, football, and many other subjects is impressive and his
input has had a big inuence on this thesis. He was also kind enough to play the role of
devil's advocate concerning situation theory, my theoretical approaches, and for many
other issues (e.g. football, politics, law). During the preparation of my thesis, Bernd's
feedback was invaluable. I would like to thank him for all his help, without which this
thesis might never have been nished.
Another type of support, nancial support, is also important for a Ph.D. researcher.
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It allows him to travel and present the research in progress all around the world. For this
reason, I would like to acknowledge the STIR-funding (visiting Peter Bruza in Brisbane),
the HCM-funding (SIGIR'94 in Dublin), SHELL and the ICCS-committee (ICCS'96 in
Sydney), and especially IDOMENEUS for allowing me to follow a research exchange
program (Esprit Network of Excellence No. 6606) that gave me the possibility to spend
7 months (January 1995 till August 1995) at the LGI-IMAG lab of Yves Chiaramella in
Grenoble.
It was Yves who invited me to Grenoble, to do research on logical information re-
trieval models. These seven months were a pleasant and productive period. In an in-
spiring atmosphere, I cooperated with Jean-Pierre Chevallet, Nathalie Denos, and Iadh
Ounis, constantly supported by the rest of the group. As my promotor, Yves was always
enthusiastic about my theoretical approach, and he kept me on the right track.
Coming back from \La douce France", my promotor Jan van Leeuwen gave me full
supervision. I am grateful to him for his patience and his interest in my work. In a
cheerful way, he suggested many corrections and improvements while still maintaining
my condence in my work.
I would also like to thank Thomas Arts, Wiebe van der Hoek, and John-Jules Meyer
for answering many questions, reading my drafts, and helping me, especially when I got
stuck with the formal aspects of the logical framework.
In the beginning of my Ph.D. research, I came into contact with a few other young
researchers in the area of Multi-Media and User Interfaces (MMuis). We decided to
meet each other and present our work on an regular basis. These MMuis meetings were
important for the pleasure in my work and I thank all the participants for turning those
meetings into enjoyable and inspiring gatherings.
In 1995 I won the Dr. Ir. H.C. Molster prize for innovative research in the area of
online information systems. This could not have come at a better time. It renewed my
agging determination to complete the writing process.
Working together with people with dierent cultural backgrounds, attitudes, inter-
ests, and ideas was what I found the most pleasant part of my work. For this reason I
would like to thank the co-authors of my articles: Frits Berger, Peter Bruza, Jean-Pierre
Chevallet, Nathalie Denos, Wiebe van der Hoek, Mounia Lalmas, Bernd van Linder,
John-Jules Meyer, Iadh Ounis, Keith van Rijsbergen, Cees Witteveen, and Bernd Won-
dergem.
I want to thank the members of my reading committee: Prof. Dr Michiel Hazewinkel,
Dr Bernd van Linder, Prof. Dr John-Jules Meyer, Prof. Dr Keith van Rijsbergen, and
Dr Theo van der Weide, for reviewing this thesis.
Anne Besselink has drawn the beautiful cover illustration and she is gratefully ac-
knowledged for that. Also for the contents of this thesis, I had a lot of `helping hands'.
Besides Mounia and Bernd, I would like to thank Frits Berger, Iain Campbell, Lynda
iii
Hardman, and Iadh Ounis for reading and commenting.
Furthermore, my thanks go to my loyal supporters Maria Wessels and Ortwin Hutten;
for all the ice-creams we ate, for all the discussions we had, and for all the pep-talks.
I would like to thank my parents, who always kept me aware of my `Brabantse' roots.
As a typical example, my father still questions the benet of a scientic researcher who
does not know how to plant a potato. I still do not have an adequate answer, perhaps
one day I can prove theoretically that the question is undecidable. Finally, I am very
grateful to Pierre-Ine and our little Zoo. They have been the anchor of happiness in my
life.
Theo Huibers, October 1996.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the beginning there was information.
The word came later.
F.I. Dretske, `Knowledge and the Flow
of Information'.
In the world there is increasing competition to manage information faster and more
inexpensively. This competition is driven by the explosive growth of the amount of
information available. For example, every year in the European Community about two
million academic, scientic, medical and social-economic articles and books appear [20].
At the other end of the spectrum is the expansion of the amount of information
available via the Internet (also known as the Web). The Internet can be viewed as a
connected collection of accessible information stores, the so-called hosts. The tremendous
growth in the number of hosts is shown in Table 1.1
1
.
Date Hosts Date Hosts Date Hosts
08/81 213 12/87 28,174 10/94 3,864,000
05/82 235 07/88 33,000 01/95 4,852,000
08/83 562 10/89 159,000 07/95 6,642,000
10/84 1,024 10/90 313,000 01/96 9,472,000
10/85 1,961 10/91 617,000 07/96 12,881,000
02/86 2,308 10/92 1,136,000
11/86 5,089 10/93 2,056,000
Table 1.1: The development of the number of Internet hosts.
The digithrope Negroponte calculated that if the rate of growth of the number of
Internet users were to continue at the rate at the time of writing (1996), which is of
1
Source: http://www.nw.com/zone/WWW/top.html.
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course impossible, the total number of Internet users would exceed the population of the
world by 2003 [105].
To conclude, the amount of available information is currently growing at an incredible
rate. Information about almost any subject is accessible leading to the presence of
various information providers at the Internet and the development of powerful tools
such as NCSA Mosaic and Netscape to browse, search and access this information. Since
the digital highway virtually connects all parts of the world with each other, accessing
information no longer presents a problem.
Be that as it may, a growing amount of information remains unused (or unread)
simply because there are no means for retrieving this information eectively. In order
to tackle this problem attempts have been made, since the early nineteen sixties, to
create appropriate computer systems the so-called information retrieval systems (or:
IR systems for short). In the next section we give a brief history of IR systems.
1.1 The history of information retrieval
In the early days of information storage, document collections were not large enough to
be in need of an IR system, not even a manual one. For example, at the end of the
fourteenth century, the English poet Georey Chaucer, in addition to being famous for
his poems, also became very well-known for the fact that he owned about sixty books,
which had cost him an immense amount of money [111]. Of course, the number of books
in the libraries was much larger, but still very modest. The library of the Sorbonne,
which was known to be one of the largest in the fourteenth century, contained 1,722
books in those days [111].
With the constant growth of the number of books an overview of a collection became
necessary. Such an overview was presented in a catalogue. In 1604 the Catalogue of
the Bodleain, the university library of Oxford, was printed for the rst time. It was
the largest general catalogue of the contents of any European library published up to
that time. About 10,200 titles were described in the Catalogue, including subject lists
of writers on Scripture, on Aristotle, on Law and on Medicine [129].
The retrieval of documents was done by using the document references, which were
rst stored in catalogues and card-trays. With the arrival of the computer in the nineteen
fties, retrieval made a big step forward since as of that moment on, the references could
be recorded in database systems. In the rest of this thesis we restrict ourselves to
computerised systems only. Therefore, when referring to information retrieval (or IR
systems), it is implicitly understood to be the computerised variant.
In the beginning of the computer era, information retrieval was focused on automatic
data processing: not the information in a document but information about the document
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was stored. The representatives of a document were facts such as author name(s), title,
number of pages, etc. These facts were recorded in database systems. The information in
the document was only accessible if the document was in your hands. Literally, in those
days information retrieval was data retrieval; if a requested fact \Writer: W. Shakespeare"
was stored as a representation of a document entitled \Julius Caesar", then a reference
(place-code) of the document \Julius Caesar" was retrieved. With this reference in hand,
one had to search for the actual document placed somewhere on a shelf.
Back then it was practically impossible to store the information that was contained in
a document. However, the importance of being able to store this information was already
recognised, as can be seen in the following quotation taking from the book `Automatic
Data Processing' of Brooks and Iverson [21] (page 52) that was written in 1963:
`The future importance of any aspect of an event is, however, not easily es-
timated, and much data are therefore recorded and retained for potential,
though unspeciable, future use. Such retention pertains particularly to doc-
uments, records which because of some validation are peculiarly acceptable
as evidence.'
A few years later, the information retrieval systems were establishing their prominent
position among the computer systems. The information content of a document was
represented by keywords or other representatives. So, the goal of an IR system was
changed from data retrieval to information retrieval. For instance, in 1967 Martin [96]
(page 164) described the task of an IR system as follows:
`A real-time [IR] system may be used to provide information about a service
or a situation when it is required and where it is required.'
For instance, given an IR system, the management of a company could obtain (or may
wish to obtain) information about another company; the police could do a search in
their document-bases to nd out whether their is a suspect tting their descriptions; a
researcher may wish to know what literature exists on her topic.
Besides the fact that in data retrieval the user retrieves descriptors and in information
retrieval she retrieves the object in question, there are some other essential dierences
between data and information retrieval. Books about information retrieval most often
start with a list of the distinguishing properties of data and information retrieval. A
summary of the principle dierences as given by Blair [19], Turtle & Croft [143], and
Van Rijsbergen [122] is shown in Table 1.2.
Given this table, it may be inferred that one of the primary task of an IR system is
to provide information, denitely not just any piece of information but information that
is relevant with respect to an information need.
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Data Retrieval Information Retrieval
The representation of
stored information
Well-dened types of ob-
jects and facts
Unstructured information
The method of answer-
ing a request for infor-
mation
Direct, through facts Information which will
likely contain what the
user wants
The relation between the
formulated query to the
system and the satisfac-
tion of the user
Satisfaction or no satisfac-
tion (deterministic)
A high likelihood that the
user is satised
The denition of a suc-
cessful system
Does the system deliver
the requested facts?
Does the system satisfy
the users' information
need?
Table 1.2: A summary of the dierences between data and information retrieval.
From the nineteen seventies onward, IR systems steadily stored representatives of
the information content of documents. Still, the IR systems did not provide information
other than document references. For instance, Lancaster [88] formulated the terms infor-
mation retrieval and information retrieval system in the context of items of literature
as follows:
`The term information retrieval, as it is commonly used, refers to the ac-
tivities involved in searching a body of literature in order to nd items (i.e.,
documents of one kind or another) that deal with a particular subject area.
An information retrieval system, then, is any tool or device that organizes
a body of literature in such a way that it can be searched conveniently.'
In the nineteen eighties, a new generation of IR systems based on Natural Language
Processing (NLP) techniques was proposed. These systems dealt with the text in the
document as meaningful sequences of words rather than just as character strings (see for
instance [18, 136]).
In the nineteen nineties, when multi-media is no longer a futuristic but a cognitively
acceptable way to represent information, the information retrieval problem starts to ex-
plode. From this moment onwards, a user is not only searching for information contained
in text, but also for information contained in sounds, images or video. Fortunately, a
huge part of the media is stored in digital form. Documents are no longer exclusively on
a shelf but also reside on a computer's accessible storage.
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Now, being able to access the information content of a document directly, the task
of an IR system has increased tremendously. The provision of information rather than a
reference to a document has become the primary task of an IR system. As Van Rijsbergen
and Lalmas [127] recently wrote:
`the purpose of an information retrieval system is to provide information
about a request and that a request is a representation of an information need
that an IR system attempts to satisfy. [. . . ] if a user states a query then
it behoves the IR system to nd the objects that contain information about
that query.'
So, from the point of view of information storage, the brief history of information
retrieval started with data retrieval and ends with multi-media information retrieval.
We can also detect another line of development in the history of information retrieval.
At rst most IR systems were originally developed to perform the `classical information
retrieval' task: a person was looking for relevant information in one collection of docu-
ments (often a library). Nowadays, the information retrieval problem is much broader
as a user is searching for information contained in very large information stores, possibly
spread around the globe. Two typical examples are the Internet as we mentioned previ-
ously, and digital libraries. Digital libraries consider related digital documents from all
over the world as belonging to their collection. The user does not notice
2
the dierence
between consulting a document that is physically stored
3
in Australia or in the Nether-
lands. The task of a digital library is to retrieve documents which contain quality
4
,
non-redundant
5
information about a formulated request regardless of physical storage
location.
Due to this rapid shift of paradigms, new requirements for IR systems have been recog-
nised. The vast size of present-day information domains forces users to apply distributed
retrieval systems to help them search distinct areas of cyberspace. These systems will in
general not be static, but can adapt to the wishes of the user. They will also have to be
autonomous to a considerable extent since it will be impossible for the user to oversee
and guide their behaviour in detail.
Over the past ten years, research in Articial Intelligence has focused on dening
highly autonomous systems displaying a rational behaviour and capable of solving com-
plicated and elaborate tasks [90]. These systems, which are commonly referred to as
rational agents, seem tailor-made for helping to solve the information retrieval prob-
lem. Rational agents, with the ability to reason, communicate, gather and maintain
2
Or at least, the system should be able to keep this hidden for the user.
3
In this sense, bits on a hard-disk, CD-Rom, tape or magnetic drum, and so on.
4
Not all information is `library' quality, such as the information in advertisement leaets.
5
An identical document taken from the Netherlands and Australia should not be retrieved twice.
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information could probably be used as autonomous IR systems (cf. [33, 70, 72, 91]).
On the Internet, information retrieval is performed by these agents: they are not called
rational agents but they have fancy names such as spiders, webcrawlers, knowbots, and
so on. It is commonly agreed that the success of the Web will depend strongly on the
eectiveness of these agents. The following quotation from December [47] is a case in
point:
`In an increasingly thin soup of redundant, poor quality, or incorrect infor-
mation, even the smartest Web spiders won't be very eective. A ood of
information unltered by the critical and noise-reducing inuences of collab-
oration and peer review can overwhelm users and obscure the value of the
Web itself. The Web certainly needs solutions in information discovery and
retrieval {indeed, developing intelligent spiders, worms, robots, and ants is
crucial to making sense of the Web.'
One way of ensuring these changes is to combine and improve existing IR systems.
This can only be done if we have a deep insight in the retrieval process, based on what
is needed and what we already have. However, in the past thirty years of information
retrieval research it has become clear that it is not evident at all how to analyse, compare,
and improve the retrieval processes of dierent IR systems. Our main aim is to dene a
framework that allows us to model IR systems in order to gain a better insight into the
retrieval process.
1.2 Information retrieval paradigms
We begin with the old information retrieval paradigm to introduce the core of the con-
cepts of information retrieval used in this thesis. The notation we use is given in brackets.
Information retrieval begins with a user having an information need (N) that she
wishes to full. The information need is formulated, as well as possible, in the form of
a query (q). Often this query is constructed using a query language in the context of
an appropriate user interface. Results are documents or parts of documents
6
that suit
the user's need according to the IR system. The retrieved documents are taken from
the document-base (D). Normally, an IR system does not, or cannot, incorporate the
entire information content of a document on account of factors of eciency and complex-
ity. Therefore, an IR system handles a manipulable representation of the document's
6
A part of a document can be viewed as a (sub-)document, therefore we omit the phrase `or parts of
the document' in the rest of this thesis when we speak of documents. However, the reader should keep
in mind that the ability to retrieve parts of a document is important. In our view information retrieval
should not consider only a document as an atomic entity.
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information content. The determination of the document representation, which is an
approximate representation of the documents content, is arrived at by a process termed
indexing. The indexing process returns for each document (d) a descriptor set ((d)) as
its representation.
The heart of the IR system consists of a matching process that compares the request
q with the descriptor set (d) of each document d. If the matching operation deems a
document as satisfying to the request, the document is assumed relevant. The match-
ing operation is also termed the relevance decision. The documents that are relevant
according to the system, are retrieved and displayed to the user. Very often these doc-
uments are ordered according to a degree of relevance, known as the ranking of the
documents. In most current IR systems, the user is able, supported by the system,
to reformulate the query after inspecting the result. This process is termed relevance
feedback.
Matching
Information
need
Formulation
Documents
Indexing
Characterization Query
Figure 1.1: Old information retrieval paradigm.
In general, IR systems are developed from a predened information retrieval model
(or: IR model for short). Such a model tries to furnish an answer for the relevance
decision. It will explain the structure and processes of these systems, and clarify their
general, as opposed to specic, characteristics [142].
A fairly diverse range of IR systems has been proposed during the past thirty years.
To date, there are boolean retrieval systems, coordinate retrieval systems, vector-space
retrieval systems, probabilistic system, logical systems, etc. In Chapter 4 we present
these models in more detail. For a presentation of about a score of IR systems we refer
the reader to the proceedings of SIGIR [22, 53, 80]. The diversity of the IR systems
results from the many possible perspectives that can be selected from the range of the
relevance decisions.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the information retrieval problem has become much
broader. An information retrieval paradigm should not consist of a single matching
process of one particular IR system but a collection of autonomous IR systems, which
are able to cooperate amongst each other. Therefore, we present a new information
retrieval paradigm to capture these new concepts.
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Query
Indexing
Documents
Characterization
Matching
Query
Composer
Characterization
Indexing
Documents
Query
Formulation
Documents
need
Information
Matching
Indexing
Characterization
Matching
Figure 1.2: New information retrieval paradigm.
In the new information retrieval paradigm the concept of the documents remains the
same. A user formulates her information need as a query (q). A composer translates
this query into acceptable forms for a variety of IR systems. There is no single collection
of documents anymore but there are numerous information stores. Each IR system
returns relevant information to the composer module that lters and ranks the delivered
information. The nal output will be a list of all relevant information that is presented
to the user.
1.3 What this thesis is about
As one can see in the paradigms, information retrieval concerns the problem of retrieving
from a given document-base those documents that are likely to be relevant to a certain
information need. Hence relevance is essentially a relation between a document and an
information need. Due to the intrinsic vagueness of terms such as `information need' and
`likely', the notion of relevance is hard to formalise mathematically.
In 1971, Cooper introduced an objective part of relevance termed logical relevance [41].
This logical relevance is one of the constituents of the denition of relevance. Cooper
distinguishes two aspects of the notion of relevance:
. Utility, which describes the ultimate usefulness of the retrieved document, and
. Logical Relevance, which describes whether a retrieved document has some topical
bearing on the information need in question.
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Of course a document can be logically relevant for a given information need but at the
same moment not be useful at all, for instance, because the content of the document is
out of date. In this thesis we focus on the concept of logical relevance, which is described
by Cooper [41] as follows:
`A stored sentence is logically relevant to a representation of an information
need if and only if it is a member of some minimal premise set of stored
sentences for some component statement of that need.'
Logical models in information retrieval attempt to encompass this denition in the
core notion of relevance. Following Maron [95], we call the logical relevance relation
`aboutness'. In the literature several other descriptions of the aboutness relation can be
found:
 `topically related' [41],
 `correspondent to' [107], and
 `likely to contain information about' [125].
The explosive growth of information has made it a matter of survival for companies,
Internet users, librarians and indeed anyone dealing with information, to have good IR
systems at their disposal. For instance, in the previous section we mentioned that the
usefulness of the Web depends on how well an information retrieval agent works. In
this thesis we argue that the concept of goodness in the context of information retrieval
is related to the characteristics of the aboutness decision. In this thesis we present a
framework that allows one to postulate these characteristics. With these postulates in
hand it should be possible to decide that one IR system is better than another. In our
opinion, the critical analysis of IR systems can be made on the basis of the aboutness
decision as proposed by their underlying model.
To develop a new improved IR model a deep understanding of the relevance decisions
of the various existing models is needed. In fact, we think it is more important that
we develop a general information retrieval theory that oers the opportunity to dene
relevance independent of the IR models than to dene a new IR model as such.
A general information retrieval theory should focus on the modelling of the infor-
mation retrieval concepts and especially on the retrieval functions. The theory should
abstract from specic notions and practical implementation problems. Therefore, such a
theory is called a meta-theory. Above all, a meta-theory should extend the possibilities
of the comparison of IR systems, which are now typically experimental. For then it
becomes possible to compare IR models of dierent IR systems. Summarising, the study
of the logical relevance denition in terms of an information retrieval theory of various
IR models is the leitmotif of this thesis.
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.4 Outline of this thesis
In this thesis we propose a general framework for use in information retrieval. This
general framework should provide a deeper insight in the notion of relevance used in
information retrieval. It is important to have such a formalism in order to propose, build
or merge IR systems that can manage any amount and sort of information as it occurs
in the new information retrieval paradigm.
In Chapter 2 we present the reasons for our choice for a theoretical approach rather
than an experimental one. An information retrieval theory can be split into two main
parts: the representatives of information and the relevance decision. In Chapter 3, we
therefore propose Situation Theory as the language for information representatives, and
an aboutness proof system for the relevance decisions. With this in hand we investigate in
Chapter 4 the underlying logic of relevance of dierent existing IR models. The objective
of Chapter 4 is also to lter out suitable new rules for relevance decisions. In Chapter 5,
we show that the relevance decisions underlying various IR models in the proposed theory
can indeed be compared formally rather than experimentally. This means that theorems
can be proved stating, for example, that the systems based on a vector-space model
have exactly the same relevance decision as those based on probabilistic models. This
result does not only spare us the eort of experimentation, but, more importantly, it
allows us to side-step the controversies surrounding the experimental process. Thus, a
classication based on the relevance decision can be made. In order to build sophisticated
IR systems capable of performing the IR tasks as presented in the Section 1.2, we need
to do more than a simple comparison. All these advantages of our theory are tested in
Chapter 6. In this chapter we show the possibility of a ranked output by ordering a
set of IR systems on a qualitative basis. We show that information retrieval agents can
be modelled using the description of relevance. Furthermore, an extended example is
presented, based on a specic search strategy in a hypermedia model. Finally, Chapter 7
presents the main results of the studies. In addition, conclusions are drawn with respect
to the theoretical approach. We will also give recommendations for further research on
the theory and its application.
Chapter 2
Approaches for studying information
retrieval
Information retrieval researchers are like automo-
tive engineers who are trying to improve the de-
sign of automobiles without being able to measure
horsepower or fuel eciency.
D.C. Blair, `Language and Representation
in Information Retrieval'.
In this chapter we present two dierent possibilities for studying information retrieval.
According to several authors [19, 43, 132] there are two possible avenues to follow for an
information retrieval study, namely an experimental one and a theoretical one. The two
approaches appear dicult to reconcile. The controversy between the people who were
mainly inspired by mathematics and those who were inuenced more by the empirical
sciences originated in the eld of analytical philosophy and dates back to the time of
Pythagoras [130]. The article `The Formalism of Probability Theory in IR: A Foundation
or an Encumbrance' by Cooper [43] is devoted to the internal struggle between these two
strategies for information retrieval. Cooper started his article as follows:
`Some approaches to retrieval system design are strongly guided by theory.
Others have little real theoretical underpinning, but are instead more exper-
imental and ad hoc in character. Which is preferable? Obviously, theory-
guidedness is a good thing if the theory leads to promising retrieval rules
to try out. Good theories have inferential power, and inferential power can
help minimize empirical oundering. However, having to stay within the con-
straints of a strict theoretical formalism can also impose costs and penalties.
The true extent of these costs is not always fully recognized.'
11
12 Chapter 2. Approaches for studying information retrieval
This thesis proposes a theoretical formalism for information retrieval. However, be-
fore presenting the theory, we feel that it is rst necessary to motivate the choice for
a theoretical rather than an experimental approach. We highlight two famous infor-
mation retrieval experiments, and discuss some of their observed limitations. We then
present several current theoretical approaches for information retrieval. In this chap-
ter we present two, at rst sight, controversial approaches. In Section 2.2.4 we show
a technique for `theory performance' inspired by the work of the philosopher Popper.
He proposes a synthesis of both the theoretical and experimental approaches in which
theories can be compared using test statements obtained from experiments. In the nal
section we introduce our version of the theoretical approach, tailor-made for information
retrieval.
2.1 Experimental approach
Traditionally the study of IR systems is purely experimental in the sense that it is
`based on tests one planned in order to provide evidence for or against a hypothesis'
1
.
The experimental study is based on the paradigm as depicted in the gure below:
New documents
Documents (parameters)
Results
Explanation
Hypothesis
Theory
IR problem Strategies
In an experimental approach an arbitrary information retrieval problem would be
studied as follows. An information retrieval tool is proposed which could oer a solution
for a typical information retrieval question. For instance: `is it true that adding more
1
Another interpretation, as for instance mentioned by Van Rijsbergen, is that experimental information
retrieval is mainly carried out in a `laboratory' situation [122].
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documents to the document-base automatically leads to a higher recall in the context
of this system'. Varying the setting of the parameters of the system and the number of
documents, a collection of results is obtained. The results are studied and could possibly
form an answer to the question under scrutiny. If such an answer is validated for several
systems or in various settings, a hypothesis is formulated. When the hypothesis ts in a
series of other related hypotheses, a theory is proposed.
In an experimental approach the comparison of two systems is formulated as: `is
system A better than system B with respect to C' and proceeds according to the method
described above. A widely accepted manner of comparing experimental results of the
retrieval performance of two IR systems is the study of the so-called recall and precision
measures. These measures are used to conclude whether system A is to be preferred over
system B or vice versa.
2.1.1 Recall and precision
Recall and precision are two measures with as input the following two document sets:
(1) the collection of documents which the user would judge to be relevant with respect
to her information need, if she would be aware of all available documents (denoted as
Rel
user
), and (2) the collection of documents which an IR system retrieves according to
the formulated query (denoted as Ret
system
). The utopia of every IR system developer
is to create an IR system such that the set Rel
user
is identical to the set Ret
system
.
Up to now, IR systems are compared in eectiveness through a calculation using the
recall and precision values. Formally the measures are dened as follows:
Denition 2.1
Recall =
j Rel
user
\ Ret
system
j
j Rel
user
j
Precision =
j Rel
user
\ Ret
system
j
j Ret
system
j
Note that both recall and precision values are between 0 and 1. A high recall value
implies that most of the documents that are deemed to be relevant according to the
user are actually returned by the system. A high precision value indicates that most of
the documents that are returned by the system are indeed relevant in the perspective of
the user. In probabilistic terms one can rewrite the values as: Recall = Pr(Ret
system
j
Rel
user
) and Precision = Pr(Rel
user
j Ret
system
).
It is now generally recognised that there is usually a certain trade-o between both
values: one could naively try to increase the recall value of a system by increasing the
number of returned documents, but in general this will lead to a decrease of the precision
value [30]. Let us digress briey and provide one way to explain this phenomenon in
terms of `incremental precision'. In the following gure the results of two IR systems
A and B are graphically depicted.
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Y
BRet
X
ARet Rel user Rel user
Let us assume that system B retrieves more documents than system A (on a query)
in an attempt to achieve a better recall. Thus let j Ret
B
j > j Ret
A
j. By abuse of
notation we will write #A = j Ret
A
j and #B = j Ret
B
j. We then have:
Lemma 2.1
Prec
A
> Prec
B
, Prec
A
>
j Rel
user
j (Recall
B
, Recall
A
)
(#B ,#A)
:
Proof Observe that
Prec
A
> Prec
B
, #B  Prec
A
> #B  Prec
B
, (#B  Prec
A
,#A Prec
A
) > (#B  Prec
B
,#A Prec
A
)
, (#B ,#A) Prec
A
> (#B  Prec
B
), (#A Prec
A
)
, Prec
A
>
(#B  Prec
B
), (#A Prec
A
)
(#B ,#A)
:
Let X = Ret
A
\Rel
user
and Y = Ret
B
\Rel
user
. Note: Prec
B
=
#Y
#B
and Prec
A
=
#X
#A
,
thus
Prec
A
> Prec
B
, Prec
A
>
(#Y ,#X)
(#B ,#A)
, Prec
A
>
(Recall
B
 j Rel
user
j), (Recall
A
 j Rel
user
j)
(#B ,#A)
, Prec
A
>
j Rel
user
j (Recall
B
, Recall
A
)
(#B ,#A)
:

Thus if we retrieve more documents but recall goes down (Recall
B
< Recall
A
), also
precision goes down. But if recall goes up (Recall
B
> Recall
A
), we have a strict condition
for precision to go up or not.
Consider the common case in which system B returns at least all those documents
that are returned by system A and possibly more, i.e., Ret
A
 Ret
B
and let us see when
recall goes up. Let 
B;A
=
def
Ret
B
, Ret
A
.
Denition 2.2 The incremental precision of B over A is
IP
B;A
=
def
j 
B;A
\ Rel
user
j
j 
B;A
j
:
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Under the assumption that Ret
A
 Ret
B
, we have the following gure.
V XARet
RetB Reluser
Z
Here, Z represents the set of retrieved documents of B that are not already in Ret
A
and that are relevant according to the user. The set V represents the retrieved documents
of B that are not yet in Ret
A
and that are not relevant according to the user. Thus,

B;A
= V [Z. According to the previous inequality, applying Lemma 2.1 precision goes
down in this case if and only if
Prec
A
> Prec
B
, Prec
A
>
(j Z j + j X j), j X j
j Z j + j V j
, Prec
A
>
j Z j
j Z j + j V j
= IP
B;A
:
It follows that if Recall
B
is greater than Recall
A
(thus Z is not empty), then the
precision has increased if and only if Prec
A
< IP
B;A
. In other words: if and only if B
achieves a better precision among the extra documents in Z and V than A did on the
original set of returned documents (which B returns to by assumption). This is indeed
unlikely, explaining the observed phenomenon to some extent.
Example 2.1 The gure below shows a retrieval situation. The grey blocks repre-
sent the documents belonging to the set judged relevant by the user (the set Rel
user
).
The white blocks represent irrelevant documents. The blocks in the large square were
retrieved by a certain IR system A (the set Ret
A
).
A B C
D E F
Since j Rel
user
j= 3, j Ret
A
j= 4 and j Rel
user
\ Ret
A
j= 2, it follows that the recall
value is
2
3
and the precision value is
2
4
. In order to achieve a better recall and a better
precision with a system B, the notion of incremental precision requires that IP
B;A
>
1
2
.
Thus, the precision increases if and only if Ret
B
= fA;B;D;E; Fg, because then IP
B;A
=
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1 and Precision
B
=
3
5
. In all other cases IP
B;A

1
2
, i.e., if Ret
B
= fA;B;C;D;Eg then
IP
B;A
= 0 and if Ret
B
= fA;B;C;D;E; Fg then IP
B;A
=
1
2
. For the last case, the
precision will neither increase nor decrease.
As we will show in Chapter 5, one of the advantages of our theoretical approach is that
it allows predictions to be made about the recall-value with respect to the underlying
IR model and information domain.
The main problem of recall and precision measures is the determination of the set
Rel
user
. In the next section we present two information retrieval tests. These tests show
the construction of such sets. Important for the success of the evaluation is the ability to
construct a suitable test collection. According to Hull [75], the fundamental components
for a successful evaluation of a retrieval experiment are the availability of the following:
1. At least one document collection suitable for testing. The collection must include
a number of queries and their relevance assessments. The relevance assessments
determine sets of documents which are relevant, given the query (Rel
user
);
2. A measure, based on the similarity ranking of relevant and non-relevant documents
with respect to the query, that reects the quality of the search; and
3. A valid (statistical) methodology for judging whether measured dierences between
retrieval methods can be considered statistically signicant.
Next we present two of the more common information retrieval tests to give the reader
an idea of how these tests are brought about.
2.1.2 Craneld
One of the very rst well-known information retrieval tests was the Craneld test
2
. The
test took place in the nineteen sixties. Strictly speaking, there were two Craneld tests,
both of which we present briey.
Craneld 1 The goal of the rst Craneld test was a comparative evaluation of four
IR systems. It was a two-year project and the evaluation was focused on the indexing
process rather than on the matching function. Four dierent indexing processes were
examined:
1. Conventional Classication,
2. Alphabetical subject index,
3. Devised schedule of a facet classication,
4. Uniterm System of Coordinate Indexing.
2
We recommend Cleverdon's article [37] for a detailed overview of the Craneld tests.
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The document collection consisted of 18,000 papers on aeronautical engineering. In
addition, 1,200 queries based on a single document in the test collection were created
(in our terminology, for each query Rel
user
was a singleton set with the document based
on the query in it). A search was successful if Ret
system
contained the document used
to create the query. The results showed that all four systems were 74 - 82% eective in
retrieving the required document. The analysis was based on aspects such as time for
indexing, learning process, and number of returns. The major point of criticism from
the information retrieval community was that the construction of the search questions
was based on documents in the test collection. So, in this case one cannot speak of a
query which is formulated by someone with an information need.
Craneld 2 The second Craneld test kept the focus on the indexing process. The
objective was to examine the eect of index languages, in isolation or in any possible
combination, using recall and precision measures. The document collection was created
in a way totally dierent from Craneld 1.
Two hundred authors of recently published papers were asked to state in the form
of a question the problem which their paper addressed. Furthermore, they had to add
supplementary questions that arose in the course of their research. They were then
requested to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 5, the level of relevance to each question of
the references they had cited in their paper. Out of these references 1400 documents
were selected and 279 queries were inspected by students and by the originator of the
question.
The evaluation concentrated on the indexing of the documents. Here, the tests used
a multi-stage process of indexing. An indexer manually identied the concepts in the
document with one, two or three keywords. A weight in the range of 1 to 3 was assigned
to each concept according to the importance for a particular document. Each single word
was then listed with respect to the values of the concepts it occurred in. Finally the con-
cepts were combined into themes. Given this indexing process, dierent representation
languages were studied. Figure 2.1 is taken from Cleverdon [37] and presents the way
the languages were obtained.
For each question it was inspected which documents would be retrieved and at which
level (the latter aspect is important for the recall and precision ratio). The results were
presented in the form of recall- and precision-curves.
Each question was indexed in all dierent representation languages. The results of
the Craneld 2 tests were not as evident as those from the Craneld 1 tests. Salton [132]
indicated for instance, that `it is also the rst evaluation project that produced unex-
pected and potentially disturbing results.' Among others, Salton was surprised by the
result that an advanced indexing process (concept indexing) showed a worse performance
than the simple indexing process (keywords indexing).
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I.3 + I.4 I.7 + THIRD HIERARCHICAL REDUCTION
I.8I.5
I.6 + SECOND HIERARCHICAL REDUCTION
I.3
I.1 + WORD FORMS
I.1
NATURAL LANGUAGE
I.7
I.1 + SYNONYMS
I.2
I.4
I.2 + QUASI-SYNONYMS
I.6
I.2 + FIRST HIERACHICAL REDUCTION
Figure 2.1: Cleverdon's representation languages.
After such a result there are two possible avenues: show that the test is not applicable
and therefore the results are meaningless, or change the system in such a way that it will
perform better with respect to the test. With respect to the former, it was remarked that
the relevance assessments with respect to the corresponding queries might benet the
simple matching techniques at the expense of the more complex matching techniques.
In Section 2.2.4 we will return to this aspect of model performance.
2.1.3 TREC
In November 1992 the rst TREC was held. TREC is the acronym of the annual Text
REtrieval Conference. Its proceedings [60, 62, 63] contain papers about tests and their
results. The tests are elements of the TREC programme, an ocially organised activity,
which has as its main goal to study dierent approaches to the retrieval of text for large
document collections. At the moment, TREC is the major experimental eort in the
information retrieval eld
3
. The test collection contains approximately one million doc-
uments (about 3 gigabytes of data). To compare the results obtained there is a detailed
schedule that all the participants of TREC should obey. For TREC-4 the schedule was
as follows:
3
We recommend `Overview of the Third Text REtrieval Conference (TREC-3)' [61] by Harman and
`Reections on TREC' by Sparck Jones [139] for a detailed overview of TREC.
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Jan All potential participants should apply for a position in the tests. The
program committee looks for as wide a range of text retrieval ap-
proaches as possible, and selects only those participants who are able
to work with the large data collection.
Feb For the accepted participants there are 3 gigabytes of information with
queries and relevance judgements available (taken from previous TREC
tests). With this collection they are able to train and improve the
performance of their system.
May A list of routing topics is distributed.
June The test data is sent to the participants.
July Fifty new test topics for ad hoc test are distributed.
Aug The results should be submitted.
Oct The evaluation process takes place.
Nov The obtained results are presented during the TREC conference.
As one can see, there is only one month of time to process the queries. The very
large amount of information makes it almost impossible to have manual interference in
the indexing or matching process. Another point of interest is the distinction made
between routing and ad hoc test topics. In the routing test mode, the situation is
simulated in which the same questions are always being asked but new or more data
is being searched. This task is similar to the one done by news clipping services or by
library proling systems [61]. Then, the relevance decision depends on previous results,
and thus a kind of learning process is involved. In an ad hoc test mode the document
collection is xed and the question is variable. The question `is this document relevant
for the query' is considered independently of previous results. This task is similar to
how a researcher might use a library, where the collection is known but the questions
which are likely to be asked are not [61]. Therefore the time for processing ad hoc tests
is much shorter than for the routing ones.
The document set in TREC is taken from several sources, individually varying and
collectively varying in topics and genres, though with much news story material. While
the relevance judgements in the Craneld tests were done manually for the complete
collection, for the TREC-collections this was practically impossible (3 gigabytes!). All
TRECs have used the pooling method [140], which proceeds as follows: for each query
and for each system the top 100 retrieved documents are merged in a pool
4
, which is
then shown to human assessors.
According to Harman [61], an important underlying assumption of this retrieval test
is `that the vast majority of relevant documents have been found and that documents
that have not been judged can be assumed not to be relevant'.
4
For TREC-1 and TREC-2, for TREC-3 it was 200.
20 Chapter 2. Approaches for studying information retrieval
The main results of TREC indicated not so much that one technique was shown to be
signicantly better than another one, but rather that individual retrieval systems were
improving over time. Also, the achieved evaluation performance is an important result
of TREC.
2.1.4 Reections on the experimental approach
Since the early nineteen sixties experimental retrieval evaluations have been constructed.
Very often the results of these evaluations were criticised by the experts (for an overview
of various arguments see [132]). The next quotation from Cleverdon [37], one of the
originators of the Craneld tests, makes this particularly clear:
`The publication of the nal report [36] attracted wide interest, caused con-
siderable annoyance to the advocates of the dierent systems, and received
some praise but much criticism.'
Obviously some criticism was justied. A whole new discipline in the area of infor-
mation retrieval developed, i.e., the evaluation of information retrieval evaluations. One
typical example of such a meta-evaluation question is the following given by Hull [75]:
`Why should experimental results based on collections with a very limited
number of short documents on restricted topics be applicable to much larger
and more variable documents collections that are found in real retrieval set-
tings?'
This intuitively acceptable concern was the underlying reason for the TREC-commu-
nity to ensure that the amount of information in the test collection was enlarged.
The following list presents an overview of the main `concerns' made by evaluation
analysts [19, 40, 75, 132]:
(i) The current measures, such as recall and precision, are not properly representing
the acuity of an IR system because
. there is a retrieved and a unretrieved set of documents, without taking into
account the possibility of an order of retrieval involving more than two classes;
. the utility factor of a document is not measured;
. returning a larger number of relevant documents is not always better: it may
be that if the system highlights one relevant document this could be much
more informative than returning a whole set;
. most often the measures are not dealing with interactive IR systems (such as
relevance feedback systems).
(ii) The relevance assessments are not realistic, as the assessments are based on a
formulated query rather than on an information need;
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(iii) The evaluation must be based on knowledge of the complete set of relevant docu-
ments with respect to each query. This is hardly possible given the very large test
collection;
(iv) Small document collections are not representative for large document collections
(and vice versa).
To conclude, up to the time of writing IR systems are compared using statistical values
such as recall and precision. We certainly perceive the utility of statistic values. However,
to be able to make more strict statements concerning the qualities of one IR model when
compared to another IR model, we feel that we should have more formal means of
comparison at our disposal. Furthermore, to prove specic statements concerning the
behaviour of IR systems, statistical tests are not adequate. There seems to be a denite
need for a more formal characterisation of IR systems. In the following section we inspect
theoretical approaches.
2.2 Theoretical approaches
One of the explanations of the word `theory' in the Collins dictionary is `a plan formu-
lated in the mind only'. This is certainly not what we have in mind. We prefer another
description given in the dictionary, namely `a set of hypotheses related by logical or
mathematical arguments to explain a wide variety of connected phenomena in gen-
eral terms'. In this thesis the connected phenomena refer to the various stages of the
retrieval process. There are various ways to study information retrieval in a theoretical
way. We distinguish three approaches, namely
1. Embedding, which formalises an IR model that covers several other models.
2. Categorisation, which classies dierent IR models based on a list of properties.
3. Meta-theory, in which a formalisation of a model and its properties in terms of a
theory are presented.
These approaches do not necessarily exclude each other. One can propose a new model
in terms of a theory and show how other models can be embedded. Or, one can describe
properties in a theory and categorise existing IR models as to how they full the described
properties. In order to give the reader the essence of each approach, we discuss each of
them briey.
2.2.1 Embedding
In the case of embedding, dierent models are studied by mapping them to one model.
We give one typical example, namely the Inference Networks as proposed by Turtle &
Croft [143].
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In the approach of Turtle & Croft dierent models are studied by mapping them
to so-called inference networks. In an inference network retrieval model, retrieval is
viewed as an `evidential reasoning process in which multiple sources of evidence about
document and query content are combined to estimate the probability that a given
document matches a query' [143].
In an inference network retrieval model there are two directed, acyclic dependency
graphs (networks), that are connected with each other.
network
Document
Q
q3
t7
Query
network
q5
q2
t6
q1
d1
t1
t5
t2 t4
t8
q4
q6
d2 d3 d4
t3
Figure 2.2: Basic inference network.
There is one graph for the document-base representation and one for the query. In
the document network there are document nodes corresponding to abstract documents,
text representation nodes representing information items of the document, and concept
presentation nodes representing type information of the objects; the arrows in the doc-
ument network represent the dependency relations. The query network is an `inverted'
directed acyclic dependency graph with a single leaf that corresponds to the event that
an information need is met, and multiple roots that correspond to the concepts that
express the information need. The query concept nodes dene the mapping between
the concepts used to represent the document collection and the concepts that make up
the queries (the dotted line in Figure 2.2, shows where the mapping takes place). In
the simplest case, the query concepts are constrained to be the same as the representa-
tion concepts, and each query concept has exactly one parent representation node (for
instance, in Figure 2.2 the query node q
3
has as parent node t
7
). In a more advanced net-
work, the query concept may have more representation nodes (as depicted in Figure 2.2
where q
1
has as representation nodes t
5
and t
6
).
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By representing known models such as the boolean model, the vector-space model
and the probabilistic model in terms of this network model, the authors showed that
`dierences between current-generation retrieval models can be explained as dierent
ways of estimating probabilities in the inference network' [143]. By tuning or adjusting
the network they are aiming to achieve the best retrieval performance. These results
can then be used for proposing a new IR system. For instance, the INQUERY retrieval
system [31, 32] is a system based on the network model using the results from the
investigation of several dierent models.
2.2.2 Categorisation
One typical example of an evaluating process based on categorisation is the work of
Blair [19]. Blair proposes that, in order to improve information retrieval, a good theory
of document representation is needed which is primarily based on language and meaning.
In order to study dierent approaches for modelling information in information retrieval,
twelve principal formal models are dened. For example Blair's `Model 12' is presented
as follows:
Example 2.2 Model 12 (Weighted Thesaurus)
I. Requests are single terms.
II. Index assignments: a set of one or more descriptors.
III. Documents are either retrieved or not.
IV. Retrieval rule: the request descriptor is looked up in a thesaurus
(on-line) and semantically related descriptors above a given cut-off
value (weight) are added (disjunctively) to the request descriptor.
The cut-off value could be given by the inquirer.
After presenting a model, advantages and disadvantages are summed up. For instance,
one of the advantages of model 12 is that it provides the user with a list of terms which
are semantically related to those in the thesaurus, which is especially useful in systems
with uncontrolled vocabularies [19].
As mentioned in Section 2.1.4, Blair is one of the critics of an evaluation based on
statistical estimations only. The great expense of such evaluations (in time and cost)
may prevent them from being performed very often (such as the scheduling of TREC,
which covers almost a whole year!). Blair compares information retrieval to astronomy
and quantum physics where experiments are expensive but a theoretical formalism exists
that can be used to advance theoretical understanding of these disciplines independently
from empirical verication. Blair states:
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`Information retrieval would benet greatly from the development of a similar
theoretical formalism that would permit at least some of its advances to be
done independently from empirical validation.'
His book [19] is focused on the use of language and its representation. Our approach is
more directed towards the relevance decision. However we believe that both approaches
could be used in tandem in order to study IR models.
2.2.3 Meta-theory
In a meta-theoretical approach, information retrieval is viewed in terms of a theory T .
The model and its properties are formalised and explained in terms of the chosen theory.
Typically, there are two kinds of arguments for choosing a specic theory T . Firstly, with
theory T we should be able to formalise existing IR models. Secondly, some property
P which is shown to be very important for information retrieval purposes should be
well-covered by the theory T .
Next, we present the two main types of theories as used in information retrieval,
namely those based on probability theory and those based on logic.
Probability Theory One main direction in theoretical information retrieval research
is based on probability theory (for an overview of probabilistic IR models see [54]).
Typically, in a probabilistic retrieval model one estimates the probability that a user
decides that a document is relevant given a particular document and query, denoted as
P (Relevant j Document ;Query). Here, an information retrieval theory is centred around
the statistical uncertainty assumptions involved in information retrieval. At a meta-level
the information retrieval theory could be studied in terms of probability theory.
For instance Cooper [42, 44] inspects some probabilistic assumptions which have
consisted of various combinations of the three statistical independence assertions I1, I2
and I3 dened as follows:
I1. P (A;B) = P (A) P (B);
I2. P (A;B j R) = P (A j R) P (B j R);
I3. P (A;B j R) = P (A j R) P (B j R).
In these formulae A and B are properties of documents or users, depending on the
focus of the study. The character R denotes the event of relevance. Assumption I1
reects the assumption that A and B are independent, which is often assumed to be true
in information retrieval for document and information need properties. Assumptions I2
and I3 are adopted by probabilistic model developers [128]. In combination with well-
known properties of conditional probabilities, such as P (A j B) =
P (A;B)
P (B)
, or phrased
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dierently, P (A;B) = P (A j B)P (B), assertion I1 implies that properties A and B are
absolutely independent (P (A) = P (A j B) and P (B) = P (B j A)). Assertion I2 and I3
express that A and B are independent given relevance or its absence. Stated otherwise,
the fact that A is relevant does not inuence the fact that B is relevant and vice versa.
On a meta-level Cooper studies the contradiction of elementary laws of probability
theories in this information retrieval setting. For instance, using the binary independence
retrieval model [54], A is the occurrence of a specic document d and B the occurrence of
a specic query q. Then we estimate the probability that document d is judged relevant
with respect to query q. Let P (A) = P (B) = P (R) = 0:1 and P (R j A) = 0:5 and
P (R j B) = 0:5. We can calculate that P (A;B;R) > P (A;B)
5
which is in conict with
the assumption that a removal of an event always leads to an increase of the probability
value. To circumvent this kind of problem, Cooper [44] suggested a reformulation of the
underlying assumptions in terms of probability theory. Cooper concludes
`When this is done, some models are found to be not only dierent in character
but more realistic than had been supposed, for the true modelling assump-
tions are weaker and more plausible than the ones thought to be in force.'
A meta-theory based on probability theory inspects IR models in terms of their uncer-
tainty calculation. The probability calculus is the rst-class citizen of this approach.
For instance, one can analyse dierent relevance-functions in terms of a probabilistic
inference model as shown in the inference network of Turtle & Croft. Without proposing
a new model, Wong & Yao [145] showed that known models such as the boolean, fuzzy
set, vector-space, and probabilistic models are special cases of the probabilistic inference
models.
Logic The rst-class citizens of a logical theory are the inference process and the mod-
elling of information (for an overview of logical IR models see [85]). If a formula ' can be
inferred from a formula  in a logic L, this could imply that the information represented
by  is relevant with respect to the information represented by '. Cooper [41] originated
the logical approach by viewing a part of the relevance decision as a logical inference pro-
cess. Van Rijsbergen suggested that if we are able to infer relevance in a logical sense,
maybe a particular logic could be used for modelling information retrieval [123, 124]. In
a logical theory the study of IR models proceeds by inspecting the logical properties of
the retrieval process. One example of using logic in order to analyse information retrieval
is given by Chiaramella & Chevallet [35]. They study the semantics of the implication as
used in IR models such as the boolean model. In terms of the underlying model they are
5
According to Cooper, P (A;B) = P (A) P (B) = 0:01 and P (A;B;R) = P (A;B j R) P (R) =
P (A j R) P (B j R) P (R) =
P (RjA)P (RjB)P (A)P (B)
P (R)
= 0:025.
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able to propose some extensions based on their logical analysis. The authors conclude
that a logical approach `provides a better way of encompassing the fundamental aspects
of information retrieval' [35]. Their conclusion was based on the following three obser-
vations. Firstly, the expressive power of the logical model. Secondly, the new insights
gained from studying existing models in a logical setting. Lastly, the necessity of coping
with the fast change of information retrieval paradigms as presented in Chapter 1.
A theory could also be a combination of two theories, one covering property P very
well, the other property Q. For example, in the Logical Uncertainty Principle [124],
the combination of a logical and a probabilistic approach is presented. The Logical
Uncertainty Principle (which will be explained in more detail in Section 6.2) is founded
on the idea that, if an IR system cannot deduce that a document d is about a query q
given a logic L, we have to add information to the data set
6
until we can determine the
aboutness relation between the document and the query. The strength of aboutness can
be associated with the measure of uncertainty P (d about q) which is based on how much
information is added. For example, assume that d is indexed with a logical formula t
1
,
and that aboutness is dened in terms of classical logic, i.e., if ` d!q then d about q.
Then we cannot derive that d is about t
1
^ t
2
. In this particular case we have to add t
2
to d in order to derive aboutness. Applying the Logical Uncertainty Principle one could
for instance calculate the uncertainty of t
2
in order to measure P (d about t
1
^ t
2
).
A typical example of a model that combines a logical and probabilistic approach is
shown in the article `Towards a Probabilistic Modal Logic for semantic-based Information
Retrieval' by Nie [108]. Here he presents an integration of semantic inference (based
on a Possible World semantics) and probabilistic measurement based on the Logical
Uncertainty Principle.
2.2.4 Theory performance
Various information retrieval experiments have now been around for some time. So far
dierent kinds of experiments have been proposed to determine which retrieval rules are
most eective in a general theory.
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, every IR model can be viewed as a theory of relevance,
or as Turtle & Croft [143] state it, `every information system has, either explicitly or
implicitly, an associated theory of information access and a set of assumptions that
underlie that theory'.
Any proposed IR model is in fact a proposal for a theory of aboutness or relevance
between information representatives. The question arises as to how to build a theory for
6
Van Rijsbergen is not explicit about what we could understand by the concept of a data set. It could
be a document d, a query q, or a consulted knowledge-base.
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eective information retrieval and, even more importantly, when is one theory preferable
over another theory? Hawking [64] denes a good theory as follows:
`A theory is good if it satises two requirements: it must accurately describe
a large class of observations on the basis of a model that contains only a few
arbitrary elements, and it must make denite predictions about the results
of future observations.'
Adopting this description we come to the conclusion that a good information retrieval
theory should describe relevance decisions in a cognitively acceptable way. It should also
present predictions about what happens, for example, if we extend the document-base or
change the representations. With the theory in hand, we should also be able to underpin
some existing assumptions and hypotheses. For example,
 Information Retrieval is an inference or evidential reasoning process in which we
estimate the probability that a user's information need, expressed as one or more
queries, is met where a document is taken as `evidence' (Turtle & Croft [143]).
 We knew that within a single system, it was not possible to improve both the recall
and the precision ratio simultaneously, but it was hypothesised that there would
be some combination of recall and precision devices which would give optimum
performance (Cleverdon [37]).
Our guideline in the comparison of information retrieval theories is the work of the
philosopher Popper [117, 118, 119]. In his work Popper proposed a way of developing,
and particularly comparing, scientic theories. We believe that in order to analyse,
compare, and improve dierent information retrieval theories a meta-theory is needed.
Popper discussed a general meta-theoretical approach in order to avoid experimental
problems. The reason is that the experimental approach eventually leads to the problem
of induction, which he calls Hume's logical problem of induction [117] and which can
be described with the following statements L
1
;L
2
and L
3
:
L
1
: Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true be justied by
`empirical reasons', that is, by assuming the truth of certain test statements
or observation statements (which are `based on experience')?
In terms of information retrieval, can the experiments mentioned in this chapter, such as
the recall and precision measures of a TREC-collection, prove the goodness of a certain
IR model?
L
2
: Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true or that it
is false be justied by `empirical reasons', that is, can the assumption of the
truth of test statements justify either the claim that a universal theory is true
or the claim that it is false?
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Stated in terms of information retrieval: can experiments prove that a certain IR model
is inadequate?
L
3
: Can a preference, with respect to truth or falsity, for some competing
universal theories over others ever be justied by such `empirical reasons'?
Or in terms of information retrieval: can IR models be ordered according to their results
of experiments?
With the experimental approach the IR models can indeed be ordered according to
their results. However, they are only ordered according to their success and not according
to their failure. To clarify this point, consider the following example.
Example 2.3 Assume we want to test the IR models A and B, given a test-collection
D. Let the test-query be `Flying objects without wings'. Let us denote the documents
returned by model A and model B by Ret
A
and Ret
B
respectively. Then model A has
a better recall if and only if j Ret
A
\ Rel
user
j>j Ret
B
\ Rel
user
j. Stated dierently,
the results conforming to the user's relevance decisions are compared. Using Popper's
argumentation it is also (and probably even more) interesting to compare Ret
A
nRel
user
with Ret
B
nRel
user
. If, for example, model A assumes `Planes with wings' relevant and
model B does not, the theory behind B could be preferred over the one behind A.
In his work, Popper questioned the validity of proofs by induction for theories. The
problem of induction is best formulated in his book `The myth of the framework' [119],
where he gives the following two theses:
 All scientic knowledge is hypothetical or conjectural,
 The growth of scientic knowledge consists of learning from our mistakes.
The failure of an IR model in fullling certain requirements will possibly lead towards
a better IR model. If we want to build a `good' or more accurately a `better' IR model,
Popper suggests thirteen steps, which we present in an information retrieval setting
7
.
Here, the theory we are searching for is a theory that explains when information in a
document d is relevant given a request q.
Step 1 It only makes sense to compare competing theories; that is, information retrieval
theories which are oered as solutions to the relevance decision.
Step 2 If we want to create an information retrieval theory we should not only be inter-
ested in the truth of `d is relevant with respect to q', but also in the condition for
its falsity because nding that `d is relevant with respect to q' is false is the same
as nding that its negation is true (it is not the case that `d is relevant with respect
7
For Popper's original presentation see [117] pages 13{17.
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to q'). However we cannot straightforwardly apply a Closed World assumption on
an explanatory theory, since the negation of an explanatory theory is not, in its
turn, an explanatory theory.
Step 3 We have to search for those cases where a theory breaks down, and not create
a new theory that succeeds where its refuted predecessor succeeds, and that also
succeeds where its predecessor failed, that is, where it was refuted. If the new
theory succeeds in both cases, it will at any rate be more successful and therefore
`better' than the old one. For instance, consider an information retrieval theory
that is improved in such a way that it recognises the dierence between `information
systems' and `system information', where the old theory did not, while the rest of
the theory remains the same. Now, under the assumption that this recognition
is an improvement for information retrieval, we can state that the new theory is
`better' than the old one.
Step 4 If the new theory can handle the problem of the old theory well, and it does not
break down in a particular case where the old model broke down, it will be a better
explanatory theory.
Step 5 Now we have to search for new cases where the theory can break down, or stated
dierently, where the decision `d is relevant with respect to q', fails in the real world
but not in the theory.
Step 6 Of course there are several new theories that could handle the break-down case
of the old theory, but many of them may be false. The theoretician will therefore
try her best to detect any false theory among the set of non-refuted competitors;
she will try to `catch' it. That is, she will, with respect to any given non-refuted
theory, try to think of cases or situations in which theory and reality do not agree.
Thus she will try to construct severe tests, and critical test situations.
Step 7 By this method of elimination, one may hit upon a true information retrieval
theory. However it is not possible to state that this theory is true, that is, that
it is the real theory of relevance. The number of possibly true theories remains
innite, at any time and after any number of crucial tests. Maybe among theories
actually proposed there is more than one which is not refuted at time t, so that
we may not know which of these we ought to prefer. But if at a time t a plurality
of theories continues to compete in this way, the theoretician will try to discover
how crucial experiments can be designed between them; that is, experiments which
could falsify and thus eliminate some of the competing theories. As pointed out in
Section 2.1.3, the main goal of TREC can be viewed as the execution of step 7.
30 Chapter 2. Approaches for studying information retrieval
Step 8 The procedure described may lead to a set of information retrieval theories.
For, although we demand from a new theory that it solves those problems which
it predecessor solved and those which it failed to solve, it may of course always
happen that two or more new competing theories are proposed such that each of
them satises these demands and in addition solves more problems than the others.
Step 9 At any time, we are especially interested in nding the best testable of the
competing theories in order to submit it to new tests. This will be, at the same
time, the one with the greatest information content and the greatest explanatory
power. It will be the theory most worthy of being submitted to new tests, in brief
it will be `the best' of the theories competing at time t. If it survives its tests, it
will also be the best tested of all the theories considered so far, including all its
predecessors.
Step 10 We should take care that our information retrieval theory is not ad hoc, and
not create a theory that can only handle particular tests. For instance, consider
a test-collection where a large number of the documents is about animals. If we
consider in our IR system a descendant system of animals for this specic test
we probably obtain a good performance. However this result is dependent on the
test-collection.
Step 11 Popper calls this method the critical method. It is a method of trial and the
elimination of errors, of proposing theories and submitting them to the severest
tests we can design.
Step 12 Unfortunately, nothing guarantees that for every theory which has been falsied
we can nd a `better' successor, or a better approximation{one that satises these
demands. There is no assurance that we will be able to make progress towards
better theories.
Step 13 The relation between test statements and information retrieval theories may
not be as clearcut as is assumed here; or the test statements themselves may be
criticised (see Section 2.1.4: this is exactly what happened with the information
retrieval test-collections). This is the type of problem which always arises if we
wish to apply pure logic to any real world situation. In connection with science it
leads to what Popper called methodological rules, the rules of critical discussion.
The other point is that these rules may be regarded as subject to the general aim
of rational discussion, which is to get nearer to the truth.
Ending with Popper's last point, it becomes clear that information retrieval tests and
information retrieval theories should be developed in tandem. The continuous search for
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a `better' successor of an information retrieval theory is what we call theory performance.
Theory performance is only possible if one has suitable tests to inspect and perform the
theory at one's disposal. Above all, an information retrieval test is only worth considering
it if it leads to a better information retrieval theory. The only choice we have to make
is which formal tool we are going to use to present the theory. This choice will be made
in the next section.
2.3 Situation Theory
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one can divide an information model into two parts, namely
the information representation and the matching process. The rst part, in its turn,
can be divided into document- and query-representations. The formal tool we propose
for modelling this kind of information is Situation Theory [2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 39, 49]. For
the matching process we present a new formal tool based on the representations of
information and a logical view of an aboutness proof system in the next chapter.
The reasons for choosing Situation Theory as the ultimate theory for representing
information as it occurs in information retrieval are discussed at length in the work of
Lalmas [82, 83, 84, 85] and Lalmas & Van Rijsbergen [86, 87, 127]. The approach taken
in this thesis diers from theirs in the sense that we view Situation Theory not as a
tool to drive information retrieval but as a vehicle to analyse theoretical properties of
information retrieval mechanisms. However, we share with them the conviction that
Situation Theory presents many characteristics that are both adequate and appropriate
for the study of information retrieval. We give a brief overview of the reasons for our
conviction based on the article `Information Retrieval and Situation Theory' [69].
As opposed to classical logic, Situation Theory takes information as the basic, un-
derlying concept, not truth. For instance, a basic activity in classical logic, inference,
no longer concerns truth preservation in Situation Theory, but is a form of information
extraction and information processing. Situation theory nds its origin in an attempt of
Barwise & Perry to create a theory of meaning [10, 11].
In Situation Theory information is represented, not by its truth value but by its con-
tent. A representation of the information content of the document is required, that is,
what is the information carried by the document, instead of the question whether the
information holds in a document (as would be needed in truth predicates in classical-
logic-based frameworks). Moreover, if predicates were used to represent the information
in the document, many contradictions or intuitively unacceptable deductions could arise,
since it can happen that information in a document is by nature logically inconsistent
(`all animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others') or in a logical
sense meaningless (`to be or not to be'). Situation Theory allows us to represent infor-
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mation content. It states that the most important thing is the notion of information,
though its precise denition is still a problem.
In information retrieval the content of the complete document can not be represented
completely. Due to the fact that an indexing process cannot capture the broad variety
of language, some information in the document will not be recorded as a representative
of the document. We have to be careful not to assume that if some information is not
stored as a representative of a document this will imply that that the negation of the
information is inherent in the document. Therefore an information theory should handle
partiality in a natural way. Fortunately, Situation Theory does this: if a particular piece
of information is not present, then this does not mean in Situation Theory that this
information is false. It can be implicit, and some constraints can make one aware of this
information.
In most informational frameworks, information is basically represented syntactically.
Indeed, a syntax is often proposed that has nothing to do with information content, only
with its structure. A semantics is attached to this syntax so that it can model the infor-
mation content. In Situation Theory, however, the semantics is explicitly incorporated
as a rst-class citizen. There is no distinction between syntax and semantics. A syntax
is used so semantics can be expressed.
The use of Situation Theory to develop a meta-theory for information retrieval leads
us to a better understanding of the nature of information in information retrieval. Choos-
ing this theory we can also look at the nature of information for user modelling. A correct
representation of the user's intention certainly generates better retrieval. The attainment
of such a representation enters the area of Cognitive Science, some aspects of which can
be formally expressed with Situation Theory.
2.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we have presented two dierent possibilities for studying information
retrieval, namely an experimental one and a theoretical one. In the rst approach an
answer to an information retrieval research topic is validated by means of experiments.
In the latter approach the solution has to be proved based on a certain theory. In this
thesis the theoretical approach for studying information retrieval is chosen. Furthermore
we presented the ideas of Popper. Through his thirteen steps, Popper showed how the
validity or failure of proofs can possibly lead towards a better IR model. Finally, we
briey present the reasons for choosing Situation Theory to be the underlying theory of
information for our framework.
Chapter 3
The framework
What do we then but draw anew the model
In fewer oces, or at last desist
To build at all? Much more, in this great work,
Which is almost to pluck a kingdom down
And set another up, should we survey
The plot of situation and the model,
Consent upon a sure foundation,
Question surveyors, know our own estate.
W. Shakespeare, `Henry IV { part 2'.
In the introduction of this thesis, we stated that information retrieval concerns the
problem of retrieving from a given document-base those documents that are likely to be
relevant to a certain information need. In 1971, Cooper introduced an objective part of
the relevance relation termed logical relevance [41]. We call this relation aboutness.
The previous chapter introduced the reasons for developing a general framework for
studying the aboutness relation. In this chapter we propose such a framework, which
captures all concepts necessary to study aboutness as used in information retrieval.
Although there is no consensus about paradigms, and on what is considered infor-
mation retrieval and what is not, there seems to be general agreement that an IR model
can be decomposed into three components, namely:
 a model for the documents;
 a model for the queries;
 an aboutness relation between the two component models.
With this decomposition in mind, we develop a theoretical framework that can be used
to study each of the three components. Within this framework it is possible to exam-
ine dierent aboutness relations and study them inductively. Although it is possible
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to investigate the aboutness relation in isolation, it is also important to consider the
underlying document and query models. We start with document models and analyse
them from a situation-theoretic perspective. As it turns out, this framework oers the
freedom to explore issues relating to document models in a neutral setting.
If we want to study the aboutness relation in a meta-theory, we have to be clear on
the domain of the aboutness relation. Is it a relation between models and formulae? Is
the relation an association between a set of sentences and a sentence? What we need is
an information retrieval-theoretic study of aboutness. Probably, we will never be able
to completely formalise the aboutness decisions that humans are capable of, but the
study of aboutness can systematise our implicit understanding of this human aboutness
behaviour and clarify some of the underlying assumptions.
In our view, the aboutness relation is an association between types of information.
In this chapter we present a framework that allows us to study aboutness as such an
association (see [26, 67]). In Section 3.1 we present the basic concepts of Situation
Theory. Section 3.2 introduces the information retrieval representatives in terms of
an underlying framework. In Section 3.3 we formulate postulates that describe some
properties of aboutness as used in information retrieval. In addition to the aboutness
postulates, Section 3.3.2 presents some anti-aboutness postulates, which describe some
properties of the opposite of aboutness. In order to combine dierent IR models, some
postulates are proposed that describe several combinations. Section 3.4 concludes this
chapter with a brief summary.
3.1 Situation Theory
As mentioned in Chapter 2, our view on information is based on Situation Theory.
The situation theoretical approach starts with the work of Dretske [50] who presents a
philosophical view of information. In his words, there is a signal between the sender
and the receiver. The signal may have a meaning, that is, what the sender intended by
sending it. More importantly a signal always carries information, or as Dretske puts it:
`What information a signal carries is what it is capable of telling us truly, about another
state of aairs.' The extraction of the information carried by a signal is viewed as a
digitalisation process, i.e., `a conversion of information from analog to digital form'.
Analog information is considered to be information carried by the signal. An un-
specied agent perceives the signal, by way of some sensor, seeing, feeling, smelling,
hearing, etc. This stage is referred to as perception. The next stage, cognition, involves
the extraction of specic items of information from this perceived `continuum', i.e., the
conversion from analog to digital information.
Situation Theory, introduced in the early nineteen eighties, is a mathematical theory
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of information based on Dretske's view of information [2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 39, 49]. In Dretske's
terminology `a signal can carry the information that s is F ' (where s denotes some
item at the source and F an item of information). In Situation Theory `a signal carries
the information that a situation s supports the item of information F , or stated
otherwise, that situation s is of some type indicated by F '.
The primitives of Situation Theory are situations which stand for events, properties
and relations. Devlin [49] puts this as follows:
`the behaviour of people varies systematically according to the kind of situ-
ation they are faced with: threatening situations, spooky situations, pleas-
ant situations, challenging situations, conversation situations, and what-have-
you, all evoke quite dierent responses.'
In the theory, situations are partial descriptors of the real world. Situations can also be
elements of situations, standing in relation to each other and to other things.
The types of situations, originally named states of aairs and by Devlin [48] in-
troduced as infons, take the form of collections of basic facts. Infons are considered
as properties holding for situations. Information is not represented by the truth value
of the infons but by the truth value of the proposition `infon ' holds in situation S'.
The notion of holds in, often referred to as the support relation, is denoted as j=. For
instance, given an infon ' and a situation S, the proposition S j= ' means that the
information item ' holds in situation S, or stated dierently, that situation S supports
infon '.
A more formal denition of an infon is needed to work with. Devlin [49] dened the
notion of an infon as follows:
Denition 3.1 An infon is an item hhR,a
1
,. . . ,a
n
; iii that represents that the relation
R holds (if i = 1) or does not hold (if i = 0) between the objects a
1
,. . . ,a
n
.
The objects in this denition
1
include the following: individuals, such as `John', `ta-
ble', etc.; spatial locations, such as, `garden',`here', etc.; temporal locations, such as
`10am',`now', etc.; situations, some structured parts of the world as discussed before;
types, high order uniformities, for instance the situation types (see later); and parame-
ters, indeterminates in the denition that range over objects of the various types, denoted
by _p,_q, _p
1
,. . . , _p
n
.
The relation R is a uniform property that holds of, or links, the objects. The value
i is called the polarity of the infon. If the polarity is 1, we call the infon positive; it is
called negative otherwise.
1
Devlin's article `Infons and Types in an Information-Based Logic' [48] presents the denition of infons
and types in all detail.
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Let us illustrate these notions with an example. Consider the situation S presented
in the book entitled Julius Caesar by Shakespeare, in which Caesar dies. Any per-
son reading this part of the book is able to extract information from it, such as: `Who
killed Caesar?', `Where is Caesar killed?', etc. For instance if the reader understands
that `Brutus killed Caesar', this can be modelled by the infon hhKilled,Brutus,Caesar; 1ii.
The relation Killed holds between the individuals \Brutus" and \Caesar". The proposi-
tion S j= hhKilled,Brutus,Caesar; 1ii is true, it provides us with information about the
document. Reading this part of the document, one may argue that the situation also
supports the negative infon hhKilled,Caesar,Brutus; 0ii. It does not support the infon
hhKilled,Cain,Abel ;1ii, since this infon certainly cannot be perceived from the situation
S. Whether this infon holds or does not hold in general is of no importance: it does not
hold in situation S.
If one of the objects used in an infon is a parameter, it is called a parametric infon.
A parameter in an infon is used to express that a reference should be linked to an
arbitrary object. In order to extract information from the proposition S j= hhparametric
infonii, the parameters of the infon have to be instantiated. This process is referred to as
anchoring. For instance, the proposition S j= hhKilled,Brutus, _p; 1ii does not provide us
with information about S unless there is an anchor from _p to an individual (for example
\Caesar" or \Cleopatra"). So, only when _p is anchored to some specic person does the
proposition S j= hhKilled,Brutus, _p; 1ii provide us with information about the document.
For this reason Devlin views a parametric infon as a kind of `template' for an item of
information.
Obviously it is hard to formally decide whether some situation supports a given infon.
Above all it is dicult to represent all the infons that are supported by a situation.
In order to create a mathematical theory, Situation Theory distinguishes two types of
situations, namely real situations and abstract situations. A real situation is referring
to the real world, an abstract situation is a mathematical construct, consisting of a set
of infons.
The support relation for an abstract situation can easily be formulated, based on
set-theoretic membership:
Denition 3.2 The binary relation supports between an abstract situation S and an
infon ', denoted as j=, is dened by:
S j= ', ' 2 S
Types in Situation Theory are `higher order uniformities'
2
. Consider the two infons
hhKilled,Brutus,Caesar; 1ii and hhKilled,Brutus,Cleopatra; 1ii. These infons are essentially
2
For detailed information see [49], page 50.
3.2. Modelling information retrieval concepts using Situation Theory 37
describing a situation in which `Brutus killed someone'. The only dierence is whom is
killed by Brutus. For the two infons there is a unifying type, namely:
 = [S j S j= hhKilled,Brutus, _p; 1ii]
The higher-order uniformity presented, is that a situation S is of type  if and only if in
this situation `Brutus killed someone', that is, if and only if S j= hhKilled,Brutus, _p; 1ii
and _p can be anchored to some specic person. The type  is an example of a so-
called situation-type. In Situation Theory other so-called basic types are considered, for
example, the type of a temporal location, the type of a spatial location, etc. We refer
the reader to [48] for a complete and in-depth presentation of types as used in Situation
Theory.
In the following section we model the information retrieval concept of information
in terms of Situation Theory. An attentive reader might wonder to what extent the
rest of this thesis depends on our choice of Situation Theory. One might for instance
suggest to use Possible World Semantics as the basis for a theory of information, rather
than the apparently more esoteric Situation Theory. We would like to emphasise that
the axiomatic (or logical) approach to aboutness which we present in Section 3.3 does
not depend on the choice of the representation of information. Furthermore, the choice
of another representation of information does not have to exclude our framework. We
are aware of the fact that several authors have inspected the relation between Situation
Theory and other (information) theories [12, 56, 133, 147]. For instance, Zalta [147]
answered the question whether Situation Theory and World Theory (such as Possible
World semantics) could peaceably coexist. Zalta proposed an assimilation of infons,
situations and worlds into a single axiomatic theory that distinguishes and comprehends
all three kinds of entity. In his theory twenty-ve theorems are proposed which are `basic,
reasonable principles that structure the domains of properties, relations, states of aairs
[infons], situations, and worlds in true and philosophically interesting ways'. Still, we
agree with the arguments given by the developers of Situation Theory, namely that an
information theory should model `information' rather than `truth'.
3.2 Modelling information retrieval concepts using Situa-
tion Theory
In our framework, the sender of the signal that carries information could be viewed as an
author who wants to inform the reader (as the receiver) in some way or another. Here,
the signal that carries information is termed a document, be it a book, a movie, pictures,
etc. In documents, various situations are present. In order to have a running example
at our disposal we present a small document.
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Example 3.1 Consider the following document: `The Sioux defeated General Custer's
cavalry at Little Big Horn in 1876. Nobody knows what really happened in the battle.
Some historians believe that the Sioux heavily outnumbered Custer's men.'
Reading this document, we are able to individuate several items of information. More
specic, every reader can individuate (perceive) dierent items of information. Some
might say that this document is best represented by the information item \battle", others
would say that the best representative information item should be \Sioux".
We propose that in the scope of information retrieval the perception of a reader or
agent takes place by a special variant of the sensor seeing, namely reading. The digitali-
sation of information takes place by the representation of documents into representative
information items. In practice, the agent is a computerised indexing system.
The process of indexing involves a huge loss of information. One of the reasons is that
the digitalisation of information takes place in terms of a representation language that
cannot capture the broad variety of information for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 1.
So far, no mention has been made of queries. A query is a request for information,
by means of which the user supplies the information items that supposedly represent
the information she is interested in suciently closely. As a query can thus be seen as
a set of information items, we do not distinguish the information corresponding to an
information need and the information in a document.
Using a representation language one can represent representative information items
inherent in a document as a set of descriptors or, in Situation Theory, infons. A re-
presentation of the document consists of a set of descriptors. These descriptors can be
almost anything, for instance, keywords, boolean formulae, conceptual graphs, photo's,
noun phrases, etc. One can see the representation of a book as an abstract situation,
constructed from the real situations presented in the book.
Since we attempt to dene a formal framework for information retrieval, we focus on
the mathematical representation of situations, or stated dierently, on abstract situa-
tions. What is needed are infons suitable to model the information retrieval descriptors
of dierent representation languages. First we introduce a specic kind of infons, the
profons.
3.2.1 Profons
Keywords play a pivotal role in the majority of representation languages. In ecient
algorithms which automatically index keywords from the document one often uses repre-
sentation languages that contain only keywords descriptors. As a result, the relationships
in which the keywords stood are not included. Restoring and detecting these relation-
ships automatically and eciently is an arduous task. The ability to deal with (and thus
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to index) large document collections is seen by many researchers as the ultimate goal for
information retrieval. The majority of the IR models, for instance, the probabilistic and
vector-space ones, use the keyword characterisation of information for their aboutness
decision.
Using keywords to model information results in very simple infons. In a sense,
keyword-based infons can be considered `sub-informational' particles, just as protons
are to atoms. For this reason we introduce the term profon [67]. Profons are infons
based on an unspecied unary relation. This relation (denoted with I) reects the fact
that all knowledge of the relations that the keyword was part of is abandoned. If a doc-
ument d is represented by the keyword \Sioux", one may conclude that the information
conveyed by \Sioux" is inherent, or holds in, document d.
In our framework, profons are intended to capture the basic information items
present in a document. These basic information items can be much more than just
keywords, for instance they can be noun phrases. Thus, the item \Little Big Horn" is
considered to be a basic information item and hhI,Little Big Horn; 1ii is the corresponding
profon. Throughout this thesis the set T is used to denote a nite set of basic information
items ft
1
; : : : ; t
n
g. By putting basic information items into Situation Theory terminology,
we can now formally introduce the notion of profon.
Denition 3.3 The language P(T ) of profons is dened by:
P(T ) =
def
fhhI,t; jii j t 2 T ; j 2 f0; 1gg:
Typical elements of P(T ) will be denoted as p; p
1
; : : : ; p
n
. Representation languages
that contain only positive profons, i.e., profons with polarity 1, can be viewed as subsets
of P(T ). The full subset of positive profons is denoted by P
+
(T ) and consists of all
elements hhI,t; 1ii. Whenever the set T is understood we write P rather than P(T ).
For the sake of brevity, we denote positive profons without mentioning the relation and
polarity. For example, the profon hhI,Sioux; 1ii is denoted by hhSiouxii.
3.2.2 Infons
A feature of information items is that they can be manipulated to form more complex
information items. For example, two pieces of information can be combined to form a
new piece of information. The combination of two infons should result in an infon. So
far, we have only introduced profons. In order to model combined information items,
more complex infons are needed. The language I(P ;Rel ;Prm) which is the language of
infons, is dened as follows:
Denition 3.4 Let P be the profon language as in Denition 3.3, Rel a nite set of
relations and Prm a set of parameters. The language I(P ;Rel ;Prm) of infons is dened
to be the smallest superset of P such that
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 If a
1
; : : : ; a
n
2 I(P ;Rel ;Prm) [ Prm and R 2 Rel is a n-place relation then
hhR,a
1
,. . . ,a
n
; 1ii 2 I(P ;Rel ;Prm) and hhR,a
1
,. . . ,a
n
; 0ii 2 I(P ;Rel ;Prm)
for any n 2 IN with n > 0.
Typical elements of I(P ;Rel ;Prm) will be denoted as ';  ;  
1
; : : : ;  
n
. Whenever the
sets T , Rel and Prm are understood we write I rather than I(P ;Rel ;Prm). Devlin [49]
speaks of infons constructed from a given set of basic information items as compound
infons, as their existence is due to an information combination.
3.2.3 Relations
In information retrieval some indexing processes combine information items by bringing
them into a relationship, in order to describe the information content of a document
more precisely. Take, for example, the keywords \Custer" and \Adventures". These
can be combined to form the phrase \Custer's adventures" or \Adventures of Custer". In
the framework we can model such a compound information item through the infon
hhPossession,hhCusterii,hhAdventuresii; 1ii. This infon is the result of combining the
two profons hhCusterii and hhAdventuresii indicating that the profons are associated by
the relation Possession, drawn from a predened set of relations. This set of predened
relations can vary from language to language. The most common example is the set of
logical relations used in the boolean model.
Boolean relations
In the boolean model we have the logical connectives ^;_ and :. Given these connectives
we can dene the boolean infon language as follows:
Denition 3.5 The boolean infon language I
Bl
(T ) is the infon language I(P(T );
f^;_;:g; ;).
For example, the infon hh^,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii,hhSleepii; 1ii expresses the informa-
tional composition of the profons hhSiouxii, hhCavalryii and hhSleepii. Intuitively, this
compound infon describes the existence of information about the three given informa-
tion items in a situation, but this does not need to be directly related information.
For example, \The Sioux were hunting for food. The cavalry was sleeping" is a valid situation
supporting the compound infon. A more sophisticated indexing approach that conserves
the informational relatedness between information items can be found in Farradane's
relational indexing.
3.2. Modelling information retrieval concepts using Situation Theory 41
Farradane's relational indexing
In Farradane's work [51, 52] information is carried by a xed set of relationship types
over an underlying set of terms. It is based on the idea that much of the meaning
of information objects is encapsulated in the relationships between terms. Farradane
proposed a set of nine primitive relationship types through which any given term rela-
tionship could be classied (see Figure 3.1). He motivated his relationship types on the
basis of psychological thought mechanisms. In his relational indexing, trained indexers
(humans!) would take an object and classify the term relationships
3
.
Associative mechanisms
Awareness Temporary Fixed
Conceptualisation association association
Concurrent concept Concurrence Self-activity Association
Discriminatory
mechanisms Not-distinct concept Equivalence Dimensional Appurtenance
Distinct concept Distinctness Action Functional dependence
Figure 3.1: Farradane's nine relationship types.
We can construct a language of infons I
Far
(T ) in which the set of relations is given by
the nine relationship types of Farradane.
Denition 3.6 The Farradane relation infon language I
Far
(T ) is the infon language
I(P
+
(T ); fConcurrence, Equivalence, . . . , Functional dependenceg; ;).
For example, the infon hhConcurrence,hhCusterii,hhCavalryii; 1ii expresses that infor-
mation about \Custer" appears in the presence of information about \cavalry" (expressed
linguistically also as \Custer's cavalry"). Even though the infons in this language clearly
capture more of the content of an object than the profons presented so far, the disad-
vantage is that indexing has to be performed manually and is not driven by a formal
specication, which makes it hard to decide for example that a term is in Concurrence-
relation with another term.
Index expressions
In Bruza's work [23], a practical variant of Farradane's approach is proposed, the so-called
index expressions. An index expression consists of a number of terms, separated by means
3
For Farradane's detailed presentation and argumentation for choosing these relations see [51, 52].
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of connectors modelling the relationships between these terms. Terms are taken from
a given set T of terms and correspond to nouns, noun-qualifying adjectives and noun
phrases; connectors are taken from a set C of connectors and are basically restricted to
prepositions in addition with a so-called null connector  to express term-phrases such as
Little Big Horn. For example, the proposed connector set of Bruza contains the elements,
f, \about",\and", . . . , \with",\within",\without"g (for detailed information see [23]).
The advantage of this approach is that the indexing process can be performed auto-
matically (for details see [23]). The disadvantage is that one is not able to express the
similarity between the situations of the type \the murder of Caesar" and \Caesar's murder".
Denition 3.7 The index infon language I
Idx
(T ) is the infon language I(P
+
(T );
f,of,in,at,. . . ,aroundg; ;).
Given this index infon language, the infon hhin,hhBattleii,hh1876ii; 1ii expresses in-
formation about a \Battle in 1876".
So far we presented document descriptors as profons and infons. Next, we focus on
two other aspects relating to document descriptors, namely information containment
and preclusion.
3.2.4 Information containment
In information retrieval it can be of use to infer additional information, information that
is implicit in the infon that is given, in order to use it for the aboutness decision. We have
some underlying assumptions for the inference of information which depend on the IR
system under consideration. For instance, in the boolean system, we have that from the
proposition p^q it is possible to infer p or even p^q^:r if the Closed World assumption
is adopted. In this case the information inference is based on a logical deduction system.
In other models other inference rules are used. In the situated information retrieval
framework we also have the notion of information inference.
Commonly, in information retrieval, information inference is based on the notion of
information containment [26]. For instance, from the infon hh^,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 1ii
the profon hhSiouxii can be inferred, as the latter infon is informationally contained in
the former. According to Barwise & Etchemendy [8], infons can be partially ordered
with respect to information containment (denoted by !). In information theory it is
assumed that the relation ! is reexive ('!'), anti-symmetric (if ' 6=  , then at least
one of ' 6! or  6!'), and transitive (if '! and  ! then '!). This last property
is also referred to as the Xerox Principle, which originates from Dretske [50]).
The ordering with respect to information containment in our framework depends
on the information containment relation of the underlying IR model. For instance, in
boolean models  !' is dened by  ` '.
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The properties of the ! relation for the infons in the boolean infon language I
Bl
(T )
could be dened straightforwardly, for any  
j
an infon and 1  j  n and j  k as
follows:
hh^, 
1
,. . . , 
j
,. . . , 
n
; 1ii! 
j
!hh_, 
1
,. . . , 
j
,. . . , 
k
; 1ii:
For relations in other languages such as the Farradane infon language I
Far
(T ), things
are not that clear. Often hhR, 
1
,. . . , 
j
,. . . , 
n
; 1ii! 
j
holds for any 1  j  n, but it
depends on the denition of the underlying relation R.
3.2.5 Preclusion
Of course, not all infons can be meaningfully combined. The reason for this is that the
information present in the infons can be contradictory. In this case, infons ' and  are
said to preclude each other, denoted by '? . It is natural to assume that an infon with
polarity 1 precludes the same infon with polarity 0. The notion of information preclusion
is considered fundamental to a theory of information [89]. Seligman [135] considers the
preclusion relation as a `negative' constraint between information items
4
, in contrast
with the positive constraint !.
Preclusion is interesting for information retrieval because if it is known that two infons
preclude each other, then this may be used to determine aboutness
5
[26]. For example, if a
document is characterised with the infon hhdefeated,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 1ii and the as-
sumption is made that this infon precludes the infon hhdefeated,hhCavalryii,hhSiouxii; 1ii,
then we may be able to derive (for instance by default) that the document also contains
the information that hhdefeated,hhCavalryii,hhSiouxii; 0ii. Therefore this document can
be relevant for somebody who is looking for information about the fact that `The cavalry
did not defeat the Sioux'.
3.2.6 Situations
Infons constitute the lowest level of information granularity. At a higher level of granular-
ity we nd the abstract situations, or in information retrieval terminology, the document
representation and queries [67, 71].
We can combine abstract situations, which actually are sets of infons, with the normal
set operators \ and [. For example, an encyclopaedia can be viewed as a complicated
description of a diverse range of situations and is represented by the situation S
E
. This
situation S
E
consists of a union of unrelated situations. One situation S
F
may supports
the infon hhFranceii, which can be seen as the description given for the word \France".
4
Actually, Seligman considers the preclusion as a relation between types, rather than infons.
5
Or more precisely, non-aboutness.
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Another situation S
S
supports the infon hhSiouxii, the description of the \Sioux". The
situation S
E
is a union of S
F
and S
S
and all the other situations supporting the other
items of the encyclopedia.
However, sometimes it is necessary to put situations in relation with each other. By
way of illustration, consider two situations, one in which \Custer's cavalry was defeated"
and another in which \the Sioux defeated someone". It is possible to create new informa-
tion using these situations by stating that \the Sioux defeated Custer's cavalry". This is
based on the assumption that \Custer's cavalry" is the someone in the situation \the Sioux
defeated someone". This is an example of situation fusion, as the respective situations
are composed very tightly.
There are dierent ways to dene this kind of situation fusion. Situation fusion is
modelled by an operator which, given two situations S and T , results in a situation U
(denoted by ST = U). One way of dening situation fusion is to compose each infon
of the rst situation with all the infons of the second situation. Another denition can
be obtained by the composition of particular infons. For example, take the situation S =
fhhdefeated, _p, _q; 1ii; hhgroup,hhSiouxii, _p; 1iig and the situation T = f hhdefeated, _r, _s; 1ii,
hhgroup,hhCavalryii, _s; 1iig. If we want to make clear that \the Sioux defeated the cavalry",
we have to state that in the union of S and T the parameters _p and _r (respectively _q and
_s) are the same. Note that the same result can be achieved using a union-operator and a
correct choice of the parameters in both sets. The fusion process is based on semantical
information concerning the two infons of the two situations. Therefore this can hardly
be dened in general. In this thesis we will not use the notion of fusion since we will
be able to represent all situation combinations of the IR models presented in this thesis
using the union and intersection-operators.
A nal aspect of situations is the question when two situations can be considered to
be identical. As an abstract situation is represented as a set of infons, the meaning of
the situation does not depend on the order of the infons and thus situation equality is
essentially an instance of set equivalence. Set equivalence is denoted by . For situations
S and T the statement S  T intuitively means that the information of S is equal to
the information of T and vice versa. In case parameters are used we could say that
two situations are equivalent if and only if the two situations can be made textually
equivalent by renaming the parameters. Such a renaming is used in lambda calculus
and is called -conversion. Expressions that can be made textually equivalent are called
-convertible.
Our formalisation of information as used in information retrieval started with the pro-
fons to model basic information items and ended with situations to model the complete
document contents. Formally, the language S(I) which is the language of situations, is
dened as follows:
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Denition 3.8 Let I be the infon language as in Denition 3.4. The language S(I)
of situations is dened to be the powerset of I.
Typical elements of S(I) will be denoted as S; T; U; V; S
1
; : : : ; S
n
. Whenever the
language I is understood we write S rather than S(I).
3.3 The aboutness proof system
In order to create a platform for a discussion about aboutness decisions, we have to
make some explicit assumptions of aboutness. The rst of these is that aboutness can
be derived with some sort of logic.
Formally, we represent the aboutness relation between situations S and T with the
symbol S  T : intuitively S  T means that situation S is about situation T , and
S 6 T that situation S is not about situation T . In conformity with reality it is often
not immediately clear whether a situation S is about another situation T . We suggest
that aboutness can be more or less logically derived [71]. These logical derivations play
an important role both in information retrieval as well as in Situation Theory [8].
For instance, given the fact that S [ T is about S, we can derive that situation
fhhdefeated,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 1ii, hhfought,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 1iig is about the sit-
uation fhhdefeated,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 1iig. This kind of derivations are used to model
the aboutness decision of IR models. In most cases an aboutness relation can be described
by an eectively given set of axioms and rules. This is for instance the case for derivation
in classical proposition logic, but also for derivation in several modal logics [65]. First
we dene the language needed for the aboutness proof system.
Denition 3.9 For a given infon language I, the aboutness language L(I) of about-
ness formulae is the smallest set such that
 if ';  2 I then '! ,'? , 6!', '6? 2 L(I);
 if S; T 2 S(I) then S  T; S 6 T; S  T; S 6 T 2 L(I)
where S(I) is as in Denition 3.8.
Typical elements of L(I) will be denoted as 	;;
1
; : : : ;
k
. Whenever the language
I is understood we write L rather than L(I).
The denition of the aboutness proof system is the following.
Denition 3.10 An aboutness proof system is a triple A
ps
= hL;Ax ;Rulei, where:
 L is an aboutness language as in Denition 3.9;
 Ax is a decidable subset of L, the elements of which are called axioms;
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 Rule = fR
1
; : : : ; R
k
g is a nite set of rules of the form R(T
1
; : : : ; T
k
; T
k+1
) with for
each 1  i  k + 1; T
i
2 L. Here, T
1
; : : : ; T
k
are the premises of the rule and T
k+1
is the conclusion. We assume that each R
i
is decidable as a relation.
Note that we do not make any statement about how the derivation relation is being
determined by the proof system. For example, it is possible that this is analogous to the
classical logical derivation: an aboutness decision is derivable from another one if there
is a range of `intermediate' decisions, which are either an axiom or arise from previous
decisions by application of a rule. However, one can also think of another proof system.
It is for instance possible to consider a default theory (cf. [121]) as a proof system. In this
case the derivation relation is dened by being an element of an extension; this derivation
relation is in general not expressible in the way of the classical logical derivation relation.
Generally, this is the case for non-monotonic derivation relations [94].
In this thesis we assume that a proof of aboutness is a nite-length sequence of
aboutness formulae that are either axioms of the derivation system or conclusions of
rules applied to formulae that appear earlier in the sequence.
This aboutness proof system results in a suciently abstract framework in which the
inference mechanism of an arbitrary retrieval mechanism can be captured, and maps it
to inference between aboutness relation of situations.
If we build an aboutness proof systemA
ps
out of aboutness axioms and rules, theorems
will be aboutness assertions in the language L. These theorems are all elements of the
language L, which are provable in a given deduction systemA
ps
. Alternatively we express
that a theorem  is provable in system A
ps
as `
A
ps
. As mentioned, we are especially
interested in theorems of the form S  T , which we call Aboutness Theorems.
3.3.1 Reasoning with situation aboutness
In our theory aboutness is treated as a relation between situations. Therefore aboutness
is treated as a fundamental notion with regard to information. This diers from other
approaches [23, 84], in which aboutness can be expressed in terms of so-called information
containment. In this section a set of postulates is presented consisting of a series of axioms
and rules which establishes properties of the aboutness relation between situations. Note
that the axioms should not be interpreted as an absolute truth in all cases. We will see
later that some axioms are not universally valid but only hold within the context of
a particular retrieval system. This oers the possibility to compare retrieval systems
according to which axioms and rules they satisfy.
The intuitive interpretation of the rules is as usual in logical systems, i.e.,
A
B
means
that if A is valid in an IR model, then B is also valid.
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Basic postulates
The rst axiom, Reexivity, expresses that any situation is about itself. Reexivity seems
to be an inherent property of aboutness in many IR models.
Reexivity (Re)
S  S
Note that with this axiom we have that ; ;. Sometimes this is an undesirable prop-
erty, for instance, if one wants to exclude aboutness decisions involving an empty-set. In
order to avoid this kind of deductions one could adopt a special version of the Reexivity
axiom called Singleton Reexivity, which is dened as follows:
Singleton Reexivity (SR)
f'g f'g
An important rule in an aboutness proof system is the Transitivity rule. It states that if
S  T and T  U are concluded, then it is allowed to draw the conclusion that S  U .
If the aboutness decision is based on the existence of some overlap then Transitivity does
not hold: an overlap between S and T and between T and U does not imply that there
is an overlap between S and U . This kind of decisions occur in vector-space models. For
an information-theoretical approach we believe however, that the aboutness property
should include this rule.
Transitivity (Tr)
S  T T  U
S  U
A rule which can cause problems for a number of aboutness theorems is Symmetry.
Symmetry expresses the claim that there is no dierence between concluding that a sit-
uation S is about a situation T and concluding that a situation T is about a situation
S.
Symmetry (Sy)
S  T
T  S
In some retrieval systems, for example boolean retrieval, Symmetry is precluded by the
strict inference mechanism. As we will show in Chapter 4, coordination level matching
and vector-space models turn out to be symmetric. The symmetry property is primarily
intended to increase the number of aboutness theorems.
Two set-equivalent sets should have the same aboutness decisions. This requirement
is modelled with the following Set Equivalence rule:
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Set Equivalence (SE)
S  U S  T
T  U
S  T T  U
S  U
As one can see Set Equivalence contains two rules, namely Left Set Equivalence and
Right Set Equivalence. Both rules state that the aboutness derivation between two situ-
ations should depend on the meaning of the situations, not on their form. Given that
S [ T  T [ S holds, we can derive with this rule, for instance that, given S [ T  S,
it is allowed to conclude that T [ S  S.
The last basic rule we present is a good example of a property which should not hold
in general within the context of a particular model.
Euclid (Eu)
S  T S  U
T  U
The rule Euclid expresses that if S is about T and also about U , the conclusion T  U
can be derived. If an aboutness proof system satises this rule, some counterintuitive
aboutness derivations can be made.
Combination postulates
The term `monotonicity', which is frequently used with respect to proof systems in gen-
eral, stems here from the fact that aboutness is preserved under informational union. An
example of the Left Monotonic Union rule is the following. Let the situation fhhSiouxii;
hhCavalryiig be about fhhSiouxii; hhCavalryiig (for instance by using Reexivity), and
form a new situation by informationally uniting the rst situation with fhhBattleiig.
Left Monotonic Union allows us to conclude that this new situation is also about fhhSiouxii;
hhCavalryiig.
Left Monotonic Union (LMU)
S  T
S [ U  T
This monotonic rule needs some attention. Adding information leads only to more con-
clusions, never to a reduction of it. This implicitly means that extending the characteri-
sation of information will possibly make the system decide that there are more aboutness
derivations, but never less. At rst sight this does not look as an unreasonable prop-
erty. However, take for example the famous Tweety{Bird example. If we could make
the decision that Tweety, being a bird, can y, then there is no possibility to withdraw
this fact by adding information, for example that Tweety is a penguin. In Chapter 5 we
prove that if a model is based on only monotonic rules of this kind, then extending the
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representation of the documents will lead to a better recall. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
increasing recall generally leads to decreasing precision. Therefore we have to be careful
in adopting this rule without any restrictions.
The Left Monotonic Union can thus be an undesirable postulate. Often user preference
plays an important role in the way the addition of information preserves the aboutness
relation with the query [27, 28]. The acceptability of a deduction step depends on
what the user had in mind. Consider the following example: if a user is interested
in \water energy" and gives the query \water", then we can assume that with respect
to this particular need, \water mills" is about \water"; nonetheless, the conclusion that
\water pollution" is about \water" is not allowed. This kind of user preferences and their
non-monotonic behaviour can hardly be generalised. What we can do is formulate some
general guarded rules of the following form:
Guarded Left Union (GLU)
S  T Requirement
S [ U  T
This is the general formulation of what we call Guarded Left Union. The requirement is to
be replaced by a concrete constraint. In the case of Left Monotonic Union the constraint
is set to true or void.
We can now propose a list of possible postulates with a specic substitution for the
requirement. For instance the Cautious Monotonicity rule can be proposed. This rule has
it origin in the work of Kraus, Lehmann & Magidor [81]. In their work, the authors try
to capture the general notion of non-monotonic reasoning.
Cautious Monotonicity (CM)
S  T S  U
S [ U  T
This postulate states that the aboutness relation is not violated by adding to S all the
information S is about.
Another suggestion for a Guarded Left Union rule is the following:
Left Related Union (LRU)
S  T U  T
S [ U  T
In this case we have evidence that the situation we unite with S is also about T . Here,
we are only extending S with information that is known to be about T . In the next
paragraphs we see some more Guarded Left Union rules.
Rather than uniting information at the left side of the aboutness derivation we can
propose right variants. For instance, Right Monotonic Union:
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Right Monotonic Union (RMU)
S  T
S  T [ U
Instead of summing up all the possible variants, we look at a dierent class of postu-
lates. Rather than adding information we can propose rules that withdraw information
as a kind of generalisation. For instance, a situation fhhSiouxiig is a generalisation of a
situation fhhSiouxii; hhBattleii; hhCavalryiig. Similar to the previous Left Monotonic Union
rule we can suggest a rule which allows to withdraw any information item of the situation
and still keeps the aboutness relation between the two situations valid:
Right Weakening (RW)
S  T [ U
S  T
Following the above example, if a situation S is about fhhSiouxii; hhBattleii; hhCavalryiig,
it is also about fhhSiouxiig. In this case we can propose the same kind of guards as we
proposed with the Guarded Left Union rules.
At this point, we can dene similar postulates for the intersection. The intersection
of two situations can be viewed as a composition of two situations, and therefore we
refer to the following rules as composition rules. Due to their set-theoretical aspects,
composition rules have much in common with the union rules. Take for example the
right composition:
Composition (Cp)
S  T
S  T \ U
The composition property expresses that if a situation S is about a given situation T ,
aboutness is preserved under any composition of the situation T .
Note that with this rule one can derive that S is about ;. If, for some reasons, this
type of aboutness theorems should be avoided one could in certain cases
6
adopt the
Strict Composition rule instead of the Composition rule. This rule states that if S is about
T , then S is about the intersection of S and T .
Strict Composition (SC)
S  T
S  T \ S
The following Right Monotonic Decomposition rule clearly represents the idea that
adopting this rule it is allowed, given that situation S is about the intersection of situa-
tion T and the situation U , to infer that situation S is about situation T .
6
More precisely, in cases in which the property: if S  T then S \ T 6 ; holds.
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Right Monotonic Decomposition (RMD)
S  T \ U
S  T
For the combining postulates we only highlight one other interesting postulate, the
rule Context-Free Union.
Context-Free Union (CFU)
S  T S  U
S  T [ U
This rule states that when one can conclude that S  T and S  U , then one can
unite the information of T and U and conclude that S is about this union. Boolean
retrieval, for one, is founded on this postulate. For example, if a document d is about
fhhSiouxiig and the same document is about fhhCavalryiig, it is assumed that d is about
fhhSiouxii; hhCavalryiig. In this case we have to be sure that we are not able to draw more
information from the situation fhhSiouxii; hhCavalryiig than the fact that both keywords
are present in the document. It is for instance not allowed to assume that there exists a
relation between \Sioux" and \cavalry".
The Cut rule is common in logical systems in order to extend the deduction possibil-
ities:
Cut (Cu)
S [ T  U S  T
S  U
Assume that we want to prove that S is about U and we already know that S is about
T . Adopting this rule implies that for obtaining the derived conclusion it is enough to
prove that S [ T is about U .
Infon-based postulates
So far we proposed postulates without taking into account the properties of the infons.
However the relation ! (information containment) may be useful for the aboutness
decision. The following rule claims that all rules valid for the information containment
are valid for the information aboutness:
Containment (Cm)
'! 
f'g f g
We can propose an extra premise of the Containment rule in order to extent the
situations which are about each other.
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Union Containment (UC)
'! S [ f g T
S [ f'g T
This rule expresses the fact that if situation S
0
is about situation T , with  2 S
0
and it
is given that '! , then we can `replace' the infon  with ' in S
0
without loosing its
being about situation T .
The use of the preclusion relation between infons can be proposed for a restricted
version of the monotonic union. For instance, if it can be established that if a situation
S is about a situation T , then adding an infon ' to the situation S and an infon  to the
situation T will not violate this, provided no preclusion between ' and  is apparent.
Compositional Monotonicity (CM)
S  T '6? 
S [ f'g T [ f g
Obviously we can use the information containment and preclusion relations as a guard
for the combination postulates. For instance, in the case of Guarded Left Union rules, the
guard restricts the situation that could be added to the situation on the left side of the
aboutness. Guarded Union Containment, for example, states that it is only possible to
add infons (representing singleton situations) which are informationally contained in the
original situation on the left side. Unfortunately our language does not have the ability
to express the requirement that ' 2 S, in order to express that '! for some ' 2 S.
Therefore we suggest:
Guarded Union Containment (GUC)
'! S [ f'g T
S [ f'g [ f g T
We can also adopt rules to axiomatise the notion of preclusion. For instance the
following rule is proposed by Seligman [135]:
Mutual Preclusion (MP)
'? 
 ?'
Seligman noticed that the meaning of preclusion in English is slightly dierent. However,
adopting this rule in order to propose a symmetric preclusion would not be problematic.
The relation of certain infons can also play a role in the aboutness derivation. For
instance, the logical connective _ of the boolean infon language may be important. Here
we could propose a rule stating that, if S  f'g then also S  fhh_,', ; 1iig.
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R-Right Monotonic Composition (R-RMC)
S  f'g
S  fhhR,', ; 1iig
Thus, in case the rule involves the connective _ the rule is called the _-Right Monotonic
Composition rule.
3.3.2 Reasoning with situation anti-aboutness
As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is useful to study the cases in which a theory is refuted. Or
stated dierently, when aboutness should not be derived. For this reason we introduce
the anti-aboutness relation. As we explained with Example 2.3 at page 28, a model
that returns `Planes with wings' given a query `Flying objects without wings' could be
improved if we have properly dened the notion of anti-aboutness.
In our opinion, an IR model should not only be good in determining aboutness,
but also in distinguishing the anti-aboutness relations. To forestall confusion, the anti-
aboutness relation expresses that two situations are each other's opposite and not that
two situations are not about each other. As we believe that these two relations are not
equivalent it should be noted that, if we are not able to prove aboutness, this does not
imply that we proved anti-aboutness.
Example 3.2 Take for example the following three situations:
S = fhhdefeated,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 1iig
T = fhhdefeated,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 0iig
U = fhhkilled,hhBrutusii,hhCaesarii; 1iig
If one is interested in a situation V = fhhdefeated,hhSiouxii,hhCavalryii; 1iig, we can
intuitively construct the following table:
about V anti-about V
S Yes No
T No Yes
U No No
Now, there is a dierence between the situations T and U with respect to the situation
V . An IR model that considers the situations S and U as being about situation V should
in our opinion be preferred over an IR model that considers the situations S and T to
be about situation V , since the errors of the retrieved set of the latter model will be
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more confusing to the user than the errors of the former. Any user would recognise the
document corresponding to situation U immediately as not relevant and therefore this
document is more harmless than if the document corresponding to situation T is showed
to the user. In this case, she needs to inspect it more closely in order to recognise that
the retrieved document is denitely not what she was interested in.
So, we propose a new relation for our language. The relation anti-aboutness (denoted
by  ) expresses the fact that a situation S is in conict with a situation T , denoted
by S T .
Denition 3.11 For a given infon language I, the extended aboutness language
L
Ext
(I) of aboutness formulae is the smallest superset of the aboutness language L(I)
such that
 if S; T 2 S(I) then S T; S6 T 2 L
Ext
(I)
where L(I) and S(I) are as in Denition 3.9.
Whenever the language I is understood we write L
Ext
rather than L
Ext
(I).
One possibly desirable property will be that it is impossible to deduce aboutness
and anti-aboutness at the same time. An aboutness proof system that precludes such
possibilities is termed consistent:
Denition 3.12 An aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL
Ext
;Ax ;Rulei is called consistent
if and only if there are no S and T in S such that
`
A
ps
S  T and `
A
ps
S T:
In case an aboutness proof system is not consistent, it is termed inconsistent.
If one wants to adopt a simple denition of anti-aboutness the following rule could
be adopted:
Simple Anti-Aboutness (SAA)
S 6 T
S T
Here the, in our opinion wrong, assumption has been made that if we are not able to
prove aboutness this implies that we proved anti-aboutness.
Example 3.2 showed us that the preclusion operator can be of great help for deter-
mining anti-aboutness:
Preclusion (Pr)
'? 
f'g f g
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If information items preclude each other, then it does not seem unreasonable to
assume that the situations that support only these particular infons are anti-about each
other. Applications of this assumption can be readily found in information retrieval.
Another use of preclusion as a premise of a rule that we would like to mention explicitly
is the one Seligman termed local preclusion [135]. In terms of our framework the rule
could be presented as:
Local Preclusion (LP)
S  f'g '? 
S f g
If a situation is anti-about fhhSiouxiig, then it is likely to assume that the situation
is anti-aboutfhhSiouxii; hhCavalryiig (as we are already convinced that the information of
S is anti-about the \Sioux", how could the information of S be about the \Sioux" and
\cavalry"?). This is the intuition behind the so-called Negation Rationale.
Negation Rationale (NR)
S T
S T [ U
If a situation is anti-about another situation, then no aboutness relation can be estab-
lished by adding information to the conclusion. This postulate stands in close relation
with the non-monotonicity behaviour. In order to create only consistent aboutness proof
systems, we have to be careful to adopt this rule together with the Right Monotonic Union
rule. For instance, the following proposition presents an inconsistent aboutness proof
system.
Proposition 3.1 The aboutness proof system A
ps
dened by hL
Ext
; fS  U; S Tg;
fSet Equivalence;Right Monotonic Union;Negation Rationalegi is inconsistent.
Proof Given the axiom S  U , using the Right Monotonic Union rule, we can derive
S  T [ U . At the same time, given the axiom S T , applying the rule Negation
Rationale the formula S U [ T can be derived. With the Set Equivalence rule, we can
determine that S  U [ T and S U [ T , which proves the inconsistency.

In order to avoid such kind of problems, we introduce the rule Cautious Negation Rationale,
which is formulated as follows:
Cautious Negation Rationale (CNR)
S T S 6 U
S T [ U
Given that situation S is anti-about situation T , this rule only allows us to extend the
anti-aboutness conclusion to the fact that situation S is anti-about situation T [ U if it
is not possible to prove that the situation S is about U .
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3.3.3 Combining aboutness proof systems
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the information retrieval problem also concerns the prob-
lem of having information available at dierent places. In the old information re-
trieval paradigm there was a one-to-one correspondence between a user and a document-
collection. Nowadays, the information retrieval problem is a matter of a many-to-many
relation, as dierent kinds of users are searching for information in dierent information
domains, possibly stretched out over the globe.
This brings in a new requirement which concerns the possibility of combining dierent
IR models in order to create a new IR model. A combination can only be justied if we
have a deep insight in the eectiveness of the proposed combination. In this section we
present a study of the combination of aboutness proof systems in terms of the framework.
In order to formalise an aboutness proof system that can use dierent aboutness-
notions, a kind of combined aboutness language is needed. This language should present
a combination of several dierent aboutness languages. We use the relation X
i
to refer to
the relation X of aboutness language i for all X 2 f!;?; 6!; 6?;  ; 6 g. For instance,
combining two aboutness languages we may have the two aboutness relations  
1
and
 
2
as elements of the combined aboutness language.
A more formal denition of a combined aboutness language is given as follows:
Denition 3.13 For a given infon language I, the combined aboutness language
L
n
(I) of aboutness formulae is the smallest set such that
 if ';  2 I then '!
i
 ,'?
i
 , 6!
i
', '6?
i
 2 L
n
(I)
 if S; T 2 S(I) then S  
i
T; S 6 
i
T; S 
i
T; S 6
i
T 2 L
n
(I)
where S(I) is as in Denition 3.8 and i 2 IN with 1  i  n.
Whenever the language I is understood we write L
n
rather than L
n
(I). For the sake
of brevity, we will not introduce the extended combined aboutness language L
Ext
n
(I)
(or L
Ext
n
for short); its denition proceeds in a similar way.
An aboutness proof system using the language L
n
(or L
Ext
n
) presents n dierent
notions of aboutness (respectively notions of anti-aboutness). We will term such a proof
system a combined aboutness proof system. Theorems of the form S  
k
T are called
Aboutness Theorems of k.
The rst rule in an extended language one may think of is that all aboutness theorems
of i are aboutness theorems of j. This aboutness meta-property is included in the
following rule.
Aboutness Inheritance (AI)
S  
i
T
S  
j
T
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Another typical example of a rule in a language L
Ext
n
is the Closed World Assump-
tion as introduced by Reiter [120]:
Closed World Assumption (CWA)
S 
i
f'g '?
j
 
S  
j
f g
Given that S is anti-about f'g in terms of aboutness proof system i and in aboutness
proof system j the axiom '? is present, it follows that S is about f g in proof system
j. This rule is typically used in databases. Normally, in databases only positive facts are
recorded. If a fact is not recorded, one may assume that the opposite of the fact holds.
As we will see in Chapter 4, some IR models adopt this rule (see also [67, 71]). Using
the same arguments that were used to question the denition of anti-aboutness in terms
of not about, the usefulness of this CWA rule can be questioned.
3.3.4 Information retrieval agents
Instead of proposing new rules, we can use a combined aboutness proof system to for-
malise the concepts of the new information retrieval paradigm as presented at page 8.
In this paradigm, there is no general search strategy, due to dierent kinds of users and
dierent kinds of search-actions (e.g., searching for general information or for detailed
information). Another point is that a search for information consists of dierent kinds of
searches on a broad range of information collections. It is not surprising that when trying
to meet these new requirements one looks at approaches that have taken root in AI. The
motivation that rational agents can be used as atomic IR systems, with the ability to
reason, communicate, and gather information is proposed by several authors [33, 70, 91].
Van Linder [90] has recently presented a rst attempt at a formalisation of information
agents. Our approach is based on similar ideas. The formalisation in modal logic [70, 72]
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Based on the intuitive ideas in the thesis of Van Linder, we consider rational agents
with the ability to reason, communicate, and gather information. We recognise two
types of agents, the retrievers and the users. The retriever agents decide whether a
document is about (or anti-about) a query. Since we are not adopting a Closed World
denition, where anti-aboutness would simply be dened to be the absence of aboutness,
the retriever agents can decide whether a document representation is anti-about to a
query.
In terms of our framework we can easily formulate an agent as an element of a
combined proof system. These agents have the ability to conclude whether a document
is about (or anti-about) a query.
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Given an aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL
Ext
n
;Ax ;Rulei, we dene k retriever agents
and l user agents with k + l = n. Each retriever agent represents a unique concept of
aboutness, for instance the one of a vector-space model or a boolean model. For the rest
of this section let us assume that we have dened k retriever agents, denoted as r
i
with
1  i  k, and a corresponding aboutness decision  
r
i
and anti-aboutness decision
 
r
i
for each of them.
The communication and information gathering is done by the so-called user agents.
In reality dierent users have dierent concepts of aboutness. We can also distinguish
dierent kinds of user agents in the way they conclude aboutness given the retrieval
results obtained by the retriever agents.
The rst user u
1
we can think of is a typical user, who is satised with a document
if at least one retriever states that the document is about the query.
Typical User (TU)
S  
r
1
T
S  
u
1
T
. . .
S  
r
k
T
S  
u
1
T
The second type of user u
2
is more like a lawyer, who is preparing a case, and therefore
considers a document about a query if none of the retrievers consider the document anti-
about the query. So, this user is sure not to forget some material which could possibly
be relevant.
Lawyer (La)
S6 
r
1
T : : : S6 
r
k
T
S  
u
2
T
The third user u
3
is a more careful one, and considers a document to be about a
query if one of the retriever agents considers it about the query while the others do not
consider it to be anti-about the query.
Careful User (CU)
S6 
r
1
T : : : S6 
r
i 1
T S  
r
i
T S6 
r
i+1
T : : : S6 
r
k
T
S  
u
3
T
The last user u
4
we present is a very careful one, which is satised with a document
if all retriever agents state that the document is about the query. So, this user requires
a complete agreement upon the aboutness decision.
Unanimous User (UU)
S  
r
1
T : : : S  
r
k
T
S  
u
4
T
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Some possible properties of the retriever agents with respect to the user agents can
be dened.
Denition 3.14 A combined aboutness proof system A
ps
is called empty with respect
to a user agent u
i
if there are no situations S and T 2 S such that `
A
ps
S  
u
i
T .
Denition 3.15 A combined aboutness proof system A
ps
is called overfull with respect
to a user agent u
i
if for all situations S and T 2 S holds that `
A
ps
S  
u
i
T .
Note that, the aboutness decision of an unanimous user is more strict in the sense
of aboutness than the one of a typical user. If we know that a document d
1
is about
query q for an unanimous user and d
2
is about query q for a typical user and not for an
unanimous user, we can draw the conclusion that we prefer document d
1
over document
d
2
with respect to the query q. Chapter 6 presents an ordering method for aboutness
proof systems to come to a ranking of documents based on above motivations.
This section has presented a rst approach towards a combination of dierent IR mod-
els based on qualitative grounds. The combination is not based on recall and precision
values but on the derivation aspects of dierent models.
3.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a framework for information retrieval based on an
underlying theory of information. Within this framework, formal representatives of doc-
uments and their characterisation can be formulated. By proposing a set of postulates,
the implicit assumptions governing an information retrieval mechanism can be brought
to light. The eectiveness of a retrieval mechanism can be examined, not only by run-
ning experiments, but by inspecting the postulates of the model. In the next chapter we
investigate theoretical and existing IR models using this theory.
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Chapter 4
IR models and their aboutness proof
systems
I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon:
{ Let us assume that what you say is true.
Say rather, beloved Agathon, that you cannot
refute the truth; for Socrates is easily refuted.
Plato, `Symposium'.
In this chapter we investigate dierent IR models, in order to explore the strength of
some general assumptions of aboutness. We start with a very basic IR model, based on
a subset relation, and end with some logical IR models. Using the framework introduced
in Chapter 3, we look at the aboutness properties that characterise these IR models.
We have motivated that aboutness is the formal counterpart of relevance, based on
the relevance denition of Cooper [41]. Van Rijsbergen [123, 124] proposed in 1986 that
an unspecied non-classical conditional logic should be used to deduce aboutness. In his
framework aboutness decisions are interpreted through logical inference: a document d
is about a query q if q can be proved from d. If q cannot be proved from d, however,
then no denitive statement can be made about d being about q.
After Van Rijsbergen's proposal, the logical approach to information retrieval has
gained quite some attention. A wide range of logical IR models were proposed based on,
for example, Modal Logic [106, 109, 107], Conceptual Graphs [34, 78, 79, 99], Renement
Machines [23, 24], Terminological Logic [100, 101, 134], Abductive Logic [103, 104],
Datalog [55], Logical Imaging [45, 46], and Situation Theory [84, 86, 87, 126, 127]. All
these proposals are part of the quest for the one and only logic for information retrieval.
Another use of logic for information retrieval is presented by Chiaramella & Chevallet
in their article `About Retrieval Models and Logic' [35]. In this article, the authors are
61
62 Chapter 4. IR models and their aboutness proof systems
not proposing a new logic for information retrieval. They are using logic as a vehicle to
analyse what they call `some lesser known aspects of information retrieval, as for example
the impact of new applications [such as multi-media] which already induce a complete
revision of the notion of document'.
In general terms they discuss in which way the semantics of the logical inference, the
semantical content of a document, the use of contextual attributes, and the semantical
representation of a query can be presented. By inspecting a typical logical IR model,
namely the boolean model, the authors make clear that one can improve a logical IR
model based on assumptions of what an IR logic should be. Furthermore they showed
that the benets of using logic for such an investigation lies in the expressive power, or
generality, of logic on the one side, and its very close relation with the fundamentals of
information retrieval on the other. This logic-based approach to information retrieval is
adopted by several authors [84, 85, 107, 112, 126].
The approach presented in this chapter is, like that of Chiaramella & Chevallet,
a study of information retrieval on a meta-level. It diers from the original logical
framework of Van Rijsbergen and Chiaramella & Chevallet in that we do not start with
a begin situation (referring to the document) and conclude via logical deduction steps
an end situation (referring to the query). We start with axioms stating what is about
what, and conclude via deduction steps whether a situation (referring to the document)
is about another situation (referring to the query).
Our approach is based on the work of Kraus, Lehman & Magidor [81], who present a
general framework in which non-monotonic inferences of logical systems can be compared
and classied. Their study of the inference-relation concentrates on properties that are
or should be enjoyed by non-monotonic reasoning systems, and their meta-theory has by
now become the standard one for characterising non-monotonic inference relations. The
main interest of Kraus, Lehman & Magidor was to study non-monotonic relations, not
to propose a new model:
`The dierent families of models described in this paper and that provide
semantics to the axiomatic systems are not considered to be an ontological
justication for our interest in the formal systems, but only as a technical tool
to study those systems and in particular settle questions of interderivability
and nd ecient decisions procedures.'
Our study of the concept of aboutness is based on the same grounds. We do not
propose our framework with the intention to create a new (formal) model, but do it to
study dierent IR systems. Hence, our study is focused on the properties of the aboutness
relation that are or should be enjoyed by IR systems. Therefore we will analyse several
common IR systems using the general framework presented in Chapter 3. For each
system we axiomatise the aboutness decisions.
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Investigation of an IR model
The study of an IR model proceeds as follows. We present an IR model A
m
and its
aboutness decision, denoted as j=
A
m
d about q. Here, we formulate the statement `d
about q if and only if. . . ' in terms of the model. Next, the representation of the model as
an aboutness proof system is given. In terms of our framework, we present an aboutness
proof system A
ps
that derives aboutness decisions, denoted as `
A
ps
S  T . In order to
translate document representations and queries into situations, we use a function map
that maps document representations (d) and queries q to situations. Here, we dene
a function that maps a representation language onto another representation language.
In case the representation language of the document representation and the one of the
query diers we dene the functions map
1
and map
2
, but we assume that this is not done
unless explicitly stated otherwise. After every introduction, we inspect the function map
to see whether it is injective, surjective, or bijective.
Axioms and rules are distilled from the properties of the given IR model. To this
end, we use the framework dened in Chapter 3. The IR model is presented in terms of
axioms and rules of an aboutness proof system A
ps
where a document d is about a query
q if and only if map((d)) map(q) can be proved using the proof system, or stated
dierently, if map((d)) map(q) is an aboutness theorem.
We inspect the connection between the derivation of aboutness decisions `
A
ps
S  T
with our proposed logic and the given model aboutness decision j=
A
m
d about q. In logic,
the properties of the relation between the model and the proof system are formalised
in terms of soundness and completeness theorems. The soundness theorem assures
us that the restrictions of the rules are sucient to block all undesirable conclusions
that might otherwise be drawn. The completeness theorem assures us that the rules
are in themselves sucient to generate all valid argument schemata; nothing has been
forgotten [57].
In the case of (predicate) logic, soundness and completeness deal with the connection
between the inference rules (syntax) and validity in certain models (semantics). In our
theory the connection is between the logical deduction of aboutness `
A
ps
S  T , a syn-
tactic approach to aboutness, and the aboutness notion of an IR model j=
A
m
d about q,
which can be viewed as the semantic approach to aboutness [66].
In order to prove that an aboutness proof system is sound with respect to an IR
model, it suces to prove that the following two requirements are satised by the proof
system. First, we have to show that each axiom of the aboutness proof system is sound,
e.g., is indeed an aboutness decision of the IR model. Second, all its rules should be
sound. This allows us to conclude by induction on the length of the derivation that the
aboutness proof system is sound.
In logic a truth preserving proof system is required, i.e., truth and falsity in the
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proof system should correspond to truth and falsity in the model. Here, we would like
to have an aboutness preserving proof system, i.e., the notion of `aboutness' in the
proof system should correspond to the notion of `aboutness' in the IR model. In case
the aboutness proof system is sound, then every aboutness theorem deducible by the
proposed aboutness proof system is indeed an aboutness decision of the model.
For the proof of completeness we have to show that every aboutness decision of the
IR model is always an aboutness theorem of the aboutness proof system. In case the
proof system is complete, every aboutness decision made by the model is deducible as
aboutness theorem in the proposed proof system.
Given a sound and complete aboutness proof system, we can use a function answer
that maps an aboutness proof system A
ps
, a query q, and a document-base D into
a set of documents (a subset of the document-base D). This function is dened by
answer(A
ps
; q;D) =
def
fd 2 D j `
A
ps
map((d)) map(q)g where map((d)) is the
situation representation of the descriptor set (d) of a document d and map(q) the
situation representation of a query q.
There are some typical elements in the IR model as well as in the aboutness proof
system. Here we dene four possible typical elements of an aboutness proof system:
Denition 4.1 Let A
ps
be an aboutness proof system and S a language of situations.
The top query of A
ps
(denoted by 1
q
A
ps
) is a (possibly empty) subset of S and is
dened by:
1
q
A
ps
=
def
fT j for all S 2 S `
A
ps
S  Tg:
The bottom query of A
ps
(denoted by 0
q
A
ps
) is a (possibly empty) subset of S and
is dened by:
0
q
A
ps
=
def
fT j for all S 2 S 6`
A
ps
S  Tg:
The top document of A
ps
(denoted by 1
d
A
ps
) is a (possibly empty) subset of S and
is dened by:
1
d
A
ps
=
def
fS j for all T 2 S `
A
ps
S  Tg:
The bottom document of A
ps
(denoted by 0
d
A
ps
) is a (possibly empty) subset of S
and is dened by:
0
d
A
ps
=
def
fS j for all T 2 S 6`
A
ps
S  Tg:
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If A
ps
is a sound and complete aboutness proof system of an IR model, then each
document descriptor for which map((d)) 2 1
d
A
ps
will always be retrieved. Indeed, every
typical element of A
ps
has a counterpart in the IR model.
Denition 4.2 Let A
ps
be a sound and complete aboutness proof system of an IR
model A
m
, D a document-base and q a query.
The top query of A
m
(denoted by 1
q
A
m
) is a (possible empty) set of queries and is
dened by:
1
q
A
m
=
def
fq j answer(A
ps
; q;D) = Dg:
The bottom query of A
m
(denoted by 0
q
A
m
) is a (possible empty) set of queries and
is dened by:
0
q
A
m
=
def
fq j answer(A
ps
; q;D) = ;g:
The top document of A
m
(denoted by 1
d
A
m
) is a (possible empty) set of documents
of D and is dened by:
1
d
A
m
=
def
fd j for all q d 2 answer(A
ps
; q;D)g:
The bottom document of A
m
(denoted by 0
d
A
m
) is a (possible empty) set of docu-
ments of D and is dened by:
0
d
A
m
=
def
fd j for all q d 62 answer(A
ps
; q;D)g:
Note that the top query of A
m
represents those queries for which each document is about.
The bottom query of A
m
represent those queries for which no document is about. Those
documents that are always retrieved no matter what the query is are elements of the top
document of A
m
. Finally, the bottom document of A
m
represents those documents that
are never retrieved no matter what the query is.
It is enlightening to study the nature of the relationship between the notions given
above and the underlying IR model in order to present dierences with other models.
One may, for instance, wonder whether 1
d
A
ps
= fmap((d)) j d 2 1
d
A
m
g holds. The
following proposition sheds some light on this issue.
Proposition 4.1 Let A
ps
be a sound and complete aboutness proof system of an IR
model A
m
, D a document-base and q a query. Furthermore, let map be a surjective
function. Then
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1
q
A
ps
= fmap(q) j q 2 1
q
A
m
g 1
q
A
m
= fq j map(q) 2 1
q
A
ps
g
0
q
A
ps
= fmap(q) j q 2 0
q
A
m
g 0
q
A
m
= fq j map(q) 2 0
q
A
ps
g
1
d
A
ps
= fmap((d)) j d 2 1
d
A
m
g 1
d
A
m
= fd j map((d)) 2 1
d
A
ps
g
0
d
A
ps
= fmap((d)) j d 2 0
d
A
m
g 0
d
A
m
= fd j map((d)) 2 0
d
A
ps
g
Proof The proposition follows, for each item, directly from the fact that A
ps
is a sound
and complete aboutness proof system of a model A
m
. So, if `
A
ps
map((d)) map(q)
then j=
A
m
d about q and vice versa. Note that the requirement of surjectivity of the
map function is indeed necessary. For in case map is not surjective, we could have that
1
d
A
ps
= fSg while for all d 2 D map((d)) 6= S. Assume towards a contradiction that
1
d
A
ps
= fmap((d)) j d 2 1
d
A
m
g and 1
d
A
m
= fd j map((d)) 2 1
d
A
ps
g. Since for all d 2 D
map((d)) 6= S, it follows that 1
d
A
m
= ;. But this implies that 1
d
A
ps
= ;, which contradicts
the assumption that 1
d
A
ps
= fSg.

Note, that we do not require the function map to be injective. In case the function
map is not injective the proposition still holds. A non-injective function map allows
that map(x) = map(y) with the possibility that x 6= y. However, if S 2 1
d
A
ps
and
S = map(d
1
) = map(d
2
) then by denition d
1
and d
2
2 1
d
A
m
. Conversely, if d
1
; d
2
2 1
d
A
m
,
then map(d
1
) 2 1
d
A
ps
and map(d
2
) 2 1
d
A
ps
, thus S 2 1
d
A
ps
.
For each model and system we can represent the top and bottom sets. However as
Proposition 4.2 states, it is possible to state that some sets are empty based on the fact
that other sets are not empty.
Proposition 4.2 Let X 2 fA
ps
;A
m
g, I 2 f0; 1g, and  2 fq; dg. Dene the function x
to be the complement function, i.e., 0 = 1 and 1 = 0, and q = d and d = q. Then
if I

X
6= ; then I

X
= ;:
Proof We show the proposition for X = A
ps
, I = 1 and  = d; the other cases are proved
analogously. We have to show that if 1
d
A
ps
6= ; then 0
q
A
ps
= ;. If 1
d
A
ps
6= ; this implies
that there is at least one S 2 S such that for all T 2 S `
A
ps
S  T . Consequently,
there is no T 2 S that no situation S is about, which implies that 0
q
A
ps
= ;. This proves
the proposition.

Structure of this chapter
In the following sections we present dierent IR models. Every individual model is
described in four subparts entitled: (1) the model, (2) translation, (3) postulates and (4)
reection.
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Each time we start a presentation of an IR model in the section `The model'. Here
we formulate the statement \d about q if and only if . . . " in terms of the model. Next,
in the section `Translation' we present the translation of the model to our framework. In
the section `Postulates', axioms and rules are distilled from the properties of the given
IR model. With respect to the model, we inspect the soundness and completeness of the
aboutness proof system.
In the last section of each model entitled `Reection', we elaborate on the following
two aspects:
(i) What are the bottom and top elements of the aboutness proof system and the IR
model?
(ii) We suggest some improvements of the IR model under scrutiny. Usually an im-
provement can be obtained by adding or modifying axioms and rules. These
new/changed postulates are no longer based on the given IR model, but are dened
in terms of the framework.
4.1 Strict coordinate retrieval
The model
The rst model we analyse is the so-called strict coordinate retrieval model. The
matching function that drives strict coordinate retrieval determines the existence of a
subset, given the set of descriptors representing a document d and the set of descriptors
comprising the query q. The way of interpreting aboutness is by declaring that d is about
q if and only if the descriptors of q are a subset of the descriptors of the representation
of document d, that is, of (d).
Denition 4.3 Let D be a document-base and d a document with d 2 D. Furthermore,
suppose that T is some nite set of basic information items (descriptors) such that (d)
and q are subsets of T , where (d) represents the descriptor set of document d and q is
a query. The strict coordinate aboutness decision is dened as follows:
j=
SC
m
d about q if and only if (d)  q:
Translation
In order to translate strict coordinate retrieval to the framework a basic infon language
I
Basic
(T ) as given in Denition 3.4 is used. The input of this language is a set of unspec-
ied basic informations items T that can be almost anything, for instance, keywords,
noun-phrases, photo's, etc.
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Denition 4.4 The basic infon language I
Basic
(T ) is the infon language I(P
+
(T ); ;; ;),
or alternatively, the language P
+
(T ).
Such a language contains a set of positive profons based on a set of basic information
items. The language of situations S
Basic
is the language S(I
Basic
(T )).
The translation of a document representation of a given document-base D in a situ-
ation of S
Basic
is dened as follows:
map((d)) = fhhI,t;1ii j t 2 (d)g:
The translation of a query to a query situation is dened in a similar way. Trivially
the function map is bijective modulo set-equivalence. This can be proved by induction,
observing that every set with a unique basic information item corresponds to a singleton
set containing a profon and vice versa.
Postulates
Next, we propose the underlying aboutness proof system of strict coordinate retrieval,
denoted by SC
ps
.
Denition 4.5 (Strict Coordinate Situation Aboutness) The aboutness proof system
SC
ps
is dened to be the triple hL(I
Basic
(T )), fReexivityg,fSet Equivalence,Left Monotonic
Union,Cutgi.
The axiom and rules are as given in Chapter 3. The rule Set Equivalence uses the
set equivalence relation , which is up till now undened. This rule expresses the
requirement that equivalent sets behave identically with respect to aboutness decisions.
Here, the set equivalence relation  is dened as follows:
S  T =
def
( 2 S ,  2 T ) for all  2 I
Basic
(T ) and S; T 2 S
Basic
:
As one may have noticed, we can introduce an aboutness proof system consisting of
a single rule, namely the rule Subset Aboutness dened by:
Subset Aboutness (SA)
S  T [ U
S  T
Here, we want to remind the reader that our intention is not to compress postulates
into the smallest possible set, but that our interest is focused on an exploration of some
general basic assumptions of aboutness. Therefore, we feel that it is better to present a
larger set of axioms and rules to describe the intuition of the model's aboutness decision
than to present a small set. Of course, we require that the proof system does not
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contain derivable axioms or rules, nor should it contain axioms or rules which do not
contribute to the understanding of the derivation of aboutness. As one may see, the rule
Subset Aboutness does not contribute to the understanding of aboutness.
Theorem 4.1 The aboutness proof system SC
ps
is sound. That is, for all subsets A;B of
T and D 2 D such that (D) = A: if `
SC
ps
map(A) map(B) then j=
SC
m
D about B.
Proof First we show that the axiom Reexivity is sound. Secondly we show that all
rules are sound. This enables us to conclude that SC
ps
is sound with respect to SC
m
.
 The soundness of the axiom Reexivity: S  S can be proved as follows. By the
denition of the function map we have that if S  map(A) and S  map(B) then
A  B. If A is equivalent to B, then the aboutness decision that A  B is sound.
This proves the soundness of the axiom Reexivity.
 Note that Set Equivalence consists of two rules. Here, we show only the soundness of
the rule Left Set Equivalence; the proof of soundness of the rule Right Set Equivalence
proceeds analogously. Assume that the premises of the rule are sound, that is,
map(A)  map(B) and map(A) map(C) are valid. Then by the denition
of the function map we have that A  B. Furthermore, the sound assumption
map(A) map(C) allows us to conclude that A  C. We have to inspect whether
the conclusion of the Set Equivalence rule map(B) map(C) is sound. Trivially,
if A  B and A  C, then B  C, which implies that map(B) map(C). This
proves the soundness of the Set Equivalence rule.
 In order to prove that Left Monotonic Union is sound, one has to prove that given
that S  T is sound, S[U  T is a sound conclusion. Assume that S  map(A),
T  map(B) and S [ U  map(C). The sound premise implies that A  B. By
the denition of the function map we have that C  A. So, from the fact that
A  B and C  A, the conclusion that C  B follows directly, which implies that
map(C) map(B). This proves the soundness of the rule Left Monotonic Union.
 Finally, we have to prove the soundness of the Cut rule. Assume that S [ T  U
and S  T are sound premises. Let S  map(A), T  map(B), and U  map(C).
Given this premise, we have to prove that S  U is a sound conclusion, that is,
A  C. Therefore, we have to inspect whether if A [ B  C and A  B then
A  C is valid. This is obviously true, which proves the soundness of the Cut rule.

Theorem 4.2 The aboutness proof system SC
ps
is complete. That is, for all subsets
A;B of T and D 2 D such that (D) = A: if j=
SC
m
D about B then
`
SC
ps
map(A) map(B).
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Proof We have to show that if A  B then map(A) map(B). Assume A  B, let C
be dened by A nB. Furthermore, let map(A) = S, map(B) = T and map(C) = U . By
the denition of the function map, S  T [ U . Starting from the Reexivity axiom one
can now make the following derivation:
T  T
LMU
T [ U  T
S  T [ U
SE
S  T

The reader may have noticed that the Cut rule is not used in the completeness proof
and therefore could be omitted as a postulate for aboutness proof system SC
ps
. However,
we already showed that the Cut rule is sound with respect to the strict coordinate model
so adding the rule to the sound and complete system containing the postulates Reexivity,
Set Equivalence, and Left Monotonic Union will not make the proof system overcomplete.
The reader may verify that Cut is not derivable from the set of postulates. This type of
rule is known as an admissible rule. The Cut rule is very useful for aboutness proofs and
describes also the intuition of the model's aboutness decision. For this reason we have
added the rule to the aboutness proof system SC
ps
.
Reection
The axiomatisation of the strict coordinate model gives us the possibility to determine
the top and bottom elements as described in Denition 4.1 on page 64.
Since we have proved that SC
ps
is a sound and complete system for IR model SC
m
,
we only present the top and bottom elements of SC
ps
. Because, using Proposition 4.1
the top and bottom elements of SC
m
can be derived from the top and bottom elements
of SC
ps
.
Proposition 4.3 In the aboutness proof system SC
ps
we have that:
(i) The top query of SC
ps
is the set f;g.
(ii) The top document of SC
ps
is the set fI
Basic
(T )g.
(iii) The bottom query of SC
ps
is the set ;.
(iv) The bottom document of SC
ps
is the set ;.
Proof
(i) We rst show that, for every arbitrary situation S 2 S
Basic
, the aboutness formula
S  ; is an aboutness theorem. To see this, start from the Reexivity axiom and
observe that one can make the following derivation:
4.1. Strict coordinate retrieval 71
; ;
LMU
; [ S  ;
; [ S  S
SE
S  ;
Furthermore, we have to show that there is, beside the empty set, no other element
T in 1
q
SC
ps
such that for all situations S, S  T . Assume there is. Since T 6= ;,
it should contain at least one element. So, T  f'g [ U with U possibly empty.
Consider a situation S with ' 62 S. Using the completeness theorem one can see
that it is not possible to deduce that S  T , which is a contradiction.
(ii) We show that the situation I
Basic
(T ) is about all situations T 2 S
Basic
. First
we note that I
Basic
(T ) is here viewed as a situation that contains all the infons
of the language I
Basic
(T ). So, the situation I
Basic
(T ) is the situation with the
maximal number of elements. For every T 2 S
Basic
it is provable from T  T ,
that T [I
Basic
(T ) T . Using Set Equivalence one determines that I
Basic
(T ) T .
So, indeed, I
Basic
(T ) is about every situation of S
Basic
. Furthermore, we have
to show that there is, beside the situation I
Basic
(T ), no other element meeting
this requirement. If this were the case, at least one infon ' should not be in the
situation. Assume such a situation S. This situation S can not be about the
situation f'g which is a contradiction.
(iii) Since 1
d
SC
ps
is not empty, Proposition 4.2 suces to conclude that 0
q
SC
ps
is empty.
(iv) Since 1
q
SC
ps
is not empty, Proposition 4.2 suces to conclude that 0
d
SC
ps
is empty.

In terms of queries and documents: if somebody enters an empty query all the docu-
ments are retrieved
1
. The document that is indexed with all descriptors of the descriptor
set will always be retrieved, as map(T ) = I
Basic
(T ). For each query there is always a
relevant document representation
2
. Conversely, for each document, it is always possible
to construct a query that will retrieve the document.
We see several directions in which the aboutness proof system SC
ps
could be extended.
First of all, additional knowledge can be adopted in the system as axioms of the type
'! , in addition with the Union Containment rule. Then one has the ability to express
informational containment relations between basic information items, in order to retrieve
more relevant documents.
1
Note also that in this theoretical case, we assume that it is possible to index a document with an empty
set. In this particular case, there are no descriptors available that present the contents of the document
correctly.
2
This does not imply that there is always a relevant document, since the representation set T may not
correspond to a document.
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4.2 Coordinate retrieval
As the term `strict' in strict coordinate retrieval implies, the aboutness decisions of
SC
ps
are `strict', in the sense that there are only a few possibilities to derive aboutness.
As a result, only a few documents are considered to be relevant in a strict coordinate
retrieval system. In order to deliver some more documents, which still are very likely to
be relevant, one could adopt a rule that allows us to extend the right-hand side of the
aboutness relation. This is the case in the following model we consider, the coordinate
retrieval model.
The model
The matching function which drives coordinate retrieval determines overlap. A document
d is about q if and only if there is some overlap between the representations of d and q.
Denition 4.6 Let D be a document-base and d a document with d 2 D. Furthermore,
let T be some nite set of basic information items (descriptors) such that (d) and q are
subsets of T , where (d) represents the descriptor set of document d and q a query. The
coordinate aboutness decision is dened as follows:
j=
C
m
d about q if and only if (d) \ q 6 ;:
The aboutness relation is symmetric: if there is an overlap between S and T then
obviously there is an overlap between T and S.
Translation
The mapping of coordinate retrieval representatives to our framework proceeds in the
same way as for strict coordinate retrieval. Here, the basic infon language I
Basic
(T ) as
given in Denition 4.4 is used. Both document representations and queries are modelled
as situations that are elements of the language S
Basic
. The equivalence relation is dened
analogously to the one of aboutness proof system SC
ps
.
Postulates
The aboutness proof system for aboutness decisions in coordinate retrieval is denoted by
C
ps
and is dened as follows.
Denition 4.7 (Coordinate Situation Aboutness) The aboutness proof system C
ps
is
dened to be the triple hL(I
Basic
(T )), fSingleton Reexivityg,fSet Equivalence,Left Mono-
tonic Union,Symmetry,Strict Compositiongi.
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The attentive reader may have noticed that we did not adopt the Reexivity axiom.
We did not do this for the following reason: it would enable us to prove that S is
about T for arbitrary situations S and T . To see this, observe the following. First,
Reexivity holds for empty sets, that is, ; ;. Given Left Monotonic Union, Symmetry
and Set Equivalence, it is then provable that S  T for arbitrary situations S and T , as
showed by the following prooftree:
; ;
LMU
; [ T  ;
Sy
; ; [ T
LMU
; [ S  ; [ T ; [ S  S
SE
S  ; [ T ; [ T  T
SE
S  T
In order to avoid this kind of anomaly we adopt a special version of the Reexivity
axiom called Singleton Reexivity as presented in Chapter 3.
Note that C
ps
covers the Strict Composition rule instead of the Composition rule of
the SC
ps
aboutness proof system. With the Composition rule it was allowed, given the
assumption S  T , to reduce the right-hand side of the aboutness relation taking the
intersection T \ U , where U is an arbitrary situation. With Strict Composition one can
only reduce the right-hand side by taking the intersection T \ S. The premise of this
rule is necessary in order to avoid that S \ T could result in an empty set, which would
lead to the same problem as with Reexivity.
Theorem 4.3 The aboutness proof system C
ps
is sound. That is, for all subsets A;B
of T and D 2 D such that (D) = A: if `
C
ps
map(A) map(B) then j=
C
m
D about B.
Proof Firstly we prove the soundness of the axiom Singleton Reexivity. Secondly we
prove the soundness of all the rules of C
ps
. This enable us to conclude that C
ps
is sound
with respect to C
m
.
 The axiom Singleton Reexivity is sound. We have to show that, if map(A)  f'g
and map(B) = f'g, then A\B 6 ;. By the denition of the function map we have
that given map(A)  map(B)  f'g for some ' 2 I
Basic
(T ), then A  B  ftg for
some t 2 T . Consequently, A\B  ftg, which proves the soundness of the axiom.
 The Set Equivalence rule is sound. Similar as with the soundness proof of SC
ps
,
we show only the soundness of the rule Left Set Equivalence. Given that map(A) 
map(B) and map(A) map(C) are sound premises, which implies that A  B
and A \ C 6 ;, we have to inspect whether the conclusion map(B) map(C)
is sound. Trivially, if A  B and A \ C 6 ;, then B \ C 6 ;. This proves the
soundness of the Set Equivalence rule.
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 In order to prove that Left Monotonic Union is sound, one has to prove that given
that S  T is a sound premise, the conclusion S [ U  T is sound. Let S 
map(A), T  map(B) and S [ U  map(C). The sound premise S  T implies
that A \ B 6 ;. By the denition of the function map we have that C  A. So,
the fact that C  A and A\B 6 ;, the conclusion that C \B 6 ; follows directly.
This proves the soundness of the rule Left Monotonic Union.
 Finally, we prove soundness of Strict Composition, that is, given that S  T is a
sound premise, S  T \ S should be a sound conclusion. Let S  map(A) and
T  map(B). Given the premise that A\B 6 ; the conclusion that A\B \A 6 ;
is valid. Set-theoretically we have that A \ B  (A \ B) \ A, so the conclusion
S  T \ S is valid, and consequently the rule Strict Composition is sound.

Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we remark that it is possible to omit the rule
Strict Composition as a postulate for aboutness proof system C
ps
. We have added the
admissible rule for the same reasons as we gave for the Cut rule of the aboutness proof
system SC
ps
.
Theorem 4.4 The aboutness proof system C
ps
is complete. That is, for all subsets A;B
of T and D 2 D such that (D) = A: if j=
C
m
D about B then `
C
ps
map(A) map(B).
Proof We have to show that if A\B 6 ; then map(A) map(B). Assume A\B 6 ;.
Then obviously a singleton set C exists such that C  A and C  B. Let D  A n C
and E  B nC. Furthermore, let map(A) = S, map(B) = T , map(C) = U , map(D) = V ,
and map(E) =W . Then consequently, map(A) = map(C)[map(D) and so on. Starting
with Singleton Reexivity, we nd:
U  U
LMU
U [W  U T  U [W
SE
T  U
Sy
U  T
LMU
U [ V  T S  U [ V
SE
S  T

Reection
As our framework is developed with the intention to compare models, we will inspect
now what the top and bottom elements of the aboutness proof system C
ps
are and detect
the dierences with those of the aboutness proof system SC
ps
.
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Proposition 4.4 In the aboutness proof system C
ps
we have that:
(i) The bottom query of C
ps
is the set f;g.
(ii) The bottom document of C
ps
is the set f;g.
(iii) The top query of C
ps
is the set ;.
(iv) The top document of C
ps
is the set ;.
Proof To give the proof the following claim is needed:
Claim 4.1 For all situations S 2 S
Basic
, 6`
C
ps
S  ;.
Proof Using the soundness theorem 4.3 and completeness theorem 4.4, we can in-
fer that `
C
ps
map(A) map(B) if and only if A \ B 6 ;. Hence it follows that
6`
C
ps
map(A) map(B) if and only if A \ B  ;. By denition map(;) = ; and for
all S 2 S
Basic
, S \ ;  ;. This suces to conclude that for all situations S 2 S
Basic
,
6`
C
ps
S  ;.

To complete the proof of Proposition 4.4, we use Claim 4.1. Since cases (ii) and
(iv) are, due to the symmetry property, analogous to cases (i) and (iii) respectively, we
restrict ourselves to proving the items (i) and (iii).
(i) The fact that ; 2 0
q
C
ps
is shown by the claim. Furthermore, we have to show that
besides the empty-set, there is no other element S meeting the requirement of the
elements of the bottom query set. Assume there is. Since S 6 ;, S  f'g [ U for
some ' and U . If U is ;, then S is about f'g by Singleton Reexivity otherwise we
can use Left Monotonic Union to conclude, starting from f'g f'g, that S  f'g.
Hence there is no other situation for which no situation is about.
(iii) Since 0
d
C
ps
is not empty, Proposition 4.2 suces to conclude that 1
q
C
ps
is empty.

In terms of queries and documents this implies that for coordinate retrieval, in con-
trast with strict coordinate retrieval, an empty query will never retrieve any document,
not even those documents that are represented by an empty set. These kind of docu-
ments are never retrieved. Consequently, it is not possible to construct a query that
will retrieve all documents, or to index a document in such a way that it will always be
retrieved.
The aboutness proof system C
ps
can also be extended by adopting knowledge axioms
of the type '! in addition to the Union Containment. Maybe, with this system there
are too many possibilities to derive aboutness. As a result, too many documents are
considered to be relevant in a coordinate retrieval system. In order to deliver fewer
documents, we could adopt some guarded rules as presented in Chapter 3, instead of
Left Monotonic Union.
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4.3 Vector-Space retrieval
The model
The vector-space model originates from the work of Salton [131]. As the name of the
model indicates, vector-space retrieval adopts a geometric viewpoint. The set of de-
scriptors T is ordered (mostly alphabetically). The list of descriptors is then used to
represent a n-dimensional space, where n is the total of number of descriptors in T . The
descriptor set of a document or a query is transformed to a vector as follows.
Let T be a nite descriptor set with n descriptors k
1
; : : : k
n
(in this xed order). For
document d the vector is ht
1
; : : : ; t
n
i with t
i
= 1 if k
i
2 (d) and 0 otherwise. Similarly
for the query q one can construct the vector hu
1
; : : : ; u
n
i. Note, that in the mapping
process from descriptor sets onto vectors, the order of the elements in the descriptor sets
does not play a role. The only requirement is that the set T should be represented in a
xed order.
In Salton's model the relevance of a document d given a query q is estimated using
the cosine of the angle between the two vectors of d and q.
Let t be the vector of (d) and u the vector of q, then the estimation of relevance is
based on the following relevance cosine-function:
relcos((d); q) =
t  u
k t k  k u k
=
P
n
i=1
t
i
 u
i
p
P
n
i=1
t
2
i

p
P
n
i=1
u
2
i
:
In order to avoid undened cases, we dene relcos((d); q) to be 0 if (d) or q = ;.
Rather than using binary values for the vectors, term weights can be used as descrip-
tive values for the descriptors. Typically these term weights are based on occurrence
frequencies [1]. The term weight is a value between 0 and 1. The estimation of relevance
remains the same. However, in this section only binary values are used.
Denition 4.8 Let D be a document-base and d be a document with d 2 D. Further-
more, suppose that (d) and q are subsets of T , where (d) represents the descriptor set
of document d and q a query. The vector-space aboutness decision is dened as follows:
j=
VC
m
d about q if and only if relcos((d); q) > 0:
Here, we have xed the aboutness denition of a vector-space model in terms of the
cosine being greater than zero. Another suggestion could be that d is about q if and
only if relcos((d); q) = 1. This would imply an IR system that returns very few relevant
documents. Or, we could use a `cut-o'-value based on the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Let j A \ B j= k. Then
relcos(A;B) 
k
1
2
(n + k)
:
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Proof In the function relcos, A and B are mapped onto 0, 1 vectors that coincide in
k ones. Let A have n
a
more 1's and B have n
b
more 1's, with clearly n
a
+ n
b
 n , k.
Then
relcos(A;B) =
k
p
(k + n
a
)(k + n
b
)
=
k
p
k
2
+ k(n
a
+ n
b
) + n
a
n
b

k
p
k
2
+ k(n, k) + n
a
n
b
=
k
p
kn+ n
a
n
b

k
q
kn +
1
4
(n, k)
2
=
k
q
1
4
(n + k)
2
=
k
1
2
(n+ k)
:

This bound is pretty good because there always are A and B that match it, up to
small rounding errors. In Chapter 5 we will look at alternatives for modelling dierent
aboutness-levels (for instance, aboutness
1
with relcos((d); q) = 1 and aboutness
2
with
relcos((d); q) > 0) without changing the structure of the underlying aboutness proof
system. But before we pursue this, we continue the discussion of the vector-space model
in our framework.
Translation
The mapping of vector-space retrieval representatives to our framework proceeds in a
way similar to strict coordinate retrieval and coordinate retrieval. Again, the basic infon
language I
Basic
(T ) as dened in Denition 3.4 is used. Both document representations
and queries are modelled as situations that are elements of the language S
Basic
. The
equivalence relation is dened analogously to the one of aboutness proof system SC
ps
.
Postulates
For the aboutness derivations in the vector-space model we propose the following about-
ness proof system:
Denition 4.9 (Vector-Space Situation Aboutness) The aboutness proof system
VC
ps
is dened to be the triple hL(I
Basic
(T )), fSingleton Reexivityg,fSet Equivalence,Left
Monotonic Union,Symmetry,Strict Compositiongi.
This aboutness proof system is identical to aboutness proof system C
ps
. The sound-
ness and completeness theorems of VC
ps
can be presented in dierent ways. One way of
presenting the theorems is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2 For a given set of descriptors A;B  T ,
relcos(A;B) > 0, A \B 6 ;:
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Proof
) Assume that relcos(A;B) > 0. Because vectors have nonnegative coordinates this
implies that
P
n
i=1
t
i
 u
i
> 0 with t the vector of A and u the vector of B and
thus there exists an i  n such that t
i
 u
i
6= 0. The result of t
i
 u
i
is zero if the
descriptor k
i
occurs in A and not in B or vice versa. Thus, if t
i
 u
i
6= 0 there is a
descriptor k
i
that is both an element of A and of B. To conclude, if relcos(A;B) > 0
then A and B are having one or more descriptors in common, and thus A\B 6 ;.
( Assume that A \B 6 ;, thus j A \B j= k for k > 0. The fact that relcos(A;B) > 0
is shown by Lemma 4.1. Since n; k > 0, we have that
k
1
2
(n+k)
> 0. This suces to
conclude that relcos(A;B) > 0.

The lemma shows that the aboutness decision of the vector-space model and the
coordinate retrieval model are equivalent. The soundness and the completeness of VC
ps
for the model VC
m
then follows directly.
Corollary 4.2
(i) The aboutness proof system VC
ps
is sound. That is, for all subsets A;B of T : if
`
VC
ps
map(A) map(B) then j=
VC
m
A about B.
(ii) The aboutness proof system VC
ps
is complete. That is, for all subsets A;B of T :
if j=
VC
m
A about B then `
VC
ps
map(A) map(B).
Reection
As VC
ps
is identical to C
ps
, the top and bottom elements of VC
ps
are identical to those
of the aboutness proof system C
ps
.
4.4 Index Expression Belief Network retrieval
The use of probabilistic laws for information retrieval to determine whether a document
is about a query is considered to be both elegant and potentially extremely power-
ful [122]. The main argument for adopting a probabilistic denition for relevance is that
for the determination of relevance one must use imperfect knowledge; the query is not
an exact match with the information need and the document representation is only a
crude approximation of the document content. Aboutness derivations are in this view
embodied by a probabilistic reasoning process. Typically, in a probabilistic retrieval
model one decides that d is about q if and only if the estimation of the probability of a
document d given a query q is larger than a cut-o value x, denoted as P ((d) j q) > x
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with P the probability function. Various probabilistic information retrieval models have
been proposed. One particular class consists of the network-based probabilistic retrieval
models [23, 24, 31, 32, 58, 77, 143].
The model
In this section we describe one particular network-based probabilistic retrieval model,
namely the Index Expression Belief Networks (IEBN) [23, 24, 77]. As the name of the
model indicates, an IEBN-model contains two aspects: Index Expressions and Belief
Networks.
First we briey introduce the notion of belief networks. A belief network is a graphical
representation of a problem domain depicting the probabilistic variables of the domain
and their interdependencies. Belief networks are used to calculate the belief in the
occurrence of an event
3
. For instance, a belief network can be used as a diagnostic system
in order to quantify the belief that someone has fever given the fact that someone has a
high temperature.
A belief network is a directed acyclic graph with a set of nodes V
G
consisting of
probabilistic variables representing the belief in an event, and a set of edges E
G
each
representing the interdependency between two events. Furthermore for each node n of
the graph there are assessment functions 
n
(x) that represent the initial belief in each
event n to be true (denoted as x) or false (denoted as :x). For instance, the belief that
someone has fever could be set to 0:15 (denoted as 
Fever
(Fever) = 0:15).
In case we know that a person has a high temperature, then we could assume that
it is more likely that the person has fever. All the conditional factors (such as red
colour, sweating and so on) are set by the assessment functions. The complete set of all
assessment functions is denoted by  .
The calculation of the belief in a certain event proceeds as follows. We enter some
evidence in the network, that is, things we know for sure. For example, we know that the
person has a high temperature and a red colour. We recalculate the nodes based on the
probability distribution expressed by the directed graph (Pearl [115] designed various
algorithms to perform this calculation eciently) and then `read' the belief-factor of a
node. This calculation process is called evidence propagation.
In the IEBN-model, the belief network approach is used to calculate our belief that
a document is about a query. Here, the graphical representation of the belief network is
based on the index expressions. Each document d in the document-base is represented
as a set of index expressions (d). From the union of all representation sets a directed
graph, termed a lattice [23], is constructed. This lattice is used as the graph of the belief
3
See e.g. Pearl's book [115] for a detailed presentation of belief networks.
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network. Next, we show how we can construct a lattice out of the index expressions,
that can be used to calculate the probability that d is about q.
In Chapter 3 at page 41, we already introduced index expressions as elements of
a relational indexing approach. Here, we introduce the denition of index expressions
based on the denition of Bruza [23]:
Denition 4.10 Let T be a set of descriptors and C a set of connectors. The language
L(T ; C) of index expressions is dened by:
 for n 2 IN with 0  i  n and t
i
2 T and c
i
2 C : (t
1
c
1
t
2
: : : t
n 1
c
n 1
t
n
) 2 L(T ; C);
 if c 2 C and I; J 2 L(T ; C) then I c J 2 L(T ; C).
In order to represent an empty index expression (for n=0), the symbol  is included
in the language L(T ; C). Here, the set of descriptors intentionally corresponds to a set of
textual elements, for instance, `(cruel  murder of Caesar by Brutus)' is a typical example
of an index expression, with the keywords cruel,murder,Caesar,Brutus and the connectors
,of,by. Brackets can be used to represent that some connectors bind index expressions
stronger than others. Bruza [23] suggested dierent priorities of the connectors. For
instance, the connector  between cruel and murder binds the terms stronger than the
connector by between Caesar and Brutus. In this view, the index expression given above
could be presented as `(cruel  murder) of (Caesar) by (Brutus)'. Bruza presented an
algorithm that based on a priority-list of connectors and given a sentence produces an
index expression with brackets included. Brackets will usually be dropped as much as
possible without causing confusing.
Bruza presents a function that given an index expression results into a tree-represen-
tation of the particular index expression.
If the index expression I is of the form (t
1
c
1
: : : c
n 1
t
n
) then I can be graphically
represented as follows:
n-1
tn
t2
t1
t
c1
n-1c
In case the index expression I is of the form I
1
c
1
I
2
: : : c
n 1
I
n
with I
i
a non-empty
index expression for every 1  i  n, the index expression can be depicted as follows:
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c1 cn
InI2
I1
In this way every index expression can be represented as a tree. For instance the
index expression (cruel  murder) of Caesar by Brutus can be graphically represented as
the following tree:
Cruel
of by
Brutus
Murder
Caesar
Index expressions can be ordered based on an `is-sub-index-expression-of' relation
(denoted by ). The informal denition of this relation, taken from [77], is as follows:
Denition 4.11 Let I
1
and I
2
be index expressions. Then
I
1
I
2
if I
1
is a subtree of the tree-representation of I
2
:
The set with all the subindex expressions of I is termed the power index expres-
sion [23], and formally dened as follows:
Denition 4.12 Let I be an index expression in a language L(T ; C). The power index
expression of I, denoted by }(I), is the set
}(I) = fJ j J Ig
where  is the is-subexpression-of relation as given in Denition 4.11.
Next we present how a lattice can be constructed out of the power index expressions.
In the IEBN-model, every document d of the document-base D is indexed by a set of
index expressions (thus (d)  L(T ; C)). In the model a directed acyclic graph with a
set of nodes V
G
of index expressions is constructed using the subindex expression relation
to present the edges E
G
. The set V
G
will be
S
d2D
}((d)). The nodes represent the fact
that an object represented by index expression is relevant. The edges of a belief network
represent an interdependency between two events. Therefore Bruza chooses the relation
 to be the interdependency relation. The fact that d is about cruel  murder depends
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on conditions such as whether d is about cruel and d is about murder, or not. To capture
this intuitive idea the set of edges E
G
is dened as follows: (I
i
; I
j
) 2 E
G
if and only if
I
i
I
j
with I
i
; I
j
2 V
G
and for all I
k
2 V
G
, if I
i
I
k
and I
k
I
j
then I
k
= I
i
or I
k
= I
j
.
For instance, given the document indexed by one index expression: (cruel  murder)
of Caesar by Brutus. The following lattice can be constructed:
murder by Brutus cruel murder
cruel murder of Caesar murder of Caesar by Brutus
murder of Caesar 
cruel murder of Caesar by Brutus
cruel murder by Brutus
cruelmurder BrutusCaesar
Figure 4.1: A belief network.
This lattice, which is a directed acyclic graph, is used as a belief network, which is
called an IEBN. Consider the directed graph depicted in Figure 4.1. In a belief net-
work nodes represent events. In the IEBN, the nodes are represented by index expres-
sions. This IEBN captures that the belief that an object is about `murder by Brutus'
depends on it being about `murder' and it being about `Brutus'. As mentioned be-
fore, besides the directed graph G a belief network consists of a set   of probability
assessment function, notated as . These functions try to assess conditional probabil-
ities. The question is how the nodes of the IEBN could be initiated. For instance,

murder by Brutus
(murder by Brutus) = 0:15 denotes the assessment function of the
node murder by Brutus and intuitively it means that the belief that an object is about
murder by Brutus is 0:15 (thus the belief that an object is not about murder by Brutus,
denoted by :murder by Brutus is 0:85). We could also have the following assessment:

murder by Brutus
(murder by Brutus j murder ^ Brutus) = 0:8, here we express that
the belief in the fact that an object is about murder by Brutus, knowing that an object is
about murder and about Brutus is 0:8.
Bruza denes the -function of   as follows. If a node I has no predecessors, e.g., for
all J 2 V
G
: (J; I) 62 E
G
(in the graph these are nodes which are elements of T ) then 
t
(t)
is based on some frequency-value. If a term occurs frequently in a small set of documents
then it gets a higher initial value. Typically a frequency function freq is used which is a
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normalised function with its domain between 0 and 1:

t
(t) = freq(t) and 
t
(:t) = 1, (t):
So, the belief that an object is about a keyword depends on the frequency of the keyword
in the document-base.
Furthermore Bruza assumed that the probability of a node with predecessors, being
true or false, depends on its predecessors. In the No Blind Faith theorem [23], Bruza
states that the probability is only non-zero if both predecessors are true. Intuitively this
is grounded on the fact that an object cannot be about I
1
cI
2
if the object is not about
I
1
or it is not about I
2
.
In case both predecessors are true, the value of this probability assessment depends on
which connector is used. For instance, the occurrence of a null-connector  between two
index expressions is more likely than the connector around, i.e., 
poor  Caesar
(poor 
Caesar j poor ^ Caesar) is larger than 
poor around Caesar
(poor around Caesar j
poor ^ Caesar). Therefore, Bruza [23] proposed 
'   
('   j ' ^  ) = 0:5366 and

' around  
(' around  j ' ^  ) = 0:0017 based on analysis of the percentage con-
nectors in the underlying document-domain. This analysis can directly be used for the
probability estimation. Following [77], we will denote the probability of the occurrence
of a connector c as P(c), so  is dened by:

t
1
c t
2
(t
1
c t
2
j t
1
^ t
2
) = P(c):
Furthermore, if two index expressions I and J are not in T , and neither have the form
t
i
c t
j
, and (I;K); (J;K) are elements of E
G
then

K
(K j I ^ J) = 1:
Using the Shinto-theorem from [77] which states that the a priori probability that a
node X has value X fully depends on its `ancestors', we dene the probability function
as follows:
Denition 4.13 Let I 2 L(T ; C) and B = (G; ) be a belief network, and   is
the set of assessment functions. Furthermore, let P
+
(I) be dened by }(I) n fg and
V
(J) =
def
K
1
^K
2
^ : : : ^K
n
with K
1
through K
n
such that (K
i
; J) 2 E
G
. Then:
P (I) =
def
Y
J2P
+
(I)

J
(J j
^
(J)):
For example, the probability of P (cruel  murder of Caesar), abbreviated as P (Cr 
Mu of Ca), is calculated as follows:
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P (Cr  Mu of Ca) = 
Cr  Mu of Ca
(Cr  Mu of Ca j Cr Mu ^Mu of Ca)

Cr  Mu
(Cr  Mu j Cr ^Mu)

Mu of Ca
(Mu of Ca j Mu ^ Ca)

Cr
(Cr) 
Mu
(Mu) 
Ca
(Ca)
= 1P()P(of) freq(Cr) freq(Mu) freq(Ca):
Inspecting this function, we see that the set }(Cr  Mu of Ca) bears an `information
bearing index expressions' subset fCr  Mu,Mu of Ca,Cr,Mu,Cag. This set contains those
elements that inuence the probability of the index expression. Formally we dene this
set as follows:
Denition 4.14 Given an index expression I the information bearing index expres-
sion subset (denoted by }(I)
+
) is dened to be the smallest subset of I such that
}(I)
+
=
def
fx j x 2 T or x has the form t
1
c t
2
with t
1
; t
2
2 T ; c 2 Cg:
Observing that P (I j I
1
^ : : : ^ I
k
) = 1 in case I not in }(I)
+
and (I
i
; I) 2 E
G
for
1  i  k we propose the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5 Let I 2 L(T ; C) and B = (G; ) be a belief network, and   is the set of
assessment functions. Furthermore,
V
(J) =
def
K
1
^K
2
^ : : :^K
n
with K
1
through K
n
such that (K
i
; J) 2 E
G
. Then:
P (I) =
Y
J2}(I)
+

J
(J j
^
(J)):
For instance, in the graph depicted in Figure 4.1, the rst two levels from below
contain the elements of the information bearing index expressions set.
The last point to explain is how to calculate the probability of a node I given evidence
J . For instance, what is P (cruel  murder j murder by Brutus)? Here, we consider
murder by Brutus to be evidence, e.g., we know that object d is about murder by
Brutus, the probability of this index expression is 1. Consequently all the subindex
expression of the evidence are true, since, for instance, knowing that an object is about
murder by Brutus is true, it is natural to assume that the object is about murder is
true. So, the calculation is then,
P (Cr Mu j Mu by Br) = 
Cr  Mu
(Cr Mu j Cr ^Mu) 
Cr
(Cr) 
Mu
(Mu)
= P() freq(Cr) 1:
See [23] and [77] for a detailed presentation of the method.
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Denition 4.15 Let D be a set of documents and d be a document with d 2 D.
Furthermore, let (G; ) be a belief network such that the set of probabilistic variables V
G
represents a set of index expressions with q 2 G and (d)  G, where (d) represents the
descriptor set of document d and q a query. The IEBN aboutness decision is dened
as follows:
j=
IE
m
d about q if and only if 9
x2(d)
[P (x j q) > P (x)]:
Now, the intuition behind this denition for information retrieval is as follows. If q
increases our belief in descriptors of (d), then it is assumed that d is about q.
Translation
The question is what the index expressions of an IEBN represent. In a typical belief
network, nodes are events. We propose that in the IEBN the nodes are situations and
the dependencies are aboutness dependencies. The descriptor set of a document (d)
which is a set of index-expressions, represents also all those index expressions which
are informationally contained in the set. We can say that the document representation
is closed under information containment. First we dene an index expression infon
language, which is a subset of I
Idx
(T ) given in Denition 3.7 at page 42.
Denition 4.16 Let P
+
(T ) be a profon language with only positive profons as given
in Denition 3.3 and C be a nite set of connectors fc
1
; : : : ; c
n
g. The index expression
infon language I
IE
(T ) is dened to be the smallest superset of P
+
(T ) such that
 if a
1
; a
2
2 P
+
(T ) and c 2 C then hhc,a
1
,a
2
; 1ii 2 I
IE
(T ).
The infon language I
IE
(T ) is a sub-language of I
Idx
(T ). The following infons are
excluded: fhhc,a
1
,. . . ,a
n
; iii j n > 2 or i = 0 or a
j
62 P
+
(T )g. The language I
IE
(T ) is
nite in contrast with the innite language I
Idx
(T ).
The language of situations S
IE
is the language S(I
IE
(T )). Furthermore, we assumed
situations to be closed under information containment, which is dened by:
Denition 4.17 The information containment relation (denoted by !) is dened by
hhc,a
1
,a
2
; 1ii!a
1
and hhc,a
1
,a
2
; 1ii!a
2
.
So, if ' 2 S and '! then  2 S. The set equivalence is dened analogously to the one
of the aboutness proof system SC
ps
.
Let (d) = fI
1
; : : : ; I
n
g The function map
1
((d)) is dened as follows:
map
1
((d)) = fmap
2
(i) j i 2 }(I)
+
and I 2 (d)g
map
2
(x) = hhc,map
2
(x
1
),map
2
(x
2
); 1ii if x has the form x
1
c x
2
map
2
(x) = hhI,x; 1ii if x 2 T :
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For the query we will not introduce a new map function. The function map
1
is dened
with as input a set and q is one index expression. In order to avoid type problems
we represent the query q, as a singleton set with one index expression. The mapping
functions of (d) and q are then the same.
Example 4.1 Examine the following index expression (d) = `(cruel  murder) of Caesar
by Brutus', abbreviated to `(Cr  Mu) of Ca by Br'. The translation of the index expression
proceeds as follows:
map
1
((d)) = fmap
2
(x) j x 2 fCr  Mu;Mu of Ca;Cr;Mu;Cagg
map
2
(Cr  Mu) = hh,map
2
(Cr),map
2
(Mu); 1ii
map
2
(Cr) = hhI,Cr; 1ii
.
.
.
map
1
((d)) = fhh,hhI,Cr; 1ii,hhI,Mu; 1ii; 1ii; : : : ; hhI,Br; 1iig:
The function map
1
is not injective. As a counterexample, take (d
1
) = fI
1
; I
2
g and
(d
2
) = fI
1
g with }(I
1
)
+
 }(I
2
)
+
. Then, map
1
((d
1
)) = map
1
((d
2
)) but (d
1
) 6= (d
2
).
Another counterexample is the following, (d
1
) = ft
1
c t
2
c t
3
c t
1
c t
2
g and (d
2
) =
ft
1
c t
2
c t
3
c t
1
g. Here, also map
1
((d
1
)) = map
1
((d
2
)). However, for both cases, in
the index expression belief network it also holds that the index expression aboutness
decisions of (d
1
) are identical to the decisions of (d
2
). The function is surjective, due
to fact that situations are nite and closed under information containment. Without
this additional requirement we could have the situation fhhc,a
1
,a
2
; 1iig without a set
A;A  G such that map
1
(A) = fhhc,a
1
,a
2
; 1iig.
Postulates
The aboutness derivation of the IEBN is based on a probabilistic estimation. It is
therefore remarkable that it is still possible to extract aboutness derivation steps.
The underlying aboutness proof system of the IEBN retrieval is denoted by IE
ps
and
is dened as follows.
Denition 4.18 (IEBN Situation Aboutness) The aboutness proof system IE
ps
is
dened to be the triple hL(I
IE
(T )), fSingleton Reexivityg,fSet Equivalence,Left Monotonic
Union,Symmetry,Strict Compositiongi.
Comparing the aboutness proof system IE
ps
with the aboutness proof systems C
ps
and VC
ps
, we see that they are identical. They only dier in their input language.
By denition we can deduce that I
Basic
(T )  I
IE
(T ). The consequence of this will be
inspected in Chapter 5.
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Theorem 4.6 For two index expressions elements I,J of V
G
with the number of nodes
in V
G
larger than 1:
P (I j J) > P (J), map
1
(fIg) \map
1
(fJg) 6 ;:
Proof Theorem 4.5 expresses that P (I) depends on the probabilities of the information
bearing index expression subset only. We have that,
P (I) =
Y
t
i
c t
j
2}(I)
+

t
i
ct
j
(t
i
c t
j
j t
i
^ t
j
)
Y
t
i
2}(I)
+

t
i
(t
i
)
=
Y
t
i
c
k
t
j
2}(I)
+
P(c
k
)
Y
t
i
2}(I)
+
freq(t
i
):
For P (I j J), all subindex expressions of J will have the probability assessment 1. Hence,
if t 2 }(J) then t is a subindex expression of J . Consequently 
t
(t) = 1, which is more
than the initial probability assessment of t, namely, freq(t). If P (I j J) depends on

t
(t) then P (I j J) > P (I). Now, P (I j J) depends on 
t
(t) if t 2 }(I)
+
as stated by
Theorem 4.5. To conclude we have that t 2 }(I)
+
and t 2 }(J)
+
. Then by denition of
the function map
1
we have that hhI,t; 1ii 2 map
1
(fIg) and hhI,t; 1ii 2 map
1
(fJg). This
proves the theorem.

Based on this theorem we can use the soundness and completeness theorem of C
ps
and conclude that:
Corollary 4.3
(i) The aboutness proof system IE
ps
is sound. That is, for all subsets A of G and
D 2 D such that (D) = A and B 2 G: if `
IE
ps
map
1
(A) map
1
(B) then
j=
IE
m
D about B.
(ii) The aboutness proof system IE
ps
is complete. That is, for all subsets A of G and
D 2 D such that (D) = A and B 2 G: if j=
IE
m
D about B then `
IE
ps
map
1
(A)
 map
1
(B).
Reection
The fact that the index expression aboutness decision is based on simple overlap between
the document and query-representation was noticed by IJdens [77]. He remarked that
`If a one-term overlap is enough to consider a document to be relevant, the
structure of the document captured by the index expressions is not used in
the selection of relevant documents.'
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One suggestion made by IJdens, in order to conclude less aboutness decisions, is to
demand that document and query should have at least two terms in common. Or in
the framework, by replacing the Singleton Reexivity with the axiom f';  g f';  g, a
kind of binary set equivalence. Another, less ad-hoc, suggestion made, was to adopt the
axioms fhhc,hhxii,hhyii; 1iig fhhd,hhxii,hhyii; 1iig with c; d elements of the connector
set. A weaker condition could be expressed by adopting the axiom in addition with
the following axioms fhhc,hhxii,hhyii; 1iig fhhc,hhyii,hhxii; 1iig. Taking the last two
axioms together, it describes the deduction that in an extended IEBN-model `information
 retrieval' and `retrieval of information' should be considered to be about each other. This
criterion is named Contextual Preselection [77].
4.5 Boolean retrieval
The model
In boolean retrieval the representation of the documents also consists of a set of terms
originating from a descriptor set T . The request is specied as a formula. These formulae
are constructed from the descriptor set T using the logical connectives _,^, and :. A
formula may contain the negation symbol :, expressing for example that the user wants
documents that are not about a certain keyword.
The boolean retrieval inference mechanism is based on the notion of derivation of
classical logic to which the Closed World Assumption (CWA) rule, introduced by Re-
iter [120], is added. We transform Reiter's CWA rule for the purpose of boolean retrieval
thus:
Denition 4.19 (Reiter 1978) The closure of a theory D, denoted by CWA(D), is the
theory D [ f:t : D 6` t and t 2 T g. The set of all theorems derivable from D by CWA is
identied with the set of all formulae classically derivable from CWA(D).
Denition 4.20 Let D be a document-base and d 2 D some document. Furthermore,
suppose that T is some nite set of basic information items (descriptors) such that (d)
is a subset of T , where (d) represents the descriptor set of document d. Let the query q
be a logical formula constructed from the descriptor set T using the logical connectives
_,^, and :. We dene the boolean aboutness decision as follows:
j=
B
m
d about q if and only if CWA((d)) ` q:
Note that the set T is used as a set of propositional constants. The truth-value of
propositional constant t represents the occurrence of the keyword t in a document. The
next step is to dene boolean retrieval in terms of our framework. Translating the CWA
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can proceed in two dierent ways: (1) one can extend the document representation with
the negation of all the terms which are not contained in the representation, or (2) one
can add a postulate that expresses the CWA in terms of a rule.
4.5.1 Boolean model I
Let us rst consider the option where the document representation is extended with the
negation of all terms which are not contained in the representation.
Translation boolean model I
In order to translate boolean retrieval to the framework we dene a boolean infon lan-
guage I
B
(T ) similar, although not equal, to the boolean infon language I
Bl
(T ) given in
Denition 3.5. Here, we do not introduce the logical connectives ^ and : as elements
of the set of relations Rel . We present the connective ^ using the conjunction operator
between situations, and the negation is handled by the polarity of the infons.
Denition 4.21 The boolean infon language I
B
(T ) is the infon language I(P(T ); f_g;
;).
The language of situations S
B
is the language S(I
B
(T )). The translation of a document
d of a given document-base D into a situation of S
B
is dened as follows:
map
1
((d)) = fhhI,t; 1ii j t 2 (d) and t 2 T g [ fhhI,t; 0ii j t 62 (d) and t 2 T g:
Example 4.2 Examine the following two documents: d
1
contains the information that
`Caesar likes Brutus' and d
2
that `Antonius hates Brutus'. The document descriptor sets
can be translated as follows:
T = fC;L;B;A;Hg
(d
1
) = fC;L;Bg
(d
2
) = fA;H;Bg
S
d
1
= fhhI,C; 1ii; hhI,L; 1ii; hhI,B; 1ii; hhI,A; 0ii; hhI,H; 0iig
S
d
2
= fhhI,C; 0ii; hhI,L; 0ii; hhI,B; 1ii; hhI,A; 1ii; hhI,H; 1iig:
Without loss of generality we require query formulae to be in conjunctive normal
form. A formula  is said to be in conjunctive normal form if and only if  is of the form
(
1
_ : : :_
j
)^ : : :^ (
k
_ : : :_
m
) with 
i
either a propositional constant t representing
a keyword or the negation :t of a propositional constant. The negation of a term is
modelled as a negative profon (hhI,t;0ii). The disjunction of two formulae is translated
with an infon of the kind hh_,
1
,. . . ,
n
; 1ii.
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A translation function map
2
from the set of boolean formulae to the set of situations
is given as follows:
map
2
(
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
) = fmap
2
(
1
)g [ : : : [ fmap
2
(
n
)g
map
2
(
1
_ : : : _ 
n
) = hh_,map
2
(
1
),. . . ,map
2
(
n
); 1ii
map
2
(t) = hhI,t; 1ii with t 2 T a propositional constant
map
2
(:t) = hhI,t; 0ii with t 2 T a propositional constant.
Example 4.3 Consider the boolean query (C _ :A) ^ (H _ B), which represents the
information-need `I want all the documents which contain information about \Caesar" or
do not contain information about \Antonius", and contain information about \Hate" or
\Brutus"'. Using the map
2
-function this query is translated as follows:
map
2
((C _ :A) ^ (H _ B)) = fmap
2
(C _ :A)g [ fmap
2
(H _ B)g
map
2
(C _ :A) = hh_,map
2
(C),map
2
(:A); 1ii
map
2
(H _ B) = hh_,map
2
(H),map
2
(B); 1ii
map
2
(C) = hhI,C; 1ii
.
.
. =
.
.
.
map
2
((C _ :A) ^ (H _ B)) = fhh_,hhI,C; 1ii,hhI,A; 0ii; 1ii;
hh_,hhI,H; 1ii,hhI,B; 1ii; 1iig:
To sum up, we have introduced two translation functions, namely map
1
which translates
the keywords of the descriptor set of the document into a set of profons; and map
2
translates boolean formulae into a set of infons. The map
1
function is injective. However,
it is not surjective. For instance, the situation S dened as fhhI,t; 1ii; hhI,t; 0iig does
not have a document description for which map
1
((d)) = S. In order to propose a
sub-domain in which the function map
1
is surjective, we dene a boolean document
situation.
Denition 4.22 A situation S 2 S
B
is called a boolean document situation if and
only if it satises the following conditions:
(a) for all t 2 T : hhI,t; 0ii 2 S or hhI,t; 1ii 2 S,
(b) if hhI,t; iii 2 S then hhI,t; 1, iii 62 S for i 2 f0; 1g,
(c) if  2 S then  2 P.
The rst condition requires that for all elements of T there is a positive profon
hhI,t; 1ii or a negative profon hhI,t; 0ii in the boolean document situation. The second
condition requires that if the positive infon of descriptor t is an element of the situation,
the negative profon is not, and vice versa. The last condition states that only profons
are elements of the boolean document situation.
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Claim 4.4 If S and T are boolean document situations and T  S [ U , then U  S.
Proof Reecting on the conditions of Denition 4.22 we have that: Condition (a)
expresses that the number of elements of a boolean document situation is equal with the
number of descriptors in T . Consequently, the number of elements of S and T are equal.
Since T  S [ U , we have that U  S.

The function map
2
is not injective. In case of syntactically dierent yet logically
equivalent formulae the result will be identical situations. Take for example the formulae
t ^ t and t, for which holds that map
2
(t ^ t) = map
2
(t) = fhhI,t; 1iig. Note that this is
not the case for all logical equivalent formulae: for instance, map
2
(t _ s) 6 map
2
(s _ t).
The function map
2
is surjective: for every situation there exists a formula.
Postulates
Given the functions map
1
and map
2
one can dene an aboutness proof system B1
ps
using
the output of these two functions.
Denition 4.23 (Boolean Situation Aboutness I) The aboutness proof system B1
ps
is dened to be the triple hL(I
B
(T )),fReexivityg,fSet Equivalence,Cut,Left Monotonic
Union,_-Right Monotonic Compositiongi.
The rule _-Right Monotonic Composition intuitively allows us to deduce that if a sit-
uation is about \Caesar" it is also about \Caesar" or \Brutus". Given the conclusion
that situation S is about the singleton set fg, one is able to deduce that S is about
the infon hh_,, ; 1ii. One could also derive that S is about hh_,,hh_,', ; 1ii; 1ii. In
order to deduce aboutness of infons representing that relation _ holds between more
than two objects, we consider the infon hh_,'
1
,. . . ,'
k
, ; 1ii to be identical to the infon
hh_,'
1
,. . . ,'
k
, 
1
,. . . , 
n
; 1ii if  = hh_, 
1
,. . . , 
n
; 1ii.
For instance, hh_,,hh_,', ; 1ii; 1ii = hh_,,', ; 1ii. Furthermore we consider that
a permutation of the objects in infons of the form hh_,'
1
,. . . ,'
n
; 1ii does not change
the information carried by the object. So, for instance hh_,, ; 1ii = hh_, ,; 1ii. The
denition of set equivalence can then be dened as:
S  T =
def
 2 S ,  2 T and  =  :
Theorem 4.7 The aboutness proof system B1
ps
is sound. That is, for all subsets A
of T and D 2 D such that (D) = A and for all logical formulae B in conjunctive
normal form constructed from the descriptor set T using the connectives _,^, and :: if
`
B1
ps
map
1
(A) map
2
(B) then j=
B
m
D about B.
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Proof First we prove the soundness of the axiom Reexivity. Secondly we prove the
soundness of all the rules of B1
ps
. This enable us to conclude that B1
ps
is sound with
respect to B
m
.
 The axiom Reexivity is sound. We have to show that, if map
1
(A)  S and
map
2
(B)  S then CWA(A) ` B. Due to the fact that map
1
(A)  map
2
(B)
we have no disjunctions in B, as by the denition of the function map
1
, infons of
the type hh_,'
1
,. . . ,'
n
; iii are not in map
1
(A), and consequently, not in map
2
(B).
Let A = fa
1
; : : : a
k
g with a
i
2 T and B = (b
1
^ : : : ^ b
l
) with b
i
a literal. We have
that hhI,a
i
; pii 2 map
1
(A) , hhI,b
i
; pii 2 map
2
(B) for 1  i j map
1
(A) j and
p = f0; 1g. If hhI,a
i
; 1ii 2 map
1
(A) then a
i
2 A, and a
i
2 B. Furthermore, if
hhI,a
i
; 0ii 2 map
1
(A) then a
i
62 A and :a
i
2 B. By the denition of the function
CWA we have that CWA(A) ` B. This proves the soundness of the axiom.
 The rule Set Equivalence is sound. As with the soundness proofs of SC
ps
and C
ps
we
restrict ourselves to proving the soundness of the Left Set Equivalence rule. Given
that map
1
(A)  map
1
(B) and map
1
(A) map
2
(C), which implies that A  B
and CWA(A) ` C. We have to inspect whether the conclusion CWA(B) ` C is
sound. By the denition of CWA trivially given that A  B if CWA(A) ` C then
CWA(B) ` C. This proves the soundness of the Set Equivalence rule.
 The rule Left Monotonic Union is sound. Given that S  T is a sound premise, one
has to prove that S [ U  T is also sound. Let S  map
1
(A), T  map
2
(B), and
S[U  map
1
(C). If S  T is sound, then CWA(A) ` B. Now, we have to inspect
whether CWA(C) ` B under the assumption that map
1
(C)  S [ U . Note that
due to the soundness of premise map
1
(A) is a boolean situation.
Referring to Claim 4.4, the reader can check easily that map
1
(C) is a boolean
situation if and only if S[U  S. Then given that S  T is sound, the conclusion
S [ U  T is sound, since we proved that the rule Set Equivalence is sound and
S [ U  S. This proves the soundness of the rule.
 The proof of the soundness of the Cut rule proceeds as follows. Given that S [
T  U and S  T are sound premises we have to prove that S  U is a sound
conclusion. The argument is similar with the one of the proof of the soundness
of Left Monotonic Union. Due to the fact that S [ T  U and S  T are sound
premises, S[T and S are document situations and as shown by the claim S  S[T ,
therefore S  U is a sound conclusion, which proves the soundness of the Cut rule.
 Finally we have to prove the soundness of the _-Right Monotonic Composition. If
S  f'g is a sound premise, the conclusion S  fhh_,', ; 1iig is sound. Let
S  map
1
(A), map
2
(B)  f'g and map
2
(C)  fhh_,', ; 1iig. By denition
of the function map
2
we have that C is logically equivalent with B _ D, for
map
2
(D) = f g. Since CWA(A) ` B then CWA(A) ` B _ D is sound, the rule
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_-Right Monotonic Composition is sound.

At rst sight the rule Left Monotonic Union seems to be a rule that does not hold
in the aboutness proof system that models an IR model with a CWA. The following
deduction seems to be sound:
fhhI,t; 0iig fhhI,t; 0iig
LMU
fhhI,t; 1iig [ fhhI,t; 0iig fhhI,t; 0iig
So, assuming the above deduction to be sound, a situation could be about fhhI,t; 1iig
and fhhI,t; 0iig. However, notice that this situation does not result in an document
situation. If `
B1
ps
map
1
(A) map
2
(B) then map
1
(A) is a boolean document situation.
Thus, if we have that S  T , with S is not a boolean document situation due to the fact
that some profons (positive or negative) profons are absent, we can add with the rule
Left Monotonic Union the absent profons to S in order to achieve a document situation
S
0
.
Theorem 4.8 The aboutness proof system B1
ps
is complete. That is, for all subsets
A of T and D 2 D such that (D) = A and for all logical formulae B in conjunctive
normal form constructed from the descriptor set T using the connectives _,^, and :: if
j=
B
m
D about B then `
B1
ps
map
1
(A) map
2
(B).
Proof We have to show that if j=
B
m
CWA(A) about B then `
B1
ps
map
1
(A) map
2
(B).
Due to the fact that B is in conjunctive normal form, B can be presented as B =
(b
11
_ : : :_ b
1s
)^ (b
21
_ : : :_ b
2t
)^ : : :^ (b
n1
_ : : :_ b
nz
) with b
ij
a literal. If D is about B,
then CWA(A) ` B. Observe that
CWA(A) ` B , (CWA(A) ` b
11
or : : : or CWA(A) ` b
1s
)
and
.
.
.
and
(CWA(A) ` b
n1
or : : : or CWA(A) ` b
nz
):
Next, we inspect CWA(A) ` b
ij
with b
ij
a literal. The reader may verify the following, if
b
ij
is a positive literal:
CWA(A) ` b
ij
, b
ij
2 A;
CWA(A) ` :b
ij
, b
ij
62 A:
By Denition 4.19 CWA(A) = A [ f:t : A 6` t and t 2 T g. Due to the fact that A is
a set of positive literals, A ` t if and only if t 2 A. Consequently A 6` t if and only if
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t 62 A. Now given b
ij
is a positive literal, we have to prove that if CWA(A) ` b
ij
then
`
B1
ps
map
1
(A) map
2
(b
ij
) and if CWA(A) ` :b
ij
then `
B1
ps
map
1
(A) map
2
(:b
ij
).
Consider the rst case CWA(A) ` b
ij
implies that b
ij
2 A. So, map
1
(A)  map
2
(b
ij
). Us-
ing Reexivity and Left Monotonic Union, we can conclude that `
B1
ps
map
1
(A) map
2
(b
ij
).
Otherwise, if CWA(A) ` :b
ij
then b
ij
62 A, thus hhI,b
ij
; 0ii 2 map
1
(A) and map
2
(:b
ij
) =
fhhI,b
ij
; 0iig. Here we can also deduce that map
1
(A) map
2
(b
ij
) using Reexivity and
Left Monotonic Union. Now, continuing the proof, the deduction `if CWA(A) ` b
j1
or : : :
or CWA(A) ` b
js
then CWA(A) ` b
j1
_: : :_b
js
' has its counterpart in the aboutness proof
system, if map
1
(A) map
2
(b
j1
) or : : : or map
1
(A) map
2
(b
js
) then map
1
(A) 
fhh_,b
j1
,. . . ,b
js
; 1iig using the rule _-Right Monotonic Composition. Finally, the deduc-
tion `if CWA(A) ` b
1
and . . . and CWA(A) ` b
n
then CWA(A) ` b
1
^ : : : ^ b
n
' is gov-
erned by the aboutness proof system B1
ps
with the rule Context-Free Union as follows:
map
1
(A) map
2
(b
1
) and : : : and map
1
(A) map
2
(b
n
) then map
1
(A) map
2
(b
1
^: : :
^ b
n
), which is identical with map
1
(A) map
2
(b
1
) [ : : : [map
2
(b
n
).

Reection
As one may have noticed, B1
ps
contains the postulates of the system SC
ps
in addition
with rules for the _-operator. Next, we inspect the top and bottom elements as dened
on page 64.
Proposition 4.5 In the aboutness proof system B1
ps
we have that:
(i) The top query of B1
ps
is the set fmap
2
(') j ' is a tautologyg.
(ii) The top document of B1
ps
is the set fhhI,t; pii j p 2 f0; 1g and t 2 T g.
(iii) The bottom query of B1
ps
is the set ;.
(iv) The bottom document of B1
ps
is the set ;.
Tautology is dened as in classical logic.
Proof
(i) We have to show that, for arbitrary situations S 2 S
B
, the aboutness formula
S  T is an aboutness theorem for all T 2 1
q
B1
ps
. A tautology B in classi-
cal logic has the property that for all A : A ` B. So, assume B is a tautology
which is in conjunctive normal form B = (b
11
_ : : : _ b
1s
) ^ : : : ^ (b
n1
_ : : : _ b
nz
)
with b
ij
a literal. This implies that for all A: A ` (b
11
_ : : : _ b
1s
) and . . .
and A ` (b
n1
_ : : : b
nz
). Let us inspect a tautology (b
11
_ : : : _ b
1s
) in isola-
tion. This implies that there is always one or more literals b
1j
with 1  j  s
for which A ` b
1j
. Due to the completeness of the aboutness proof system,
we can conclude that there is always a b
1j
for which map
1
(A) map
2
(b
1j
), and
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consequently map
1
(A) map
2
(hh_,b
11
; : : : ; b
1s
; 1ii). So, one may conclude that
map
1
(A) map
2
(B).
(ii) We have to show that, for arbitrary situation T 2 S
B
, the aboutness formula S  T
is an aboutness theorem for all S 2 1
d
B1
ps
. First we note that the element of the
top document of B1
ps
is a situation S that contains all profons of the the language
I
B
(T ). Assume T is a situation such that U [V  T , with U the profons of T and
V is a situation with infons of the form hh_,'
1
,. . . ,'
n
; 1ii. Furthermore assume
W  SnU then, it is provable from U  U , that U[W  U . Using Set Equivalence
one determines that S  U . Now, we have to prove that S  V , which allows
us to conclude that S  U [ V , and using Set Equivalence one determines that
S  T . The rule _-Right Monotonic Composition states that given S  f'g one
may conclude that S  fhh_,', ; 1iig. So, for each element of V we have to
inspect if one object a
i
of the infon hh_,a
1
,. . . ,a
n
; 1ii is about S. Recursively, we
could proceeds as follows: S  fhh_,a
1
,. . . ,a
n
; 1iig if and only if there is a a
i
with
1  i  n such that S  fa
i
g. If a
i
is a profon, then we could prove that S  fa
i
g,
using Reexivity and Set Equivalence analogously as we did for the situation V .
Otherwise, we continue recursively on the structure of a
i
. This recursion on the
structure will determine on a specic profon '. Here, one can analogously prove
that S  f'g.
(iii) Since 1
d
B1
ps
is not empty, Proposition 4.2 suces to conclude that 0
q
B1
ps
is empty.
(iv) Since 1
q
B1
ps
is not empty, Proposition 4.2 suces to conclude that 0
d
B1
ps
is empty.

Note that since we do not have a surjective map function, we can not use Proposi-
tion 4.1 to derive the top and bottom elements of the model B
m
.
Proposition 4.6 In the IR model B
m
we have that:
(i) The top query of B
m
is the set f' j ' is a tautologyg.
(ii) The bottom query of B
m
is the set f' j ' is a contradiction g.
(iii) The top document of B
m
is the set ;.
(iv) The bottom document of B
m
is the set ;.
Tautology and contradiction are dened as in classical logic.
Proof
(i) The proof of item (i) is completely analogous to the proof of item (i) of Proposi-
tion 4.5.
(ii) There is no document that is about a contradiction. A contradiction B in classical
logic has the property that for all A : A 6` B. So, assume B is a contradiction then
for all (d), CWA((d)) 6` B. Consequently, there is no document retrieved with
respect to query B which proves the proposition.
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(iii) Since 0
q
B
m
is not empty, Proposition 4.2 suces to conclude that 1
d
B
m
is empty.
(iv) Since 1
q
B
m
is not empty, Proposition 4.2 suces to conclude that 0
d
B
m
is empty.

One may wonder, whether, given ' is a contradiction, map
2
(') is not an element
of the bottom query of B1
ps
. Since Reexivity is an axiom of B1
ps
, we have that
map
2
(') map
2
('), which contradicts the assumption.
4.5.2 Boolean model II
The presented approach is based on a `Closed World' indexing: if a document is not in-
dexed with a descriptor, it is assumed to be indexed with the negation of that particular
descriptor. This approach includes the following aspects. First, adding new documents
with descriptors not yet in the set T to the document-base requires an update of all the
representations of the documents with the negated form of the new descriptors. Further-
more, the fact that boolean retrieval operates under the CWA is, according to Bruza,
`one of the principle clarications why these models oer ineective disclosure' [23]. For
instance a document indexed with the keywords \killed", \Brutus", and \Caesar", is about
the query not \murder".
In order to highlight the `rule' that is governed by the CWA we present an aboutness
proof system in which the CWA is incorporated as a rule rather than through the mapping
function.
Translation boolean model II
Another approach consists of adopting the CWA in terms of a rule. The boolean infon
language I
B
(T ) is dened as in the previous boolean aboutness proof system. The
translation function of a document representation into a situation is given as follows:
map
1
((d)) = fhhI,t; 1ii j t 2 (d)g:
Here, the denition of a boolean document situation is dierent than the one given in
the previous approach.
Denition 4.24 A situation S 2 S
B
is called a boolean document situation if and
only if S  P
+
(T ).
The query transformation is identical to the translation of the rst approach.
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Postulates
In this case we do not add negative infons to the representation, but instead we add
new rules to obtain the same eect. The document boolean situation is a set of positive
profons the query boolean situation is an element of S
B
as dened before.
Denition 4.25 (Boolean Situation Aboutness II) The aboutness proof system
B2
ps
is dened to be the triple hL
Ext
2
(I
B
(T )); fReexivity
1
g; fSet Equivalence
1
; Left Mono-
tonic Union
1
;Cut
1
;Context-Free Union
2
;_-Right Monotonic Composition
2
;Aboutness Inheri-
tance; Simple Anti-Aboutness;Closed World Assumptiongi.
Here we are using the extended combined aboutness language L
Ext
2
(I
B
(T )) as given
on page 56. Therefore some of the axioms and rules have to be indexed. For instance
the Cut
1
appears as follows:
S  
1
T S [ T  
1
U
S  
1
U
Let us explain the aboutness proof system to some extent. The Aboutness Inheritance
expresses that all aboutness theorems of 1 are aboutness theorems of 2. Note that  
1
is dened with the postulates of the aboutness proof system SC
ps
. This implies that if
S  
1
T , then S  T , which has been proved in Section 4.1.
Furthermore the rule Simple Anti-Aboutness implies that if one is not able to prove
S  
1
T then one concludes S 
1
T . As mentioned in Chapter 3, we believe that this
is not a good denition of an anti-aboutness relation. The rule Context-Free Union
2
expresses that given the premises S  
2
T and S  
2
U , then one may conclude that
S  
2
T [ U .
Finally the postulate Closed World Assumption is a rule of the aboutness proof sys-
tem. The Closed World Assumption rule deserves more attention. We are using an
anti-aboutness decision S 
1
T in combination with a preclusion decision to derive an
aboutness decision of S  
2
U . Preclusion is dened here as hhI,t; 1ii?
2
hhI,t; 0ii for
all t 2 T . Note, that this implies that the preclusion relation is not symmetric, i.e.,
hhI,t; 0ii?
2
hhI,t; 1ii is not an axiom. In order to explain the Closed World Assumption
rule (given that S 
1
fg, and that ?
2
 , we can deduce that S  
2
f g) let us con-
sider the following example: we can prove that fhhI,Caesar; 1iig is about fhhI,Brutus; 0ii;
hhI,Ceasar; 1iig as follows (in abbreviated form):
I
fhhI,C; 1iig 
1
fhhI,B; 1iig hhI,B; 1ii?
2
hhI,B; 0ii
CWA
fhhI,C; 1iig 
2
fhhI,B; 0iig
II
fhhI,C; 1iig 
1
fhhI,C; 1iig
AI
fhhI,C; 1iig 
2
fhhI,C; 1iig
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I II
CFU
fhhI,C; 1iig 
2
fhhI,B; 0iig [ fhhI,C; 1iig
SE
fhhI,C; 1iig 
2
fhhI,B; 0ii; hhI,C; 1iig
Theorem 4.9 The aboutness proof system B2
ps
is sound. That is, for all subsets A of
T and D 2 D such that (D) = A and for all logical formulae B in conjunctive normal
form constructed from the descriptor set T using the connectives _,^, and : and for
i 2 f1; 2g: if `
B2
ps
map
1
(A) 
i
map
2
(B) then j=
B
m
D about B.
Proof First we prove the soundness of the aboutness theorems of 1. Secondly we prove
the soundness of all the other rules of B2
ps
. This enable us to conclude that B2
ps
is
sound with respect to B
m
.
 In order to prove that S  
1
T is a sound theorem we can reect to the soundness
proof of the aboutness proof system SC
ps
. There we proved that if S  T , then
S  T . So, if map
1
(A) 
1
map
2
(B) then map
1
(A)  map
2
(B). Assume that
S  map
1
(A) and T  map
2
(B). By the denition of function map
1
we have that
map
1
(A) is a boolean situation, thus S  P
+
(T ), and consequently T  P
+
(T ).
By the denition of the function map
2
it follows that B = t
1
^ : : : ^ t
n
with t
i
a
positive literal and t
i
2 A for 1  i  n. Obviously, CWA(A) ` B, which proves
the soundness of the aboutness theorems of 1.
 By the preceding considerations the proof of the soundness of the Aboutness Inheri-
tance rule is nished as well. Since, given the sound premise S  
1
T , then trivially
S  
2
T is sound.
 The soundness of the Closed World Assumption can be proved as follows. Given
that S fg is a sound premise and that ?
2
 . Assume that S  map
1
(A) and
 = hhI,t; 1ii. The sound premise implies that hhI,t; 1ii 62 S. So, now we have to
prove that S  fhhI,t; 0iig is a sound conclusion. Thus, that CWA(A) ` :t. By
denition of the function map
1
we have that if hhI,t; 1ii 62 S then t 62 A, which
allows us to conclude that CWA(A) ` :t.
 In order to prove the soundness of the rule Context-Free Union
2
, one has to prove
that given S  
2
T and S  
2
U are sound, S  
2
T [ U is sound. Assume that
S  map
1
(A), T  map
2
(B), and U  map
2
(C). By the denition of the function
map
2
we have that map
2
(B^C)  map
2
(B)[map
2
(C). The sound premise implies
that CWA(A) ` B and CWA(A) ` C, which allows us to conclude that CWA(A) `
B ^ C. This suces to conclude that the rule Context-Free Union
2
is sound.
 The proof of the soundness of the rule _-Right Monotonic Composition
2
proceeds
analogously to the one of aboutness proof system B1
ps
.

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Theorem 4.10 The aboutness proof system B2
ps
is complete. That is, for all subsets
A of T and D 2 D such that (D) = A and for all logical formulae B in conjunctive
normal form constructed from the descriptor set T using the connectives _,^, and : and
for i 2 f1; 2g:: if j=
B
m
D about B then `
B2
ps
map
1
(A) 
i
map
2
(B).
Proof For the rst part of the completeness proof proceeds analogously to the one of
the aboutness proof system B1
ps
. We continue the proof after the conclusion that, if b
ij
is a positive literal:
CWA(A) ` b
ij
, b
ij
2 A;
CWA(A) ` :b
ij
, b
ij
62 A:
Then, we have to prove that map
1
(A) 
2
map
2
(b
ij
). Assume that S  map
1
(A) and
map
2
(b
ij
)  fhhI,b
ij
; 1iig. If b
ij
62 A, then hhI,b
ij
; 1ii 62 S. Applying the rule Simple Anti-
Aboutness we have that S 
1
fhhI,b
ij
; 1iig. By the denition of the preclusion-relation
we have that hhI,b
ij
; 1ii?
2
hhI,b
ij
; 0ii. Using the rule Closed World Assumption we can
conclude that S  fhhI,b
ij
; 0iig. In case b
ij
2 A, then hhI,b
ij
; 1ii 2 S. Consequently
S  
1
fhhI,b
ij
; 1iig and the rule Aboutness Inheritance allows us to conclude that S  
2
fhhI,b
ij
; 1iig. The proof proceeds analogously to the completeness proof of B1
ps
.

Reection
The top query set and the bottom query set are identical to the ones of the aboutness
proof system B1
ps
. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the denition of anti-aboutness in
terms of not about leads to undesirable properties. The fact that a document titled
`Brutus killed Caesar' is not indexed with the keyword \murder" should not imply that
this document is anti-about \murder". In case we want to improve the aboutness proof
system B2
ps
one could suggest to improve the anti-aboutness denition. This can be
done by improving the rule Simple Anti-Aboutness. If one is able to dene anti-aboutness
more precisely, the retrieval results of B2
ps
could be more precise. Based on the same
intuition one could suggest an extended denition of the preclusion relation.
4.6 Conceptual Graph retrieval
The model
In this section we introduce the logical IR model Elen as presented in the thesis of
Chevallet [34] (see also [73, 74, 114]). Chevallet proposes the use of the conceptual
graphs formalism to build an operational version of the logical model suggested by van
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Rijsbergen [124]. The logical model is only a formal framework for designing informa-
tion retrieval systems involving knowledge and deduction mechanisms. Several logical IR
models are already designed to deal with complex information and deductions through
an appropriate knowledge representation formalism. For example, within the RIME [18]
and MIRTL [101] projects formalisms are used that are based on the notion of Con-
ceptual Dependency and on Terminological Logic, respectively. These projects aim at
building operational logical models for IR.
It is in the same direction that Chevallet proposes to use the conceptual graphs
formalism to instantiate the logical model. His idea led to the system Elen (geniE
logicieL & recherchE d'informatioNs), which is based on an indexing language that uses
conceptual graphs. The conceptual graph approach is based on the basic denitions and
properties of conceptual graphs as developed by Sowa [137].
Next, we introduce the conceptual graphs in the way in which they are used in the
conceptual graph model, which we refer to as Elen. A graph is a representation of
information and consists of the following three basic elements:
 concept nodes,
 relation nodes,
 edges between concept and relation nodes.
A concept node, represented graphically by a box, has a concept type. This concept
type corresponds to a semantic class, e.g., Person,Place, and so on. This concept type
has possibly a referent, which corresponds to an instantiation of the class of the concept
type. For instance, Brutus, Garden could be referents of the concept types Person and
Place respectively. A relation node, represented graphically by an oval, has a relation
type only, which corresponds to a semantic class of relations such as, ActsOn, Position,
and so on. Two concept nodes can be related to each other using a relation node and
edges. The edges express in which way the concept nodes are related. The following
graph is constructed out of the concepts Place and Roman, the referents Brutus and
Garden, and the relation Position.
Garden Position ROMANBrutusPLACE
The Roman \Brutus" is in a Place \Garden".
In this graph, the arrows express that the \Garden" is the position of \Brutus" and
not \Brutus" is the position of the \Garden". Now we can dene the conceptual graph as
follows [137]:
Denition 4.26 (Conceptual Graph [Sowa '84]) A conceptual graph is a nite and
oriented, bipartite, connected graph of concepts and relations nodes. In a conceptual
graph, concept nodes represent entities, attributes, states and events, and relation nodes
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represents relations between the concept nodes. The edges show how concept nodes are
interconnected by relation nodes.
Besides a graphical representation of information, Sowa [137] introduces a knowledge
base. This knowledge base contains a concept and relation type taxonomy. Such a type
taxonomy is a lattice structure of types. In this lattice the information is represented
that a certain type is semantically included in another type. For instance, it could be the
case that Roman is semantically included in Person. The gure below is an example
of a fragment of a concept type taxonomy:
Persons
Roman Dutchman Frenchman Greec
One can use the lattice to induce a partial ordering relation . This relation is
dened as follows: if X is semantically included in Y according to the lattice then
X  Y . Furthermore,  is assumed to be reexive and transitive. For instance, in the
graph depicted above, Roman  Person. We say that type Roman is a restriction or
a subtype of Person, and that Person is a generalisation of Roman. The knowledge
base contains two such lattices, one for the concept types and one for the relation types.
In case of the concept types, the  relation can be extended to concept nodes having
referents. For example, Roman:Brutus  Roman , where Roman represents the
concept of all Romans, and Roman:Brutus represents the concept of a Roman named
\Brutus".
In Elen documents are represented by graphs. According to Peirce [116] and Sowa
[138] it can be argued that it is easier for the user to express her information (sentences)
by means of a graph than by using formulae from rst order logic. Adopting this point
of view, a graph representation is a suitable option to formulate a query.
Furthermore, Chevallet motivated his choice for Elen by the fact that the conceptual
graph formalism can represent all components of an IR system: documents and queries,
as well as the general domain knowledge of the document-base.
Next we present how one can index documents by conceptual graphs. In the con-
ceptual graph approach the indexer manually creates a set of conceptual graphs, called
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the minimal canonical graphs. These graphs represent information descriptors, for ex-
ample, that the concept type Place is related by relation Position to a concept type
Person. The reason that they are called canonical is that these graphs are assumed to
have a correct informational meaning (from the position of the indexer). A set of minimal
canonical graphs from the minimal canonical base. This base contains all sucient and
necessary information descriptors, which are needed to represent the document-base.
Furthermore, for each concept type there exists a conformity relation indicating that
a referent is a correct instantiation of a concept type. With this relation we can inspect
whether \Brutus" is conform to the concept type Roman or not. If a concept type X is a
generalisation of a concept type Y , and \t" is conform to Y then one may also conclude
that \t" is conform to X.
The conformity relation and set of minimal canonical graphs are xed and created
manually by a human indexer. Now, new canonical graphs may be generated from
existing ones using the following four elementary operators:
(1) Copy: if w is a conceptual graph then a copy u of w is also a conceptual graph.
A r B A r B
Figure 4.2: The copy of a graph.
(2) Restriction: a graph is restricted when a concept type or a relation type is replaced
by a subtype, or when a referent is replaced by an included set. In Figure 4.3, given
the fact that C is a subtype of the concept type A, the left graph can be restricted
to the right graph.
r BA: x r BC: x
Figure 4.3: The restriction of a graph.
(3) Simplication: when two concepts are linked by two identical relations, then one
may be deleted. For instance, in Figure 4.4, the left graph can be simplied to the
right graph.
A r B
r A r B
Figure 4.4: The simplication of a graph.
(4) Join: two graphs that have one concept in common, can be joined to form one graph
by sharing this common concept. In Figure 4.5 two graphs are joined on their
common concept B.
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A r B rB C
A r rB C
Figure 4.5: The join of two graphs.
These operators can be used to construct new graphs. The result will be a conceptual
graph that represents the information of a document or a query q. For the sake of
simplicity Elen adopts the constraint that every document and query are represented
by one single graph [137]. Furthermore, Elen adopts the additional constraint that only
dyadic relations are used in the index.
If it is possible to build a graph B starting from the graph A using the four operators,
then we can view this graph B as a restriction of graph A. Or, stated dierently, that
B  A. This implies that the denition of the -relation is extended to graphs. A node
with a concept type with or without a referent could be seen as a graph, therefore we
could say that  is a relation on conceptual graphs. In this perspective Sowa dened 
as follows: if the graph B is the result of using the four operators starting from graph
A then B  A. Note that in this denition, we still have that a concept type with a
restriction is a subtype of the same concept type without a referent, due to the restriction
operator on graphs.
The  relation dened on conceptual graphs is of prime importance in Elen. A
document d indexed by a conceptual graph (d) is about a query represented by a
conceptual graph q, if and only if (d)  q, i.e., the information contained in graph q
is also contained in graph (d). One can say that the relation  plays the role of the
deduction connective in the logical model.
Sowa [137] introduced a projection operator that makes it clear whether a graph is a
specialisation of another graph or not.
Denition 4.27 A conceptual graph H is projected on a graph G if and only if there
consists a subgraph G
0
of G that satises the following conditions:
(i) The conceptual relations in G
0
and H are identical.
(ii) The concepts C
1
; : : : ; C
n
of G
0
are specialisations of the corresponding concepts
D
1
; : : : ; D
n
of H.
(iii) If a relation R links two concepts D
i
and D
j
in H, then it also links the concepts
C
i
and C
j
in G
0
.
Sowa proves that if a conceptual graph G is a specialisation of H, there must exist a
projection of H on G. Mugnier [102] shows the converse, e.g., that if there is a projection
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of H on G, then G  H. This shows that the projection operator may be viewed as
the basic retrieval operator: retrieving documents that imply query q is equivalent to
retrieving documents that contain a projection of q.
Denition 4.28 LetD be a document-base and d a document with d 2 D. Furthermore,
let G be a set of conceptual graphs, with q and (d) 2 G, where (d) is the representation
of document d and q is a query. The conceptual graph aboutness decision is dened as
follows:
j=
CG
m
d about q if and only if (d)  q:
Let us consider an example of a conceptual graph aboutness decision as given in [113].
A user wants to retrieve all documents dealing with `a UNIX command that searches for
an object in a structure'. In Figure 4.6 two conceptual graphs are depicted. The query is
formulated as a conceptual graph q. The document is represented as a conceptual graph
d. This document is a manual of the UNIX command `grep'. In this gure, the subgraph
of d, which contains darkened nodes corresponds to the projection of q. Note that in this
projection, the concepts File and Expression of (d) are restrictions of the concepts
Structure and Object of q, respectively. One could verify that q is indeed projected
on graph d (or alternatively, that d is a specialisation of q) and therefore retrieved.
"A Unix command that searches an object in a structure"
"Grep search on a file for a string or a regular expression"
A Conceptual Graph for the document:
Obj
STRUCT
OBJECT
IncludeIn
ActsOnSEARCH
A Conceptual Graph for the Query:
AgtUNIX-MAN
STRING
Obj
Chr
q
d Agt SEARCH ActsOn FILE
IncludeIn
EXPRESSION
UNIX-MAN:grep
Figure 4.6: Document d is conceptual graph about query q.
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Chevallet [34] noticed that the join operator can be used in three dierent ways: (i)
join two common concept nodes belonging to the same graph, termed internal join. (ii)
join two common concept nodes belonging to two distinct graphs, termed external join.
(iii) join all common concept nodes and simplify if possible afterwards, termed maximal
join.
Consider the following sequence of operators on a graph G1:
A r B
Figure 4.7: Graph G1.
A r B A r B
Figure 4.8: After the copy operator.
A r rB A
Figure 4.9: External join on common concept node B (Graph G2).
A r B
r
Figure 4.10: Internal join on common concept node A (Graph G3).
A r B
Figure 4.11: Simplication (Graph G1).
Here, we have that G1  G3 and G3  G1. Hence, G1 is a specialisation of G3,
and G3 is a specialisation of G1 which implies that the information of G1 is identical to
the information of G3. In case we want to represent the information of a document as
a graph precisely, it is important to be aware that a document indexed with graph G1
and a document indexed by a graph G3 is threated identically by the system. Therefore
Chevallet introduced the notion of normalised graphs. A graph is normalised if no
non-empty sequence of simplications, internal joins or specialisations can be applied to
this graph to yield an equivalent graph. In Elen only normalised graphs are used as
representation of the documents. Furthermore, Elen uses only the maximal join as the
join operator, which directly leads to normalised graphs.
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Translation
The next step is the translation of conceptual graphs to situations. One of Sowa's
important statements about conceptual graphs is that they can be associated to rst-
order logical formulae through a transformation function (see beside [137], [12] for an in-
depth study of the relation between conceptual graphs and logic). We believe, however,
that for using conceptual graphs in information retrieval, we need a transformation to
an information theory instead of to a truth theory. This belief is explained in Chapter 2.
A conceptual graph carries information, as such it can be seen as a situation. What
are the infons of this situation? A conceptual graph is constructed out of concepts,
references, and relations. All parts have a specic role in the description of information.
For instance, the concepts describe the type of the objects. Following this idea, we
propose to translate each item of a graph (concept, reference, relation) into a specic
infon. We have to be careful to conserve the information as given by the graph. For
instance, that we conserve the information about which referent belongs to which concept
type in a graph. First we dene the conceptual graph infon language.
Denition 4.29 Let C be a nite set of concepts and T a nite set of referents. Further,
let Rel be a nite set of conceptual relations and Prm be a set of parameters. Let T be
the union of C and T . The conceptual graph infon language I
CG
(T ) is dened to be
the smallest set such that
(i) if r 2 Rel ; _p; _q 2 Prm then hhr, _p, _q; 1ii 2 I
CG
(T ),
(ii) if t 2 T; _p 2 Prm then hhRef,t, _p; 1ii 2 I
CG
(T ),
(iii) if C 2 C; _p 2 Prm then hhType,C, _p; 1ii 2 I
CG
(T ).
Infons as dened at item (i) are called relation infons. Those dened at item (ii) are
called referent infons. Finally the infons dened at item (iii) are called concept infons.
The conceptual graph infon language contains a set of positive infons based on a set of
concepts, relations, referents, and parameters. The set of situations is dened to be the
set S(I
CG
(T )) (or S
CG
for short).
Given two conceptual graphs g and h 2 G, and let S
CG
be the set of situations, the
translation function map : G ! S
CG
is dened as follows:
 For each concept node u with a concept type U without a referent, the function
map(U) has as result fhhType,U, _p; 1iig with _p as a unique parameter and U the
concept type of u.
 For each concept node u with a concept type U and a referent t, the function
map(U : t) has as result fhhType,U, _p; 1ii, hhRef,t, _p; 1iig with _p a unique parameter
and t the referent of concept u.
 If R is a binary relation between two conceptual graphs g and h (in that par-
ticular order) with hhType,C, _p; 1ii 2 map(g) and hhType,D, _q; 1ii 2 map(h) then
4.6. Conceptual Graph retrieval 107
map(gRh) = fhhR, _p, _q; 1iig [map(g) [map(h).
Example 4.4
PositionPLACE ROMANBrutus
The translation of the above conceptual graph using map results in the situation
fhhType,Place, _p; 1ii, hhPosition, _p, _q; 1ii, hhRef,Brutus, _q; 1ii, hhType,Roman, _q; 1iig.
If we have two infons that are sharing the same parameter then we call this cor-
responding infons. For instance, the corresponding infons hhType,Roman, _p; 1ii and
hhRef,Brutus, _p; 1iig.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we dene two situations S; T with parameters equiva-
lent if we can obtain two identical situations by renaming the parameters. For exam-
ple, with this denition, we have that fhhPosition, _p, _q; 1iig  fhhPosition,_r,_s; 1iig and
fhhPosition, _p, _q; 1iig 6 fhhPosition,_r,_r; 1iig.
It is important to note here that we do not have the following property: if S  T
then S [ T  S. Only if S is identical to situation T without renaming the parameters
this will be the case.
The function map is injective: for every conceptual graph there is an unique situation.
However the function is not surjective: there are situations S for which there is no g
such that map(g) = S. Therefore we dene the notion of a graph situation.
Denition 4.30 (Graph Situation) A situation S 2 S
CG
is called a graph situation if
and only if it satises the following conditions for its elements:
(i) For each parameter used in the relation infons in S there exists a corresponding
concept infon in S.
(ii) For each concept infon in S there exists at most one corresponding referent infon
in S.
(iii) If there is more than one concept infon in S then for each concept infon there exists
a corresponding relation infon in S.
(iv) For each referent infon there exists a corresponding concept infon.
(v) Each relation infon in S has exactly two parameters.
(vi) Each pair of relation infons r
i
and r
j
in S has a parameter in common, or there
exist a list of pairs (r
i
; r
k
) : : : (r
l
; r
j
) such that r
n
2 S and each pair has a parameter
in common.
The rst condition states that each relation node should be connected with concepts.
The second condition expresses that a concept type of a concept node has at most one
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referent. The third condition requires in case there is more than one concept node that
concept nodes are connected to a relation node. The fourth item states that each referent
is connected to a concept type. The fth item limits the conceptual graph to have only
dyadic relations. Finally, the last item requires that the graph is connected.
Corollary 4.5 If S and T are graph situations. Then,
(i) situation S [ T [ fhhr, _p, _q; 1iig is a graph situation if and only if there is a concept
infon hhType,C, _p; 1ii 2 S and a concept infon hhType,D, _q; 1ii 2 T , or there is a
concept infon hhType,C, _q; 1ii 2 S and a concept infon hhType,D, _p; 1ii 2 T .
(ii) situation S [ fhhRef,k, _p; 1iig is a graph situation if and only if there is a concept
infon hhType,C, _p; 1ii 2 S and hhRef,t, _p; 1ii 62 S for k 6= t.
The map function is injective, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 If map(G)  map(H) then G  H.
Proof We have to prove that for every situation, there is only one unique graph.
Obviously map(G) and map(H) are graph situations, the situations contain only three
kinds of infons, namely, referent infons, relation infons, and concept infons, with the
conditions as given in Denition 4.30. The structure of the graph is conveyed by the
infons, the direction of the edges between two concepts and a relation node is represented
by the order of the occurrence of the parameters in the relation infon. Every concept
infon can be directly translated into one concept of the graph, similar for the referent
infons, which can be translated to referents of the concepts, according to the translation
function. Therefore, every graph situation corresponds to a unique graph.

The information containment holds between two concept infons '! if the concept
type corresponding to ' is a subtype of the concept type corresponding to  . according to
the concept taxonomy. For example, let Roman  Person be dened in the taxonomy.
Then hhType,Roman, _p; 1ii !hhType,Person, _p; 1ii for any parameter _p.
Postulates
Next we propose the underlying aboutness proof system of Elen, denoted by CG
ps
.
First we start with a useful property of the graph situations.
Proposition 4.7 For all conceptual graphs A;B 2 G: if map(A)  map(B) then A  B.
Proof In order to prove the proposition, we use Denition 4.27, which states that A  B
if there is a subgraph A
0
of A satisfying the three conditions given in Denition 4.27. If
A
0
is a subgraph of A then by the denition of the function map: map(A)  map(A
0
).
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Let map(A)  map(A
0
)[C. In the case that map(A
0
)  map(B) all the conditions of the
denition are satised, namely, all the conceptual relations in A
0
and B are identical, the
concepts of A
0
and B are identical, and if a relation r links two concepts in B', then the
same concepts are linked with r in A
0
. So, if map(A)  map(B) there is indeed a subgraph
A
0
of A satisfying the conditions of Denition 4.27, which proves the proposition.

Denition 4.31 (Conceptual Graph Situation Aboutness) The aboutness proof sys-
tem CG
ps
is dened to be the triple h L(I
CG
(T )),fReexivityg,fSet Equivalence,Left Mono-
tonic Union,Cut,Union Containmentgi.
Theorem 4.11 The aboutness proof system CG
ps
is sound. That is, for all conceptual
graphs A, B 2 G and D 2 D such that (D) = A: if `
CG
ps
map(A) map(B) then
j=
CG
m
D about B.
Proof First we show that the axiom Reexivity and the rules Set Equivalence, Left
Monotonic Union and Cut are sound. Secondly we show that the rule Union Containment
is sound. This enable us to conclude that CG
ps
is sound with respect to the model CG
m
.
 The soundness of the axiom Reexivity and the rules Set Equivalence, Left Monotonic
Union and Cut follows directly from Proposition 4.7. In this proposition the premise
map(A)  map(B) allows us to conclude that A  B. The aboutness decision
map(A)  map(B) is dened by the sound SC
ps
aboutness proof system. So, given
the postulates of SC
ps
we can derive that map(A)  map(B) which suces to
conclude that A  B. This proves the soundness of the axiom Reexivity and the
rules Set Equivalence, Left Monotonic Union and Cut.
 We have to prove the soundness of the Union Containment rule. Given that '! 
and S [ f g T are sound premises, the conclusion S [ f'g T is sound. Let
S [f g  map(A) and T  map(B). Then, given the sound premise S [f g T
and that the concept type C
'
corresponding to the concept infon ' is a subtype of
the concept type C
 
corresponding to the concept infon  , we have that A  B.
Thus there is a projection of B on A, which allows us to conclude that there is
a subgraph A
0
full-lling the requirements of the projection relation. Replacing a
concept type infon by its restriction on the left-hand side of the aboutness will lead
to a situation S
0
, which is a graph situation. The corresponding graph is identical
to graph A except one concept type is replaced by its restriction. Trivially this does
not violate the projection relation. This suces to conclude that Union Containment
is sound.

Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.7 we remark that it is possible to have a situation
S about another situation T without S being a graph situation. One could view these
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situations as a kind of graphs-under-construction situations. Since formalising the notion
of graphs-under-construction is cumbersome and does not contribute to the clarity of the
proof we do not digress on it here.
Theorem 4.12 The aboutness proof system CG
ps
is complete. That is, if the fol-
lowing holds for all conceptual graphs A, B 2 G and D 2 D such that (D) = A: if
j=
CG
m
D about B then `
CG
ps
map(A) map(B).
Proof We have to show that if A  B then map(A) map(B). Assume A  B, this
means that A is constructed out of B using a sequence over the four graph operators.
So, for each graph operator there should be a representative deduction possibility in the
aboutness proof system.
 If A is a copy of B then map(A) is a situation containing the same infons as map(B)
but this set is possibly labelled with dierent parameters. In this case, according
to the set equivalence relation , we have two equivalent situations. Starting with
the Reexivity axiom, we can infer that map(A) map(B) when they correspond
to equivalent sets of infons.
 If A is obtained from B by the restriction operator then two cases are possible:
graph A is a restricted graph of B due to a replacement of a concept type by a
subtype, or in B there exists a type without a referent and in A such a referent
conform to that type is added. For the rst case, the rule Union Containment allows
us to deduce that a subtype infon is about a type infon. Let map(A) be S [ f'g,
map(B) be T with C
'
!C
 
or stated dierently, the concept type C
'
corresponding
to infon ' is a specialisation of the concept type C
 
corresponding to infon  . Then
S [ f g T '! 
UC
S [ f'g T
Otherwise, in case of an added referent t to concept type C, we know that it
corresponds to map(C)[f'g with ' the referent infon corresponding to t. Therefore
we can use the rule Left Monotonic Union and Set Equivalence in order to deduce
aboutness map(C) [ f'g map(C).
 The simplication rule, removing a relation when two concepts are linked with two
identical relations, is governed in the aboutness proof system by the set equivalence
rule. Namely, S [ fhhR, _p, _q; 1iig is equivalent to S [ fhhR, _p, _q; 1ii; hhR, _p, _q; 1iig.
Therefore the simplication rule is modelled in the aboutness proof system.
 Two graphs that share a common concept can be externally joined to form a new
graph having this common concept. So, if A is constructed from B by a join
operator then map(A)  map(BxC), where x is representing the join operator.
As mentioned before, after the join operation BxC is always equal or larger as the
original graph B. Due to the properties of the map function, map(BxC)  map(B).
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And map(A)  map(B) can be proved using Reexivity, Left Monotonic Union, and
Set Equivalence.

Reections
This aboutness proof system is based on the same set postulates as the aboutness proof
system of the strict coordinate model in addition with the Union Containment rule.
Proposition 4.8 In the aboutness proof system CG
ps
we have that:
(i) The top query of CG
ps
is the set f;g.
(ii) The bottom query of CG
ps
is the set ;.
(iii) The top document of CG
ps
is the set fI
CG
(T )g.
(iv) The bottom document of CG
ps
is the set ;.
The proof of the proposition proceeds in a similar way as for the sets of the aboutness
proof system SC
ps
.
Note that since we do not have a surjective map function, we can not use Proposi-
tion 4.1 to derive the top and bottom elements of CG
m
.
Proposition 4.9 In the IR model CG
m
we have that:
(i) The top query of CG
ps
is the set ;.
(ii) The bottom query of CG
ps
is the set ;.
(iii) The top document of CG
ps
is the set ;.
(iv) The bottom document of CG
ps
is the set ;.
Proof
(i) We have to show that there is no conceptual graph that is about every graph. In
case of an empty graph, that is, a graph without concepts and relations, it is not
possible to build a larger graph, since there are no concepts to join with. In case of
a non-empty graph, one can remove from this graph a concept and all its relations.
The result can not be a specialisation of the original graph. So for each empty and
non-empty graph we proved that they can not be an element of the top query set.
(ii) The specialisation relation is reexive. Consequently there is no graph that is never
about a graph.
(iii) We show that there is no graph that is about all graphs in G. Since the empty
graph is only about the empty graph, there is no graph that is about all graphs.
This proves item (iii) of Proposition 4.9
(iv) The proof of item (iv) is completely analogous to the proof of item (ii).

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One of the goals of Elen was to create a precision-oriented system in order to provide
the user not with an overdose of non-relevant information but with highly precise relevant
information. The aboutness decisions of CG
ps
are therefore strict, in the sense that there
are only a few possibilities to derive aboutness. As a result, often a few documents are
considered to be relevant in the Elen system. In order to deliver some more documents,
which still are very likely to be relevant, we inspect some new rules. These rules can be
added to the aboutness proof system CG
ps
. This sort of rules are no longer based on the
projection operators, but are dened in terms of the framework. Maybe we can consider
that documents which are derived with this extended system have a lower degree of
relevance than documents derived with the original system.
Consider for instance the union of relation infon to a situation, for some relation
infons R and R
0
:
S [ T [ fRg S [ T [ fR
0
g.
This axiom implies that two situations related by a situation with the relation in-
fon R, is about the same two situations related by situation with another relation
infon R
0
. This axiom is already valid if R = R
0
(applying the reexivity axiom).
Now, the situation fhhType,Roman, _p; 1ii, hhType,Roman, _q; 1ii, hhKill, _p, _q; 1iig is about
fhhType,Roman, _p; 1ii, hhType,Roman, _q; 1ii, hhMurder, _p, _q; 1iig. Although if we replaced
the `murder' infon with the relation infon hhKilled, _p, _q; 1ii this would also be about the
same situation. Of course we should be careful by adopting this axiom for every relation.
It depends fully on the context and the two relations R and R
0
if we could suggest such
an axiom. Another suggestion is to allow a parameter _r, as a relation infon. In this case,
we model that two concepts are related but we do not know in which way. The axiom
can be given as: let _p ( _q) be a parameter used in S (and T respectively), then
S [ T [ fhhR, _p, _q; 1iig S [ T [ fhh_r, _p, _q; 1iig.
this idea needs an extension of the language I
CG
(T ).
An extension of CG
ps
could be to permit the aboutness derivation between a graph
and its restricted form,
Right Monotonic Relation Union (RMRU)
S  T
S  T [ fhhRef,t, _p; 1iig
For instance, up till now it was not allowed to conclude that the graph representing
\The Roman Brutus hates a Roman" is about the graph representing \The Roman
Brutus hates the Roman Caesar" because the right graph is a specialisation of the left
one (rather than the opposite). With the new Right Monotonic Relation Union we are
allowed to add references on the left side in order to determine aboutness. Adopting
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this new plausible rule can be viewed as allowing the user to mislabel references. A user
uses a referent in the query as an example, but maybe she is looking for more general
information.
Finally we want to suggest a new postulate based on situation union. In case a user
is searching for a document in which \a person is driving a car" and in which \a red car"
occurs, without stating that the car in which the person is driving has to be red. Because
everything in Elen is connected (the join was the only way to build up graphs) we can
not express unrelated information. Therefore the rule Context-Free Union could be useful
in the system. With this rule we get all that if S  T and S  U then S  T [U . Or
in conceptual graph words, if a graph G is about a graph H and also about a graph I,
then we conclude that graph G is about graph H or about graph I.
4.7 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we presented the formalisation of six common IR models. The formali-
sation mainly concerns the notion of aboutness, and the representation of the document
descriptor set and query in situations. We considered eight sets 1
d
X
; 0
d
X
; 1
q
X
and 0
q
X
with X
the IR model or the aboutness proof system. These sets correspond to typical elements
of an IR model and demonstrate a specic characteristic of the model. We summarise
the aboutness proof systems of the models studied in the table on the next page.
In this chapter we showed that the framework can be used to formalise several dier-
ent IR models. Furthermore we have showed that soundness and completeness theorems
could be proved. Given a sound and complete aboutness proof system, interesting ob-
servations could be made. It is very important to notice that we have achieved several
general axiomatic denitions of aboutness. These axiomatisations provides some inter-
esting observations that will be worked out in the next chapter.
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PS L Axioms Rules
SC
ps
L(I
Basic
(T )) Reexivity Set Equivalence
Left Monotonic Union
Cut
C
ps
L(I
Basic
(T )) Singleton Reexivity Set Equivalence
Left Monotonic Union
Symmetry
Strict Composition
VC
ps
L(I
Basic
(T )) Singleton Reexivity Set Equivalence
Left Monotonic Union
Symmetry
Strict Composition
IE
ps
L(I
IE
(T )) Singleton Reexivity Set Equivalence
Left Monotonic Union
Symmetry
Strict Composition
B1
ps
L(I
B
(T )) Reexivity Set Equivalence
Left Monotonic Union
Cut
_-Right Monotonic Composition
B2
ps
L
Ext
2
(I
B
(T )) Reexivity
1
Set Equivalence
1
Left Monotonic Union
1
Cut
1
Anti-Aboutness Rule
1
Context-Free Union
2
_-Right Monotonic Composition
2
Aboutness Inheritance
Simple Anti-Aboutness
Closed World Assumption
CG
ps
L(I
CG
(T )) Reexivity Set Equivalence
Left Monotonic Union
Cut
Union Containment
Chapter 5
Comparing IR models through their
aboutness proof systems
If you can't say it in words, then you had better not
whistle it in mathematics either.
C.J. van Rijsbergen & M. Lalmas, `An Information Calculus
for Information Retrieval'.
In this chapter we combine the insights gained in the previous chapters and apply it
to our main goal to devise a technique to compare and analyse IR models. The fact
that many relevant IR models can be characterised by means of (sound and complete)
aboutness proof systems immediately suggests to shift the focus towards the use of these
proof systems. The rst application is an obvious one: using aboutness proof systems
one can attempt to compare IR models theoretically instead of experimentally. The
known insights from logic about ways to compare formal systems and theories can be
brought to bear on comparing the relative strength of IR models. The advantage of
this type of comparison is that theorems could be proved, for instance expressing that
one IR model is more eective than another model. Such results would not only spare
us the eorts of experimentation, but more importantly, it would allow us to sidestep
the controversies surrounding the experimental process. The rst section presents a
theoretical comparison for IR models based on the modelling work done in Chapter 4.
After we have compared the various IR models, we analyse in Section 5.2 the prop-
erties of several aboutness proof systems separately. The reason for using the more
abstract aboutness proof system instead of the underlying model lies in our intention to
show the syntactic properties of the models, but also in our desire to obtain some insight
into the general properties of the aboutness proof systems. Therefore we study in this
section some basic properties of aboutness proof systems. In particular, an important
aspect of a formal reasoning system is whether it fulls the Principle of Monotonicity.
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The derivation of aboutness statements can be viewed as a specic reasoning process,
and therefore it is interesting to investigate whether a proof system and hence, some IR
model, is monotonic or not. Furthermore, we study the consequences of monotonicity
and non-monotonicity from the point of view of information retrieval. We conclude the
chapter with a summary and ideas for possible extensions.
5.1 The comparison of IR models
We have seen in Chapter 4 how IR models can be related to aboutness proof systems. In
terms of its corresponding proof system, the collective aboutness theorems as they can
be deduced form the `theory' of an IR model. In this section we investigate in which
way aboutness proof systems can be related to each other in order to make comparative
statements about IR models. More in particular, we compare IR models by comparing
their associated proof systems. Through studying the inferential power of proof systems,
we can present a rst evaluation. To make this kind of comparison formal, we introduce
some additional terminology.
First we dene the notion of embedding. This notion captures the idea that aboutness
derivations in some system may be simulated in another system.
Denition 5.1 An aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i is embedded in an
aboutness proof system B
ps
= hL
b
;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i with respect to the aboutness decision if
and only if L
a
 L
b
and for all situations S; T 2 S 2 L
a
it holds that if `
A
ps
S  T
then `
B
ps
S  T .
Informally, an aboutness proof system A
ps
is embedded in an aboutness proof system
B
ps
if and only if the aboutness language of A
ps
is a subset of the aboutness language of
B
ps
and all aboutness theorems of A
ps
are aboutness theorems of B
ps
.
In logical terms it means that the theory of A
ps
is a restriction of the theory of B
ps
or,
alternatively, that the latter is an extension of the former. The denition has a further
implication in case the rules of inference of A
ps
can be simulated, as is the case in many
of the systems of Chapter 4, by xed proof schemes using the rules of inference of B
ps
. In
this case the translation of derivations in A
ps
to derivations in B
ps
is fully eective, and
the resulting proofs in B
ps
are never longer than some xed constant factor times the
proof-length in A
ps
. When this is the case, we say that A
ps
is conservatively embedded
in B
ps
.
Denition 5.2 Two aboutness proof systems A
ps
= hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i and B
ps
=
hL
b
;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i are called equivalent with respect to the aboutness decision if and only
if A
ps
is embedded in B
ps
and B
ps
is embedded in A
ps
.
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Theorem 5.1 If the same set of descriptors T is used in the aboutness language of
aboutness proof system C
ps
and the aboutness language of aboutness proof system VC
ps
,
then C
ps
and VC
ps
are conservatively equivalent.
Proof The aboutness languages of C
ps
and VC
ps
were both dened as L(I
Basic
(T )). Fur-
thermore, for all situations S and T we have that `
C
ps
S  T if and only if `
VC
ps
S  T ,
as proved in Lemma 4.2. This implies that the aboutness proof systems C
ps
and VC
ps
are
equivalent. The proof that C
ps
and VC
ps
are conservatively equivalent follows directly
from the fact that the aboutness proof systems are identical.

For the next few theorems we need the following observation. For two languages
L
a
(I
a
) and L
b
(I
b
) of aboutness formulae, if I
a
 I
b
then L
a
 L
b
. For two languages
I
a
(P
a
;Rel
a
;Prm
a
) and I
b
(P
b
;Rel
b
;Prm
b
) of infons, if P
a
 P
b
and Rel
a
 Rel
b
then
I
a
 I
b
.
Theorem 5.2 If the same set of descriptors T is used in the aboutness language of
aboutness proof system C
ps
and the aboutness language of aboutness proof system IE
ps
,
then C
ps
is conservatively embedded in IE
ps
.
Proof The aboutness language of C
ps
was dened as L(I
Basic
(T )) and the aboutness
language of IE
ps
was dened as L(I
IE
(T )). By Denition 4.16 we can deduce that I
IE
(T )
is a superset of I
Basic
(T ), which is sucient to conclude that L
Basic
 L
IE
. Furthermore,
for all situations S and T we have that if `
C
ps
S  T then `
IE
ps
S  T , as was proved
in Theorem 4.6. This implies that aboutness proof system C
ps
is embedded in aboutness
proof system IE
ps
. The proof that C
ps
is conservatively embedded in IE
ps
follows directly
from the fact that C
ps
can be simulated using a subset of the rules of IE
ps
. The latter
follows because the rules of C
ps
are a subset of the rules of IE
ps
.

Theorem 5.3 If the same set of descriptors T is used in the aboutness language of
aboutness proof system SC
ps
and for the aboutness language of aboutness proof system
B1
ps
, then SC
ps
is conservatively embedded in B1
ps
.
Proof The aboutness language of SC
ps
was dened as L(I
Basic
(T )) and the about-
ness language of B1
ps
was dened as L(I
B
(T )), where I
Basic
(T ) = I(P
+
(T ); ;; ;) and
I
B
(T ) = I(P(T ); f_g; ;). Hence, I
Basic
(T )  I
B
(T ), which is sucient to conclude that
L
Basic
 L
B
. Further, whenever `
SC
ps
S  T then `
B1
ps
S  T which has been proved
in Theorem 4.7 and 4.8. This implies that SC
ps
is embedded in B1
ps
. The proof that
SC
ps
is conservatively embedded in B1
ps
proceeds in a similar way as the one for the
conservative embedding of C
ps
in IE
ps
as was proved in Theorem 5.2.

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Besides the notions of embedding and equivalence, it is also interesting to consider
the notion of minimal aboutness proof systems. This notion is formalised as follows:
Denition 5.3 An aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i is called minimal with
respect to an aboutness language L if and only if there exists no equivalent aboutness
proof system B
ps
= hL;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i with Ax
b
 Ax
a
or Rule
b
 Rule
a
.
It can be argued that for all aboutness proof systems which we presented, there is a
minimal equivalent one. It is not clear that in general a minimal aboutness proof system
can always be found eectively and that it has attractive properties.
In Chapter 4 we observed some similarities between the aboutness proof systems
associated with dierent IR models. Let us classify aboutness proof systems in order to
look at some classes of aboutness proof systems more systematically.
Denition 5.4 Let A
ps
= hL;Ax ;Rulei be an aboutness proof system. Then
(i) A
ps
is called an R-system if and only if
 Ax = fReexivityg and
 Rule = ;;
(ii) A
ps
is called an SC-system if and only if
 Ax = fReexivityg and
 Rule = fSet Equivalence; Left Monotonic Union;Cutg;
(iii) A
ps
is called a C-system if and only if
 Ax = fSingleton Reexivityg and
 Rule = fSet Equivalence; Left Monotonic Union; Symmetry; Strict Compositiong.
Corollary 5.1 If A
ps
= hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i is an R-system and B
ps
= hL
b
;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i is
an SC-system with L
a
 L
b
, then A
ps
is conservatively embedded in B
ps
.
The reader may have noticed that R-systems and SC-systems are not embedded in
C-systems. The reason is that ; ; is an aboutness theorem of any R-system and of
any SC-system, while it is not an aboutness theorem of any C-system. To circumvent
this, we dene the notion of a weak embedding.
Denition 5.5 An aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i is weakly embed-
ded in an aboutness proof system B
ps
= hL
b
;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i with respect to the aboutness
decision if and only if L
a
 L
b
and for all situations S; T 2 (S n ;) 2 L
a
it holds that if
`
A
ps
S  T then `
B
ps
S  T .
Analogous to the notions of conservative embedding and equivalent aboutness proof
systems we can dene the notions of conservative weak embedding and of weakly equiv-
alent aboutness proof systems. Clearly, if an aboutness proof system A
ps
is embedded in
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the aboutness proof system B
ps
then the aboutness proof system A
ps
is weakly embedded
in the aboutness proof system B
ps
.
Corollary 5.2 If A
ps
= hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i is an SC-system and B
ps
= hL
b
;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i is
a C-system with L
a
 L
b
, then A
ps
is conservatively weakly embedded in B
ps
.
Theorem 5.4 If the same set of descriptors T is used in the aboutness language of
aboutness proof system SC
ps
and the aboutness language of aboutness proof system C
ps
,
then SC
ps
is weakly embedded in C
ps
.
The aboutness proof systems inspected so far can be classied using the notion of
(weak) embedding as presented above. Still there are two aboutness proof systems that
seem to require a further modication of the notion, namely, B2
ps
and CG
ps
. The
aboutness proof system B2
ps
is not captured due to the fact that the aboutness relations
 
1
and  
2
are used instead of aboutness relation  . To make a comparison
possible we generalise the notion of embedding in the following way.
Denition 5.6 An aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i is embedded in an
aboutness proof system B
ps
= hL
b
;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i with respect to the aboutness decision if
and only if L
a
 L
b
and for all situations S; T 2 S 2 L
a
and for all i it holds that if
`
A
ps
S  
i
T then there exists a j such that `
B
ps
S  
j
T .
The derived notions of conservative embedding and equivalence can be generalised in
a similar way. In case one wants to prove that an aboutness proof system with one single
aboutness relation is embedded in an aboutness proof system with several aboutness
relations, one should transform the single aboutness relation from  to  
1
in order
to exploit the generalised denition.
Theorem 5.5 If the same set of descriptors T is used in the aboutness language of
aboutness proof system SC
ps
and the aboutness language of aboutness proof system
B2
ps
, then SC
ps
is conservatively embedded in B2
ps
.
Proof The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.3.

The reader may have noticed that B1
ps
is not (conservatively) equivalent with B2
ps
,
although we showed in Chapter 4 that both proof systems are sound and complete
with respect to the IR model B
m
. Furthermore, the aboutness languages are identical.
However, at page 97 we gave as an example of an aboutness theorem of B2
ps
the following
theorem: hhI,C; 1ii 
2
fhhI,B; 0ii. This could never be an aboutness theorem of B1
ps
as noticed at page 93.
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Finally, we relate the aboutness proof system CG
ps
to one of the other aboutness
proof systems. In the aboutness language of CG
ps
profons are not contained in situations.
Therefore L
CG
is neither a subset nor a superset of one of the other introduced languages.
To circumvent this, we dene the notion of -embedding.
Denition 5.7 An aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i is -embedded in
an aboutness proof system B
ps
= hL
b
;Ax
b
;Rule
b
i with respect to the aboutness decision
if and only if there exists a bijective function  such that (L
a
) = L
a
0
and L
a
0
 L
b
and
for all situations S; T 2 S 2 L
a
0
it holds that if `
A
ps
S  T then `
B
ps
(S) (T ).
In order to embedded SC
ps
in CG
ps
we dene a function  : L
Basic
!L
Basic
0
that
maps positive profons to referent infons as follows: for any hhI,t; 1ii 2 I
Basic
(T ) 2
S
Basic
2 L
Basic
(hhI,t; 1ii) = hhRef,t, _p; 1ii for some parameter _p. Then it follows that
L
Basic
0
 L
CG
. Adopting this point of view results in an embedding relation of SC
ps
in
CG
ps
.
Theorem 5.6 Assume that the same set of descriptors T is used in aboutness lan-
guage of aboutness proof system SC
ps
and the aboutness language of aboutness proof
system CG
ps
. Furthermore, let  be a mapping function dened as above, then SC
ps
is
conservatively -embedded in CG
ps
.
Proof (Sketch) We refer to the proof of Proposition 4.7. There it was proved that if a
graph situation S is a superset of a graph situation T , then `
CG
ps
S  T .

Note that in the case the function  is dened in such a way that it maps profons to
concept infons or relation infons, Theorem 5.6 is also valid.
Another point of interest is that the denition of aboutness of the vector-space model
and IEBN model was strict, e.g., a document is about a query or not about a query. For
example, for the vector-space model we dened query q to be about document d whenever
relcos((d); q) > 0, but we might have required relcos((d); q) = 1 as another possible
denition instead. If one uses the latter denition the corresponding aboutness proof
system of the vector-space model would dier from VC
ps
. Consequently, the comparison
would be slightly dierent. We return to this subject in Section 6.2 where we investigate
the situation where there are several aboutness proof systems that correspond to one IR
model.
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The nal gure is as follows:
strict coordinate
embedded
Embedded Embedded
Weakly embedded
IEBN
coordinateboolean IIboolean IElen
vector space
Equivalent
Embedded
5.2 Analysing aboutness proof systems
For aboutness proof systems corresponding to IR models, some basic properties can be
distinguished. One property, namely aboutness consistency, was already mentioned in
Chapter 3. Here we want to elaborate on the following two aspects. Firstly, can we
derive axioms or rules that are implicit in the aboutness proof system? These derivable
axioms and rules can deliver us a deeper insight in the aboutness derivation. Secondly, in
Chapter 3 an aboutness proof was viewed as a reasoning process with situation aboutness.
Research in Articial Intelligence over the past ten years has led to many new insights
concerning (common-sense) reasoning processes. Being monotonic or not is an important
property of formal reasoning systems. Here, we inspect aboutness proof systems on
whether they full the Principle of Monotonicity. In addition, the consequences for an
aboutness proof system of being (non-)monotonic will be studied.
5.2.1 Derivable postulates
In this section we elaborate on the question whether we can derive axioms or rules that
are implicit in the aboutness proof system. The axiomatisation of the IR models gives
us the possibility to derive rules that oer a deeper understanding of the model under
scrutiny.
Here, we consider the three classes of systems as dened in Denition 5.4. For an
R-system one cannot derive interesting rules. The only observation that can be made
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is that for any R-system Singleton Reexivity is a derived rule of this system. For an
SC-system there are some derivable postulates that can deliver us a deeper insight in the
aboutness reasoning process.
Proposition 5.1 Let A
ps
be an SC-system. Then
(i) Transitivity is a derived rule of A
ps
,
(ii) Composition is a derived rule of A
ps
,
(iii) Context-Free Union is a derived rule of A
ps
.
Proof
(i) To prove Transitivity we have to show that, in the system A
ps
, S  U is prov-
able from S  T and T  U . So suppose that S  T and T  U . Using
Left Monotonic Union we deduce from T  U that T [S  U . Since T [S  S[T
we conclude S [ T  U . Finally, using Cut we conclude from S  T that also
S  U . Alternatively, the argument can be presented as a prooftree as follows:
S  T
T  U
LMU
T [ S  U T [ S  S [ T
SE
S [ T  U
Cu
S  U
(ii) To prove Composition we have to show that in the system A
ps
, S  T \ U is
provable from S  T . Assume that S  T . Since Reexivity is an axiom of SC
ps
,
T \ U  T \ U is a valid premise. Left Monotonic Union allows us to deduce that
(T \ U) [ T  T \ U . Then, since (T \ U) [ T is equivalent with T , it holds that
T  T \ U . Finally, the assumption S  T and the Transitivity rule are sucient
to deduce the conclusion S  T \U . Alternatively, the argument can be presented
as a prooftree as follows:
S  T
T \ U  T \ U
LMU
(T \ U) [ T  T \ U (T \ U) [ T  T
SE
T  T \ U
Tr
S  T \ U
(iii) We have to show that in SC
ps
, the assumptions S  T and S  U enable us to
prove that S  T [ U . Here, we present only the prooftree:
S  T
S  U
LMU
S [ T  U
T [ U  T [ U
LMU
(T [ U) [ S  T [ U (T [ U) [ S  (S [ T ) [ U
SE
(S [ T ) [ U  T [ U
Cu
S [ T  T [ U
Cu
S  T [ U

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Comparing an SC-system to a C-system, the rst remark one can make is that the
Cut rule does not hold in a C-system. For, given that S [ T is about U (the situation
S united with T has an overlap with situation U) and S is about T (the situation S
has an overlap with situation T ), it does not follow that S has an overlap with U . As a
counterexample, take S = f
1
; 
2
g, T = f
2
; 
3
g, and U = f
3
g where 
1
6= 
2
, 
1
6= 
3
and 
2
6= 
3
.
Transitivity is also not implied by a C-system. As a counterexample we use the previous
example for the Cut rule. Given this example, one can deduce that S  T and T  U
but not S  U . In Chapter 3 the statement is made that Transitivity is an inherent rule
of any information theoretical approach. So, in this context, using a C-system to deduce
aboutness could be in conict with desired information theoretical fundamentals.
Proposition 5.2 Let A
ps
be a C-system. Then
(i) Right Monotonic Union is a derived rule of A
ps
,
(ii) Right Monotonic Decomposition is a derived rule of A
ps
.
Proof
(i) To prove Right Monotonic Union we have to show that given the assumption S  T ,
it is provable that S  T [ U . This is easily shown by using Left Monotonic Union
and Symmetry, in this order.
(ii) Given the assumption S  T \U , with Symmetry we can deduce that T \U  S.
Left Monotonic Union allows us to deduce that (T \ U) [ T is about S. Using
Symmetry and Set Equivalence is sucient to conclude S  T .
S  T \ U
Sy
T \ U  S
LMU
(T \ U) [ T  S
Sy
S  (T \ U) [ T (T \ U) [ T  T
SE
S  T

The Right Monotonic Decomposition rule clearly represents the idea that in a C-system
it is allowed, given that situation S is about the intersection of situation T and the
situation U , to infer that situation S is about situation T . This rule is denitely not
valid in any SC-system.
5.2.2 Non-monotonicity
The non-monotonic behaviour of rules (as encountered in non-monotonic reasoning)
is a well-studied phenomenon in Articial Intelligence. A rather informal denition
proposed by  Lukaszewicz [94] presents the idea of this sort of reasoning.
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Denition 5.8 By non-monotonic reasoning we understand the drawing of conclu-
sions which may be invalidated in the light of new information. A logical system is called
non-monotonic i its provability relation violates the property of monotonicity. [94]
Denition 5.9 By a non-monotonic inference pattern (a non-monotonic rule) we
understand the following reasoning schema: \given information A, in the absence of
evidence B, infer a conclusion C". [94]
An example of a non-monotonic rule in situation aboutness reasoning might be the
following:
`Given S  T , in the absence of the preclusion '? , infer S [ f'g T [
f g.'
The absence of '? will be denoted as '6? . Formally, monotonicity in terms of about-
ness proof systems is dened as follows.
Denition 5.10 (Monotonicity) Let A
ps
= hL
n
;Ax ;Rulei be an aboutness proof sys-
tem.
(i)  
i
is monotonic if and only if for all situations S; T; U 2 S 2 L
n
:
if `
A
ps
S  
i
T then `
A
ps
S [ U  
i
T:
An aboutness relation  
i
is called non-monotonic if and only if the aboutness
relation is not monotonic.
(ii) A
ps
is monotonic in its axioms if and only if for all aboutness proof systems B
ps
=
hL
n
;Ax
b
;Rulei with Ax  Ax
b
and for all situations S; T 2 S 2 L
n
and for all i
with 1  i  n:
if `
A
ps
S  
i
T then `
B
ps
S  
i
T:
An aboutness proof system A
ps
is called non-monotonic in its axioms if and only
if the aboutness proof system is not monotonic in its axioms.
(iii) A
ps
is monotonic in its rules if and only if for all aboutness proof systems B
ps
=
hL
n
;Ax ;Rule
b
i with Rule  Rule
b
and for all situations S; T 2 S 2 L
n
and for all i
with 1  i  n:
if `
A
ps
S  
i
T then `
B
ps
S  
i
T:
An aboutness proof system A
ps
is called non-monotonic in its rules if and only if
the aboutness proof system is not monotonic in its rules.
In case an aboutness proof system is monotonic both in its axioms and in its rules,
we say that the aboutness proof system is monotonic in its postulates. Note that in case
of an aboutness language L with only one aboutness relation one should transform the
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single aboutness relation from  to  
1
(and L to L
1
) in order to use the denition
of monotonicity.
An aboutness proof system of which the derivation relation is dened in the same way
as classical (propositional or rst-order) logic is monotonic in its postulates. However,
this does not hold for arbitrary aboutness proof systems. Consider for instance an
aboutness proof system that contains the Closed World Assumption rule as presented in
Section 3.3.3 on page 57:
Closed World Assumption
S 
i
fg ?
j
 
S  
j
f g
The aboutness relation  
j
is non-monotonic and the aboutness proof system B2
ps
that contains this rule is non-monotonic in its postulates. This is formally stated by the
following two theorems.
Theorem 5.7 The aboutness relation  
2
of B2
ps
corresponding to the aboutness
derivation of boolean retrieval, is non-monotonic. The aboutness proof system B2
ps
is
non-monotonic in its postulates.
Proof First we prove that  
2
is non-monotonic. Let S = f'g, T = fg, and
 ?
2
. In this case S  
2
T , because S 
1
f g and therefore S  
2
fg. Now consider
S
0
 S [ f g. Then S
0
6 
2
fg because S  
1
f g. Hence the aboutness relation  
2
of B2
ps
is non-monotonic.
Next we prove that B2
ps
is non-monotonic in its postulates. Let S = f'g, T = fg,
and  ?
2
. In this case S  
2
T . Adding the axiom S  
1
f g to the aboutness proof
system B2
ps
leads to the conclusion that S  
2
T is no longer valid. Hence there is
an i for which the property of monotonicity does not hold. This implies that B2
ps
is
non-monotonic in its postulates.

Note in this proof that, if we would have added the axiom S  
2
f g, then the con-
clusion S  
2
f'g would still be true. Only additional information of the type S  
1
T
and '?
2
 can withdraw aboutness conclusions.
Theorem 5.8 The aboutness proof systems SC
ps
, C
ps
, VC
ps
, IE
ps
, B1
ps
, and CG
ps
are monotonic in their postulates. Furthermore, the aboutness relations of these systems
are monotonic.
Proof First we prove that the aboutness relation of these systems is monotonic. All these
aboutness proof systems are using an aboutness language with one aboutness relation.
Furthermore they all satisfy the postulate of Left Monotonic Union. For situations S; T
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and U , Left Monotonic Union supposes that from S  T it can be concluded that S [
U  T , which is similar to monotonicity of the aboutness relation. Therefore every
aboutness relation that satises the postulate of Left Monotonic Union is monotonic. This
implies that for each of these systems their aboutness relation is monotonic. In order to
prove that the aboutness proof systems are all monotonic in their postulates we refer to
the fact that they are all dened in the way the derivation relation of classical logic is
dened. This implies that these systems are monotonic in their postulates.

5.2.3 The recall of monotonic IR models
One of the goals of this thesis is a qualitative comparison of aboutness relations associ-
ated with information retrieval. An interesting possibility oered by the framework of
aboutness proof systems is a qualitative assessment of quantitative retrieval measures
such as recall and precision. Here we investigate, for a specic IR model, the relation
between the property of monotonicity of the underlying aboutness proof system and of
the aboutness relation and the quality of the recall and precision values of this model.
When one has completely characterised the aboutness relation of a specic infor-
mation retrieval model by means of an aboutness proof system, one can try to prove
statements such as `addition or omission of this rule would aect recall or precision
positively or negatively'. In order to make statements about an IR model based on
its underlying aboutness proof system we require some specic property of the map-
function. Corresponding to the idea that extending the representation of the document
should lead to new infons (or at least not to fewer infons) contained in the corresponding
situation, the notion of monotonicity can be used.
Denition 5.11 Let x be a descriptor set. Then the function map is called monotonic
if for all extensions x
0
of the descriptor set x: map(x)  map(x
0
). A function map is
called non-monotonic if and only if it is not monotonic.
The denition of `an extension of the descriptor set' depends on the representation
of the document (or query) in the underlying IR model. For instance, in coordinate
retrieval x
0
is an extension of the descriptor set x if x  x
0
. For the conceptual graph
model, a graph that corresponds to a document (or query) can be extended by joining
conceptual graphs to the original conceptual graph.
A typical example of a non-monotonic map-function is the following. Let x be a set
of descriptors with x 2 T . The map-function dened as: map(x) = fhhI,t; 1ii j t 2 T nxg
is non-monotonic. Extending the set x will lead to a decrease of elements of map(x).
Proposition 5.3 The map-functions of SC
ps
,C
ps
,VC
ps
,IE
ps
,B2
ps
, and CG
ps
and the
map
2
-function of B1
ps
are all monotonic. The map
1
-function of B1
ps
is non-monotonic.
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Proof We need to check for each map-function that extending the representation leads to
an identical or increased number of infons of the corresponding situation. The monotonic
map-functions are easy to check. We only show that the map
1
-function of B1
ps
is a non-
monotonic map-function. The map
1
-function is dened as follows:
map
1
(x) = fhhI,t; 1ii j t 2 x and t 2 T g [ fhhI,t; 0ii j t 62 x and t 2 T g:
Let x be a descriptor set with t
1
2 x and t
2
62 x and T = ft
1
; t
2
g. Then map
1
(x) =
fhhI,t
1
; 1ii; hhI,t
2
; 0iig. The extension of x with t
2
(which gives x
0
) results in map
1
(x
0
) =
fhhI,t
1
; 1ii; hhI,t
2
; 1iig. Trivially, map
1
(x) 6 map
1
(x
0
), which suces to conclude non-
monotonicity.

As a rst start to a completely inductive theory of IR models, we give two theorems
concerning the consequences for the recall value of a change of the IR model.
Theorem 5.9 If an IR model is completely described by a aboutness proof system A
ps
and its aboutness relation and the used map-function(s) are monotonic, then extending
the representation of the documents with more descriptors will never decrease the recall
of the model.
Proof On page 13, recall was dened as:
jRel
user
\Ret
system
j
jRel
user
j
. In this denition the set
Rel
user
is user-dependent but it is a xed set of documents which the user judges to be
relevant with respect to her information need. Let us assume that j Rel
user
j= x, which
implies that the user indicates that there are x relevant documents in the collection.
The set Ret
system
for a aboutness proof system A
ps
can be dened as answer
q
(A
ps
) =
fd 2 D j `
A
ps
map
1
((d)) map
2
(q)g. For short, we denote map
1
((d)) and map
2
(q)
with S
d
and S
q
respectively. Let us assume that j Rel
user
\Ret
system
j= y. This implies
that the aboutness proof system considers y documents about the query in harmony
with the user's decision. Extending the representation of the documents with more
descriptors leads in case of a monotonic function map
1
to a situation S
0
d
for d with
S
d
 S
0
d
. As  is assumed to be monotonic, `
A
ps
S
d
 S
q
implies that `
A
ps
S
0
d
 S
q
.
However, if `
A
ps
S
d
6 S
q
then it could be possible that `
A
ps
S
0
d
 S
q
as well. If d is
about q according to the user and the model decides that S
d
6 S
q
and with an extended
representation of d it decides that S
d
 S
q
, then y will increase. Before the extension
the recall was
y
x
. After the extension the recall becomes
z
x
with z  y. This implies that
for any query q the recall of the model does not decrease.

Theorem 5.10 If an IR model is completely described by a aboutness proof system A
ps
that is monotonic in its postulates, then every IR model which is completely described by
an aboutness proof system obtained from A
ps
by extending it with additional postulates
will have a recall value that is at least as high.
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Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.9. By the denition of an aboutness proof
system being monotonic in its postulates, extending the aboutness proof system with
more postulates cannot lead to fewer aboutness theorems. In case the aboutness theorems
are the same, the recall will be the same. Otherwise, if the set of aboutness theorems
is extended, then if a new theorem S
d
 S
q
leads to a new document d in the set
answer
q
(A
ps
) and in case this new retrieved document is relevant according to the user,
the recall will increase, otherwise the recall remains the same. This proves the theorem.

The intuitive idea behind Theorem 5.10 is that in monotonic aboutness proof systems
the set of aboutness theorems can only expand with the addition of axioms c.q. rules. For,
due to the monotonicity, all previously derived aboutness theorems are still derivable.
In other words, for any IR model as described in Theorem 5.10 the addition of new
postulates can only lead to a richer theory.
Example 5.1 Consider the gure below, originally introduced in Chapter 2.
A B C
D E F
Assume that a monotonic aboutness proof system has derived that the situations
A,B,D and E are about a given situation Q. By adding new postulates to the aboutness
proof system it could be possible that also situation F is returned as being about the
situation Q. Because the previous situations will still be returned (by the monotonicity
of the aboutness relation), the additional returning of the situation F will result in a
higher recall value, i.e., the recall increases from
2
3
to 1.
A closer look at the example makes it also clear that one cannot make strict statements
about the eect for the precision values as dened in Chapter 2. The addition of postu-
lates to a monotonic aboutness proof system corresponding to some IR model A
m
could
increase the precision of aboutness relations, but this is only the case if Ret
A
m
 Ret
B
m
and IP
B
m
;A
m
> Prec
A
m
with B
m
denoting the extended version of IR model A
m
, as ex-
plained in Section 2.1.1. For example, adding new postulates to aboutness proof system
A
ps
corresponding to IR model A
m
could result in the determination of aboutness of
situation F ; this will increase the precision value to
3
5
, but it is also possible that only
situation C would be returned as being about situation Q. In the latter case the precision
value would drop to
2
5
.
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If two models are based on the same representation language, as in the case with
strict coordinate retrieval and coordinate retrieval as presented in Section 4.1 and Sec-
tion 4.2 respectively, then one can relate the recall values in the case of weakly embedded
aboutness proof systems as in Theorem 5.10. For instance the following theorem holds:
Theorem 5.11 If IR models A
m
and B
m
are completely described by aboutness proof
systems A
ps
and B
ps
respectively, A
m
and B
m
are using the same indexing function ,
and aboutness proof system A
ps
is weakly embedded in aboutness proof system B
ps
, then
the recall value of model A
m
will be less than or equal to the recall value of model B
m
.
Proof By denition of weakly embeddedness, if `
A
ps
S  T then `
B
ps
S  T for non-
empty S and T . This implies that if d 2 answer(A
ps
; q;D) then d 2 answer(B
ps
; q;D)
and trivially, if d 2 Rel
user
for IR model A
m
then d 2 Rel
user
for IR model B
m
. In
case 6`
A
ps
S  T then it could be possible that `
B
ps
S  T . The rest of the proof is
completely similar to the proof of Theorem 5.10.

Note that in Theorem 5.11 the implicit assumption is made that the query q with
map(q) = ; is not considered for recall evaluation. The answer to the question `what are
relevant documents in case nothing is asked' is an arbitrary and subjective one. If one
would answer `all documents' then the recall of strict coordinate retrieval will be 1 for
an empty query. The recall of coordinate retrieval will be 0 (as ; is the bottom-query
of the aboutness proof system C
ps
). So, in this particular case, Theorem 5.11 does not
apply.
Corollary 5.3 The recall value of strict coordinate retrieval is always less than or equal
to the recall value of coordinate retrieval.
Theorem 5.12 If IR models A
m
and B
m
are completely described by aboutness proof
systems A
ps
and B
ps
respectively, A
m
and B
m
are using the same indexing function ,
and aboutness proof systems A
ps
and B
ps
are equivalent, then the respective recall and
precision values of model A
m
will be identical to the recall and precision values of model
B
m
.
Proof By denition of equivalent aboutness proof systems it follows that if `
A
ps
S  T
then `
B
ps
S  T and vice versa. Consequently, if d 2 answer(A
ps
; q;D) then d 2
answer(B
ps
; q;D) and vice versa. Thus, the recall and precision values of IR models
A
m
and B
m
will be identical. This proves the theorem.

Corollary 5.4 The respective recall and precision values of coordinate retrieval and
vector-space retrieval are identical.
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Using the above theorems one has a rst tool to make qualitative statements about
the recall values of the various systems which we have studied. In the way we presented
it, monotonicity thus seems to be a desirable property. Having monotonicity one can
make qualitative statements, without it one cannot. Nevertheless, some authors argued
that IR models should display a non-monotonic character [27, 28, 76]. In the following
section we discus how non-monotonic aboutness in reality is.
5.2.4 How non-monotonic is aboutness?
In this section we concentrate on the following question: `is aboutness monotonic?' and
if so, in which way can one formalise it using the framework we have developed. We
show that in information retrieval the notion of aboutness and it is present in the user's
mind is typically non-monotonic. In order to handle non-monotonicity in the models of
Chapter 4, some new rules will be proposed. These `non-monotonic' rules should replace
the Left Monotonic Union rule. Let us rst explain why we feel that aboutness should be
non-monotonic.
The user formulates a query, which is based on her expectation of what it returns.
This expectation can be considered as a set of defaults. For instance, a user who wishes
to be informed about \what is on television tonight" can formulate a query \programs".
In this case, the user assumes by default that there are no other sorts of programs. If
the system returns a document with the descriptor \computer programs", the user would
probably reject this document.
Using Denition 5.9, one can view the use of defaults in terms of a non-monotonic
aboutness derivation as follows: `given the information that A, in the absence of evidence
against default D, infer a conclusion B'. The Closed World Assumption is a rule implic-
itly using defaults. The default is then `if a document is not represented by a descriptor
t it is represented by the negation of t'. This is a crude approach of the system to span
the users' defaults. Due to the cognitive character of the users' defaults, it is hard to
formalise them in general. However, if we can formalise the users' implicit defaults the
precision will probably increase. Using defaults will bring the set Ret
system
closer to the
set Rel
user
. Thus, the fact that \programs" is about \programs" should not automatically
allow us to conclude that \computer programs" is about \programs". Or, stated dierently,
we observed that aboutness is non-monotonic.
Next we will introduce some non-monotonic rules in order to handle the non-mono-
tonicity of aboutness. Let us start with a formalisation of a rule that deals with a simple
interpretation of a user's default. The rule is called Rational Compositional Monotonicity
and states that information composition may occur only when no preclusion relationships
are violated.
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Rational Compositional Monotonicity (RCM)
S  T S  f'
1
; : : : ; '
n
g '
1
6? : : : '
n
6? 
S [ f g T
Replacing the Left Monotonic Union rule by Rational Compositional Monotonicity in a
SC-system or a C-system, in addition with some preclusion relations, results in a non-
monotonic aboutness relation.
Let '? be an axiom of a SC-system in which Left Monotonic Union is replaced by
Rational Compositional Monotonicity. We can conclude in this system that f'g f'g
using Reexivity. Here the conclusion that f'g [ f g f'g does not hold.
So, given a particular information need, certain preclusion relations can be given as
user's defaults. This rst approach to model the non-monotonic behaviour of aboutness
seems to succeed. However, given that '? holds one should avoid the undesirable
conclusion in which a situation occurs containing the elements ' and  . Such a conclusion
can be achieved as follows. Starting from the Reexivity axiom:
f!g f!g
RCM and SE
f'; !g f!g
RCM and SE
f';  ; !g f!g
The underlying idea that made this deduction possible is that some preclusion rela-
tions are missing. We suggest that the following preclusion rule should be adopted:
Composition Preclusion (CP)
S [ f'g f g  ?!
'?!
Now, if we want to have the conclusion f ; !g f!g we are not allowed to conclude
f';  ; !g f!g, as for now '?! is an added axiom.
Let us illustrate the rules with an example. Consider a user who wishes to learn
about \programs". Assume that she typically wants to be informed about aspects such
as \movies", \talk shows", etc. Within this specic information need, the user would
seemingly not want to be informed about \computer programs". It seems that the profon
hhProgramsii precludes the profon hhComputerii given this particular information need.
Given the rule Rational Compositional Monotonicity we can conclude that fhhProgramsii,
hhTelevisioniig  fhhProgramsiig and it is then not possible to conclude that
fhhProgramsii,hhComputersiig  fhhProgramsiig. In case fhhTelevisionii,hhProgramsiig
 fhhTelevisioniig is concluded, the preclusion hhTelevisionii?hhComputersii is adopted
by means of the Composition Preclusion rule. Due to this preclusion relation it is not possi-
ble to conclude then that fhhComputersii,hhTelevisionii,hhProgramsiig  fhhTelevisioniig.
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We have assumed that the profon hhTelevisionii precludes the profon hhComputerii
given the user's particular information need. The last clause `given the user's particular
information need' plays an important role in the preclusion information. Defaults based
on an information need are very hard to obtain. They are time-, person-, and place-
dependent and often based on non-logical grounds. Statistical information cannot be
used. For example, somebody enters the query \Prime Minister". Typically the user
wants to be informed about the Prime Minister of the country where she lives. Probably
the user also wants to be informed about the current Prime Minister and not the one
of 1980. These are the kind of defaults the IR system should take into consideration.
However, if she is searching from the Netherlands in the Reuter newswire (a world-wide
news document collection), the statistical information would certainly not tell her that
we can associate Prime Minister with Wim Kok
1
. Instead, the concept of Prime Minister
who is most favoured with news-attention is linked with her or his name, probably John
Major, and that will be the default based on statistical grounds. What we can do is to
extract default information of the user by using a so-called navigation process on the
query. In this process the query is not entered by a sentence but via a navigation process
in which the user build her request. We discuss this aspect in Chapter 6.
To conclude, this section has demonstrated that (non-)monotonicity should play a
pivotal role in IR models. If an IR model is monotonic, recall predictions can be deduced.
The statement than an IR model should be monotonic is weakened. In reality, aboutness
shows a non-monotonic character under information composition. Therefore, IR systems
must be conservative with regard to information composition. This conservatism should
be guided by the user's defaults. The rule Left Monotonic Union should be replaced by
some non-monotonic variants using the user's defaults in the derivation. The question
how the user's defaults can be (automatically) derived is hard to answer. In Chapter 6
we return to this subject.
5.3 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we showed how our framework can be applied to the fundamental analysis
and comparison of IR models. There are many avenues for further research. To begin
with, the investigation of further useful concepts, denitions, and theorems is needed.
The denitions of embedding, non-monotonicity, and so on given in this chapter are
only the beginning of a theoretical study of IR models. Detailed investigations of more
denitions and theorems are needed in order to develop a complete information retrieval
theory. Such a theory must ultimately enable us to accurately predict the results of
possible IR models or combinations of it.
1
Is at the moment the Prime Minister in the Netherlands.
Chapter 6
The use of the axiomatic theory for
information retrieval
I suppose that bronzesmiths in the Bronze Age had
a working knowledge of bronze, but not what we
would consider a very good theoretic account of
bronze. So maybe it should not surprise us to dis-
cover that the same holds for information in this
Age of Information. For it does.
J. Barwise, `The Situation in Logic'.
In this chapter we present some ideas for an eective use of the axiomatic theory for
information retrieval as laid out in the previous chapters. We investigate three directions
for it: (1) a combination of IR systems based on their aboutness proof systems [70, 72], (2)
a method to obtain an ordering of relevant documents based on the axiomatic denition
of aboutness [68], and (3) a presentation of the use of the framework in order to model
a hypermedia approach [15]. These three directions will be presented in some detail in
the following sections.
In Section 6.1 we return to the notion of combining aboutness proof systems as
presented in Chapter 3. The analysis of the underlying aboutness proof systems, as
presented in Chapter 5, can be very useful in order to propose workable combinations. In
Section 6.2 an ordering method for aboutness proof systems is presented. The ordering
method provides a technique for the relative ordering of documents based on logical
reasoning rather than on statistical information. In Section 6.3 we use our framework
to formalise a possible integration of information retrieval and hypermedia. With the
formalisation one can study some properties of the behaviour of an integrated information
retrieval hypermedia system. We conclude this chapter with a summary and ideas for
possible extensions.
133
134 Chapter 6. The use of the axiomatic theory for information retrieval
6.1 Combining aboutness proof systems
In Chapter 1 we presented the current information retrieval paradigm and its impact on
the development of new IR systems. These IR systems have the following features:
(i) there are several document-bases;
(ii) each document-base contains dierent types of information (for instance a `hand-
book of logic' should not be treated by the system in the same manner as the
`proceedings of a conference on modal logic');
(iii) there are various types of users and there are vast dierences between their infor-
mation needs (for instance, in a university library there is a huge dierence between
a rst-year student searching for relevant information and a professor searching for
relevant information);
(iv) there are various kinds of search-tasks, or stated dierently, there are several ways in
which a user can be satised with the returned information (for instance, somebody
may want to be informed about a subject in general or in detail).
In Chapter 3 we mentioned the basic concepts of a theory of information retrieval agents
with the capability of reasoning about aboutness, based on the intuitive ideas exposed
in the thesis of Van Linder [90]. The theory of agents seems tailor-made for helping to
model the information retrieval problem, covering the features mentioned above. Since
rational agents have the ability to reason, communicate, gather and maintain information
they could be used as autonomous IR systems, operating in several document-bases. For
dierent types of information, users and search-tasks, one could dene dierent types of
information retrieval agents. In this section we look at the aboutness proof systems from
an agent-oriented perspective based on [70, 72].
We distinguish two types of agents, the retrievers and the users. The retriever agents
decide whether a document representation is about a query. One can formalise a specic
retriever agent for each document-base and/or type of information. User agents are
agents that have a certain information need, to be satised by the retrievers. Similarly,
for dierent kinds of users and search-tasks a specic type of user agent can be given.
In Figure 6.1 an agent-oriented approach for an IR model is graphically depicted.
Let us explain this gure in the context of an example. Assume a user wants to be
generally informed about \Caesar". She activates a specic user agent, which triggers a
suitable composition of several retriever agents based on her specic information need
(\Caesar") and her search task (general information). The retriever agents can be viewed
as aboutness proof systems with a single aboutness relation, for instance, the one of a
vector-space model or of a boolean model. Performing this search action, the selected
retriever agents transfer all their aboutness theorems with respect to the query \Caesar".
The user agent decides on the basis of the retriever agents which documents should
be displayed to the user. For example, the unanimous user, as dened at page 58, only
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returns a document if all selected retriever agents agree on the fact that the document
is relevant.
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Figure 6.1: Graphical representation of an agent-oriented approach.
In Chapter 3 we dened a combined aboutness proof system hL
n
;Ax ;Rulei with k
retriever agents and l user agents with k+l = n. Each retriever agent represents a unique
concept of aboutness. Each user agent also represents a unique concept of aboutness
based on the notion of aboutness of some or all of its underlying retriever agents.
It is important to know whether two retriever agents have identical or embedded
results or not. For instance, if two retriever agents always have the same aboutness
theorems, a user that is relying on the two retrievers could rely on only one of them. In
case one views an autonomous retriever agent as an aboutness proof system with a single
aboutness relation, one could analyse the case of equivalence and embedding as proposed
in Chapter 5. Two retriever agents are equivalent if and only if their corresponding
aboutness proof systems are equivalent. So, it is important to know whether the retriever
agents (or their corresponding aboutness proof systems) are embedded or not. For if this
is the case, combining them in the way we presented in Section 3.3.4 does not yield new
retrieval results. Consider the user agents as presented at page 57.
Theorem 6.1 Given two retriever agents r
1
and r
2
with their corresponding aboutness
proof systems A
ps
and B
ps
respectively. Assume that for the aboutness proof systems A
ps
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and B
ps
the language L is identical. Furthermore assume that in the combined aboutness
proof system C
ps
the aboutness decisions of r
1
and r
2
are combined together in a user
agent u. Then
(i) if u is a typical user and A
ps
is embedded in B
ps
, then u and r
2
are equivalent in
terms of their aboutness decisions.
(ii) if u is a unanimous user and A
ps
is embedded in B
ps
, then u and r
1
are equivalent
in terms of their aboutness decisions.
Proof Note that by the denition of embedding every aboutness theorem of A
ps
is also
an aboutness theorem of B
ps
.
(i) The typical user is based on the following rule: if  is an aboutness theorem of one
of the retriever agents, then  is an aboutness theorem of this user. We prove here
that the aboutness theorems of B
ps
are the same as the aboutness theorems of C
ps
.
Given that  is an aboutness theorem of C
ps
,  should be an aboutness theorem of
A
ps
or of B
ps
. If  is an aboutness theorem of A
ps
then by the assumption,  is an
aboutness theorem of B
ps
. This is sucient to conclude that all aboutness theorems
of C
ps
are aboutness theorems of B
ps
. The opposite, all aboutness theorems of B
ps
are aboutness theorems of C
ps
, trivially holds by the denition of a typical user.
Hence r
2
and u are equivalent in terms of their aboutness decisions.
(ii) The unanimous user is based on the following rule: if  is an aboutness theorem
of all retriever agents, then  is an aboutness theorem of this user. We prove here
that the aboutness theorems of A
ps
are the same as the aboutness theorems of C
ps
.
Given that  is an aboutness theorem of C
ps
,  should be an aboutness theorem
of A
ps
and of B
ps
. If  is an aboutness theorem of A
ps
then by the assumption,
 is an aboutness theorem of B
ps
. Thus  is an aboutness theorem of A
ps
and of
B
ps
. This is sucient to conclude that u and r
1
are equivalent in terms of their
aboutness decisions.

Informally, Theorem 6.1 captures the intuitive idea that it is not useful to use retriever
agents whose corresponding aboutness proof systems are embedded, in the way given
above. In order to present workable combinations, one has to inspect rst whether
two aboutness proof systems are embedded or not, otherwise nothing new is gained by
combining them as retriever agents.
6.1.1 Filtering process
However, if two aboutness proof systems are embedded one can use this to dene a sort
of ltering process. For instance, consider the aboutness proof systems VC
ps
and SC
ps
presented in Chapter 4. We already deduced that SC
ps
is weakly embedded in VC
ps
.
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Given a very large document-base D, the set of relevant documents corresponding to a
query q in SC
ps
can be ideally presented with a lter as follows:
answer(SC
ps
; q; answer(VC
ps
; q;D)):
The idea is that rst the vector-space model is used on the complete document-base and
that all the resulting documents are then fed to the strict coordinate retriever. One of
the advantages is that one can use a fast IR system to set bounds to a potentially enor-
mous document-base rst in order to search it more accurately with another IR system
afterwards. To capture this we dene a ltering function f-answer which formalises the
notion of ltering in the way presented above.
Denition 6.1 Let A
ps
and B
ps
be two aboutness proof systems, D a document-base,
and q a query. The ltering function f-answer of A
ps
with respect to B
ps
is dened by:
f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) = answer(A
ps
; q; answer(B
ps
; q;D)):
We call B
ps
the lter of f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D). Applying the lter function is called
a ltering process. Thus applying the lter function f-answer(SC
ps
;VC
ps
; q;D) results
in the set of all documents that are rst retrieved using the vector-space model and
afterwards fenced in by the strict coordinate model.
Assume one has an aboutness proof system A
ps
which is not fast enough. Someone
wants to dene a lter B
ps
with the idea in mind that the lter process should not change
the nal set of relevant documents. This requirement means that f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D)
= answer(A
ps
; q;D) should hold. However note that there are some occasions in which
it is desirable that f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) 6= answer(A
ps
; q;D), for instance if someone
wants to use two systems which are disjoint with respect to the embedding relation.
One could also analyse aboutness proof systems in order to circumvent useless lters.
For example the information that one aboutness proof system is embedded in another
aboutness proof system can be used to prevent useless ltering processes. First we dene
the notion of a useless lter.
Denition 6.2 Let A
ps
and B
ps
be two aboutness proof systems. The ltering func-
tion f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) is called useless if for all document-bases D and non-empty
queries q
f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) = answer(B
ps
; q;D):
Informally, if the set of documents retrieved with aboutness proof system B
ps
can not
be fenced in by aboutness proof system A
ps
then the ltering f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) is
useless. Note that in Denition 6.2 the empty query (map(q) = ;) is explicitly omitted
from consideration.
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Corollary 6.1 Let A
ps
and B
ps
be two aboutness proof systems, and assume that B
ps
is weakly embedded in A
ps
. Then the function f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) is useless.
Hence, it does not make sense to use the strict coordinate retrieval aboutness proof
system SC
ps
as a lter for a vector-space retrieval aboutness proof system by using
the function f-answer(VC
ps
;SC
ps
; q;D). This follows because the aboutness theorems of
SC
ps
(the lter) are a subset of the aboutness theorems of VC
ps
. Thus no theorems are
removed by using the system VC
ps
after one has used the proof system SC
ps
.
Besides proposing and inspecting lters based on aboutness proof systems, one can
use lter processes to inspect aboutness proof systems.
Denition 6.3 Let A
ps
, B
ps
be aboutness proof systems, D a document-base, and q
a query. Given that for all document-bases D and queries q: f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) =
f-answer(B
ps
;A
ps
; q;D). Then,
 the aboutness proof systems A
ps
and B
ps
are said to preclude each other if and
only if f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) = ;;
 the aboutness proof systems A
ps
and B
ps
are said to be f-equivalent if and only if
f-answer(A
ps
;B
ps
; q;D) = answer(A
ps
; q;D);
 the aboutness proof systems A
ps
and B
ps
are said to overlap if and only if the
systems do not preclude each other and are not f-equivalent.
Note that if two aboutness proof systems are equivalent then they are f-equivalent.
The opposite does not hold. For, given that the aboutness language of a system A
ps
is
a superset of the aboutness language of B
ps
and that the two systems have exactly the
same aboutness theorems, it does not necessarily follow that A
ps
and B
ps
are equivalent
(B
ps
is conservatively embedded in A
ps
), but one can easily verify that A
ps
and B
ps
are
f-equivalent.
Especially if two aboutness proof systems are in overlap, one could inspect whether
the two systems are good combinations; in other words, whether the aboutness theorems
of A
ps
are limited in the correct way by aboutness proof system B
ps
, and vice versa.
6.1.2 Conclusion
In this section we have presented user and retriever agents and a ltering process based
on aboutness proof systems. We showed how one can inspect workable combinations
of aboutness proof systems without doing experiments. Instead of combining aboutness
proof systems as rules, one could use them as lters. Combinations and lters of several
IR models can be suggested on the basis of their aboutness proof systems instead of on
the basis of unpredictable recall and precision values.
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6.2 An ordering of aboutness proof systems
In this section we present a way to order aboutness proof systems so as to obtain an
ordering of relevant documents. The ordering of the proof systems is based on the idea
that each property of aboutness can be represented as an aboutness proof system, and
that certain properties of aboutness are preferred over other properties.
In the aboutness proof systems considered up till now an aboutness derivation is
always strict: either one can derive aboutness or one cannot. Therefore aboutness has no
degrees in these proof systems. In information retrieval, however, the ordering of relevant
document (ranking) is normally regarded as a necessary requirement. The classication
`relevant' and `non-relevant' is strict and rigid. When presenting the probabilistic IR
models in Chapter 4 we argued that an ordering of documents was needed because
for the determination of relevance one must use imperfect knowledge; the query is not
an exact match with the information need and the document representation is only a
crude approximation of the document content. In a probabilistic information retrieval
approach, the question whether a document is relevant to a given query is not answered
by `yes' or `no' but by a value.
The problem that documents retrieved by our aboutness proof systems, e.g., all doc-
uments in the set answer(A
ps
; q;D), do not have an order, also occurs in the logical IR
models. Here, the relevance of a document d given a query q depends on the validity of
the formula d about q. The formula d about q has no degrees other than true or false.
For this reason, Van Rijsbergen proposed the Logical Uncertainty Principle in
1986 [124] in order to extend the logical models with some uncertainty values:
`Given any two sentences x and y; a measure of the uncertainty of y about x
related to a given data set is determined by the minimal extent to which we
have to add information to the data set, to establish the truth of y about x.'
The main idea is that if a system cannot logically deduce that a document d is about a
query q, we have to add information to the data set until we can determine the aboutness
between the document and the query. The strength of aboutness can be associated with
the measure of uncertainty P (d about q) which is based on how much information is
added. Then according to Van Rijsbergen [124], d
1
is preferred over d
2
if and only
if P (d
1
about q) > P (d
2
about q). At rst the data set mentioned in the principle
was referring to the set of descriptors of the document representation. Later, Nie [107]
suggested to calculate how much information is needed of the underlying knowledge-base
to determine aboutness.
In this section we consider a dierent approach (based on the article [68]). We propose
an ordering of documents not based on a uncertainty function but based on an ordering
of aboutness proof systems. We note that the preference of the aboutness of certain
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documents over others with respect to a query is strongly dependent on the user. This is
one advantage of our ordering technique. Typically, the role of the user is modelled as an
undistinguished source of uncertainty in IR models that obtain an ordering of documents
by using probability measures [54, 125, 128, 143] for handling the ordering of documents.
The variations between dierent users cannot be accounted for because the user is not
available in a symbolic form in the model.
Contrary to [124], we do not dene a document d
1
to be preferred over a document d
2
if and only if P (d
1
about q) > P (d
2
about q). In our approach, a preference of documents
with respect to a query is based on an ordering of aboutness proof systems, which can
be viewed as a logical preference. Pursuing this, we propose an order of aboutness
proof systems in order to make the preference of properties of aboutness explicit. This
proposal is based on the idea that each property of aboutness can be represented as
an aboutness proof system, and some properties of aboutness are preferred over other
properties. For instance, a document retrieved by an R-system could be preferred over a
document that is retrieved by an SC-system, because for a particular user the aboutness
property reected by the R-system is more correct or intuitively more acceptable than the
aboutness property reected by an SC-system. An ordered output of documents is then
obtained given a set of ordered aboutness proof systems. The retrieved document-set is
ordered following the user's preferences on the aboutness properties.
To conclude, we will show an ordering technique for documents based on an ordering
on aboutness proof systems. A technique is presented, that transforms an aboutness
proof system into an ordered list of aboutness proof systems. The ordering of these
systems is done on logical grounds only, i.e., without resorting to a quantitative formalism
for uncertainty.
6.2.1 Ordering aboutness decisions
In this section we show a technique that can be used to obtain an ordering of about-
ness proof systems given a set of (unordered) aboutness proof systems. The ordering
represents a logical preference of documents. Using this technique the dierent levels of
appropriateness of the aboutness properties are captured by setting preferences on the
aboutness proof systems representing the properties.
Given a list of n aboutness proof systems one can dene an ordering function  :
[1; : : : ; n] ![1; : : : ; k] for some k with 1  k  n. This leads to an ordered list of
aboutness proof systems, denoted as O. The underlying idea is that  projects a list of
aboutness proof systems onto another list in which the aboutness proof systems occur in
order of preference. Let us study the ordering function  more closely. The case where
 : [1; : : : ; n]![1; : : : ; k] is a total surjective function results in the property that for all
1  i  k, there is a j with 1  j  n such that (i) = j. If this is not assumed, maybe
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some aboutness proof system is not mapped onto the ordering. This could be useful if
an aboutness proof system of the list is not taken into consideration for the ordering,
because the user thinks that the corresponding aboutness property of that particular
system is not very useful. We will not consider this further.
The case in which the function is not injective, i.e., where k 6= n, could be useful in
the case where a user likes two documents equally well. The user then considers both
documents on the same level of relevance. So, if (i) = (j) and i 6= j the ith and jth
aboutness proof system of the list O are equally preferred. In case  is bijective and
hence a permutation, we call the preference of the aboutness proof systems in the list O
a simple order preference. If  is bijective then the order @

is a strict total order (or
a linear order).
Denition 6.4 Let a list [A
ps
; : : : ;Z
ps
] of n aboutness proof systems and an ordering
function  be given, with B
ps
denoting the ith element of the list and C
ps
the jth element.
Then B
ps
is preferred over C
ps
with respect to  if and only if (i) < (j). If B
ps
is
preferred over C
ps
with respect to , we write B
ps
@

C
ps
.
For simplicity we write (B
ps
) = x when (i) = x and B
ps
is the ith element of the list.
The preference relation on aboutness proof systems reects the intuitive idea that
a document derived with an aboutness proof system B
ps
with (B
ps
) = 1 should be
considered as most relevant. Those documents derived with any aboutness proof system
C
ps
for which (C
ps
) = 2 and which are not already derived with an aboutness proof
system B
ps
for which (B
ps
) = 1 should be considered as second most relevant, etc. In
this way one can use the ordering function  to construct a so-called ranked document
classication.
Denition 6.5 Let a list [A
ps
; : : : ;Z
ps
] of n aboutness proof systems, a document-base
D, a query q, and an ordering function  : [1; : : : ; n]![1; : : : ; k] be given. Then a ranked
document classication is the list of documents sets [C
1
; : : : ; C
k
; C
k+1
] such that
C
1
=
[
(B
ps
)=1
answer(B
ps
; q;D)
C
k
=
[
(B
ps
)=k
answer(B
ps
; q;D) n
[
1j<k
C
j
C
k+1
= D n
[
1jk
C
j
The ordering @

on aboutness proof systems (obtained by the ordering function )
is meant to take into account the particular notion of relevance involved in the given
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retrieval situation and user's background. Or, phrased dierently, for every retrieval
situation or user there could be a dierent .
Let us explain the concepts with an example. Consider a list of aboutness proof
systems [A
1
;A
2
;A
3
;A
4
]. The following diagrams all represent some list O, where O is
the result of the ordering function , and the arrow presents the preference relation @

.
A4
A1
A2
A3
Figure 6.2:  : [1; 2; 3; 4]![2; 1; 3; 4].
A4
A1
A2 A3
Figure 6.3:  : [1; 2; 3; 4]![1; 2; 2; 3].
We have now dened a list of document sets that represents a preference of the
documents of set C
i
over the documents of set C
j
if i < j. This list is constructed based
on an ordering of aboutness proof systems, and so far, no numerical calculations are
used. One can dene the notion of logical preference as follows:
Denition 6.6 Let a list of n aboutness proof systems, a document-base D, a query
q, and an ordering function  be given. Then a document d
1
is logically preferred over
a document d
2
if and only if d
1
2 C
i
and d
2
2 C
j
with i < j and C
i
; C
j
as given in
Denition 6.5. If a document d
1
is logically preferred over a document d
2
with respect
to  and q we write d
1

q

d
2
.
Denition 6.7 Two ordered lists of aboutness proof systems O
1
and O
2
are called
equivalent if and only if for all document-bases D and queries q, the document sets C
i
of the two ranked classications are equivalent.
Proposition 6.1 Given the list [A
1
;A
2
;A
3
] in which A
1
is an R-system, A
2
is an
SC-system, and A
3
is a C-system. Then the ordering functions  : [1; 2; 3]![3; 1; 2] and
 : [1; 2; 3]![3; 2; 1] result in equivalent ordered lists of aboutness proof systems. The
same holds for the ordering functions:  : [1; 2; 3]![2; 1; 3] and  : [1; 2; 3]![2; 3; 1].
Proof We show the rst item, leaving the second item, which is analogous to the rst,
to the reader. Let  be [1; 2; 3]![3; 1; 2] then C
1
= answer(A
3
; q;D). By the denition
of embedding, C
2
and C
3
are empty. For if S  T is an aboutness theorem of A
1
or A
2
then it is an aboutness theorem of A
3
. For the function  : [1; 2; 3]![3; 2; 1] the resulting
list is similar, with the last two sets being empty again.

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6.2.2 Building ordered aboutness proof systems
In the previous section we proposed a technique based on aboutness proof systems that
allows presenting an IR model in such a way that relevance degrees are dened in logical
terms only. Moreover, the order of the aboutness proof systems could easily be obtained
by asking the user for her preferences. Although the possible eects of `an ordered
aboutness proof system' have been demonstrated, we still have paid no attention to
the aspects of creating an ordered aboutness proof system. We focus on the following
fundamental question: `on which set of aboutness proof systems should the -function
be based'.
We present a technique for extracting an ordering for a list of aboutness proof systems
given one single aboutness proof system. Consider an aboutness proof system A
ps
.
Without applying any method, given a query q we can already split the document-base
D into two disjunct sets; namely, C
1
= answer(A
ps
; q;D) and C
2
= D n C
1
. In order to
obtain more granularity in the classication we can construct a list of aboutness proof
systems O with the elements of the following set:
fB
ps
j B
ps
is (weakly) embedded in A
ps
or A
ps
is (weakly) embedded in B
ps
g:
In practice one should be aware of not adding aboutness proof systems to the set for
which answer(A
ps
; q;D) = ; or answer(A
ps
; q;D) = D.
For each element of the list of aboutness proof systems we have to study its corre-
sponding aboutness property (if at all) and propose one or several ordering function(s)
 based on the analysis. For specic information needs or particular types of users one
can dene dierent functions . If the user is oered a set of ordering functions, the user
is no longer a undistinguished source of uncertainty in IR models but she can play an
active role in selecting an ordering of documents.
6.2.3 Logical aboutness uncertainty principle
The approach to ordering documents we proposed, uses an ordering function on a list
of aboutness proof system. This leads us to propose a new logical uncertainty principle
based on the principle of Van Rijsbergen. First, the following denition is needed.
Denition 6.8 Let a list O of n aboutness proof systems and an ordering function  be
given. Furthermore let S and T be two situations. Then an aboutness proof system B
ps
is called minimal with respect to situation S and T and list O if and only if `
B
ps
S  T
and there is no aboutness proof system C
ps
in O such that `
C
ps
S  T and C
ps
@

B
ps
.
Consider a descriptor set T with A  T and B  T , a list of n aboutness proof
systems and an ordering function . The new principle we want to propose is this:
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Logical Aboutness Uncertainty Principle:
`Given any two descriptors sets A and B and an ordered list of aboutness
proof systems O; a measure of the uncertainty of A about B related to a
given data set is determined by the minimal aboutness proof system of the
list O we have to use to establish the truth of map(A) map(B).'
Note that we slightly redened the principle of Van Rijsbergen. In our approach the
uncertainty is determined by which aboutness proof system has to be used to determine
aboutness, and not how much information has to be added. In this principle, the uncer-
tainty measure is determined by which class a document is in, based on Denition 6.5.
Of course some of the document classes could contain many documents. In order to cir-
cumvent that all the documents of one class are assumed to be equally relevant, one can
use the uncertainty functions as proposed by the original logical uncertainty principle.
Each class of documents, an unordered set, is ordered by means of a uncertainty function
P , to have more granularity in a class. Therefore, we dene a uncertainty function LP
which is an extension of the function P used in the logical uncertainty principle. We
have to be careful that this extension still preserves our logical ordering. Or, formally
stated
Property 6.2 If d
i

q

d
j
then LP (d
i
about q) > LP (d
j
about q).
We dene a function LP that considers the document classication as the most im-
portant factor.
Denition 6.9 Let a list O of n aboutness proof systems, a document-base D, a
query q, and an ordering function  be given. Let [C
1
; : : : ; C
k
] be the ranked document
classication of k document classes based on O, D; q and . Furthermore assume a
function P with a range h0; 1i which calculates the uncertainty measure of d about q
based on the logical uncertainty principle of Van Rijsbergen. The function LP is dened
by:
LP (d about q) = k , i+ P (d about q)
with d 2 C
i
.
In this denition the function P is the same for all levels, but it is worth noticing that
it could be of great value to calculate dierent aboutness levels with dierent calculation
functions. For example, consider the following two classes: all documents of class C
i
are
retrieved by an R-system, thus documents with representations that exactly matched
the query. Another class C
j
contains documents which are retrieved by a C-system, thus
documents with representations that have some overlap with the query. Clearly, one
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would like to have two dierent functions P for the documents in classes C
i
and C
j
. To
accommodate this, we dene LP (d about q) = k , i + P
i
(d about q).
Let us explain Denition 6.9 in the context of an example.
Example 6.1 Consider the list [A
ps
;B
ps
; C
ps
] in which A
ps
is an R-system, B
ps
is an
SC-system, and C
ps
is a C-system, an ordering function  : [1; 2; 3]![1; 2; 3] and let map
be dened as map(x) = fhhI,t; 1ii j t 2 xg. Furthermore, assume a document-base D
containing the following documents:
doc doc descriptors
d
1
fa; bg
d
2
fa; b; cg
d
3
fa; b; dg
d
4
fb; cg
d
5
fc; dg
Let q be the query fa; bg. Then C
1
= fd
1
g, C
2
= fd
2
; d
3
g, C
3
= fd
4
g, and C
4
= fd
5
g
In this example LP (d about q) is the following:
LP (d
1
about q) = 3 + P
1
(d
1
about q)
LP (d
2
about q) = 2 + P
2
(d
2
about q)
LP (d
3
about q) = 2 + P
2
(d
3
about q)
LP (d
4
about q) = 1 + P
3
(d
4
about q)
LP (d
5
about q) = P
4
(d
5
about q):
In this case d
1
is always preferred over d
2
. The question whether d
2
is preferred over
d
3
depends on the probability measure P
2
. For instance, in case this function is using
occurrence-factors it depends on whether the descriptor c occurs more often than the
descriptor d. Note that in this example, given that for all i : 0 < P (x) < 1, the
Property 6.2 holds.
6.2.4 Comparison of rankings
To show how the presented ordering technique can be used for a comparison of rankings,
we briey present the work of Wong & Yao [145, 146] as one example of how the study
of ranking takes place in current information retrieval research.
In the work of Wong & Yao a user preference is dened as a binary relation > on D.
For d
i
; d
j
2 D, d
i
> d
j
means that the user prefers d
i
over d
j
. They study the relation in
146 Chapter 6. The use of the axiomatic theory for information retrieval
terms of axioms, such as asymmetry: d
i
> d
j
) :(d
j
> d
i
) and negative transitivity:
:(d
i
> d
j
)&:(d
j
> d
k
) ) :(d
i
> d
k
). Furthermore, Wong & Yao study the ordering
function f satisfying the following property: d
i
> d
j
) f(d
i
) > f(d
j
).
The result is a promising method for analysing ordering functions: for each IR model
with a ranked output the ordering function can be inspected. The rst-class citizen in
this approach is the ordering function itself.
In our approach we are not interested in the output and the behaviour of function
f , but in the logical sense in which f(d
i
) > f(d
j
) is defensible for a given d
i
and d
j
.
We are interested in the question: if a document d
i
is preferred over a document d
j
,
e.g., f(d
i
) > f(d
j
), is this in harmony with the
1
conception of aboutness? For instance,
given a query f\Brutus"; \Murder"g, an IR model that prefers a document descriptor
f\Brutus"; \Murder"g over a document descriptor f\Brutus"; \Murder"; \Caesar"g is in har-
mony with the assumption that a document derived with an R-system is more likely to
be about the query than a document that needs an SC-system. Based on this idea, one
can easily inspect the orderings of measure-based IR models, whether they are logically
consistent with the `inspectors' aboutness conception. Then one can discuss orderings
based on aboutness proof systems, rather than on numerical grounds. It is also more
transparent, i.e., in case of inconsistency one could point out where the ordering fails.
Example 6.2 Let us consider someone inspecting rankings of documents. She proposes
that documents derived with an R-system should be preferred over documents derived
with an SC-system, and that documents derived with an SC-system should be preferred
over documents derived with a C-system (for the denitions see page 118). Inspecting the
Index Expressions Belief Networks and the vector-space model results in the following
table:
Preference relation IEBN VC
R-system @

C-system Yes Yes
R-system @

SC-system No Yes
SC-system @

C-system Yes No
This table can be interpreted as follows. VC
ps
prefers an R-system over an SC-
system, but not an SC-system over a C-system. The IE
ps
prefers not an R-system over
an SC-system, but an SC-system is preferred over a C-system.
This shows how it possible to compare dierent rankings based on our axiomatic
theory.
1
Ours, the user's, etc.
6.3. A two-level hypermedia approach 147
6.2.5 Theory performance
Another way to present a logical ranking of aboutness proof systems is based on Popper's
procedure for theory performance. In Section 2.2.4 we described thirteen steps in order
to come to a better information retrieval theory. Let us assume one starts with a certain
information retrieval theory T . In an improved theory T
0
all the `good' aboutness deci-
sions of the old theory T are covered, in addition with some improvements. Sometimes
there are competitive theories T
00
and T
000
that are both improved theories of the original
theory T . If we view the theory of aboutness in terms of an aboutness proof system, we
can use the inverse chronological order of the way the theory performance took place as
a preference orders among theories. The order we obtain presents the belief that docu-
ments that can be considered relevant in terms of a theory T
0
should be preferred over
documents that can be considered relevant in terms of a theory T , given that theory T
0
is an improved version of theory T .
6.2.6 Conclusion
In this section we have presented a technique for an ordering of suitable aboutness
proof systems in order to obtain an ordered output of documents. We showed how
the framework can be used for proposing or comparing a ranked output of document
classication. The ordering of the documents is based on an ordering of aboutness proof
systems.
6.3 A two-level hypermedia approach
In this section we give an elaborate example that shows how our theoretical framework
can be applied in information retrieval. In particular, we formalise the so-called two-level
hypermedia approach
2
, which is a preliminary attempt to integrate information retrieval
(aboutness decisions) and hypermedia (browsing process of the user [110].). The choice
for this particular approach is based on the fact that in the two-level hypermedia ap-
proach aboutness plays a pivotal role in several dierent ways. The occurrence of several
dierent aboutness decisions oers us an exquisite possibility to highlight the features of
the framework presented in this thesis. We show dierent facets, starting with the mod-
elling of the aboutness decisions as they occur in the paradigm. We analyse the dierent
aboutness decisions, and show how they relate to each other. Finally, an ordering on
aboutness proof systems is proposed according to the approach presented in Section 6.2.
Here, the ordering is distilled automatically from the user's search actions. The basic
2
For more detailed information we refer to [14, 23, 29].
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aim of this section is to show the reader how the theoretical framework proposed in this
thesis can be used in practice.
Before we start with the formalisation of the two-level hypermedia approach in terms
of our framework, we discuss in Section 6.3.1 the general concepts behind the approach.
In Section 6.3.2 we actually formalise the two-level hypermedia model using the theory
proposed in the previous chapters. We show that in the hypermedia model several dier-
ent aboutness derivations occur. Each type of derivation has its own requirements and
specic properties and can be modelled as an aboutness proof system. In Section 6.3.3
and following we analyse the cooperation of the dierent aboutness proof systems of the
hypermedia model. Finally, in Section 6.3.6 we address some further issues relating to
the presented paradigm.
6.3.1 Introduction of a two-level hypermedia approach
Over the past ten years, several authors have proposed the integration of information re-
trieval and hypermedia [3, 29, 38, 92, 93, 141]. The two-level hypermedia paradigm con-
stitutes such an integration. It consists of two levels, the hyperbase and the hyperindex.
The hyperbase is a hypertext representation of the document-base D. The hyperindex
is a hypertext representation of the document representations (see Figure 6.4).
documents
descriptors
up
Beam
down
Beam
Figure 6.4: The Two-Level Hypermedia Paradigm.
A hypertext representation is a graph G = hN;Ei, consisting of a set N of nodes
and a set E of directed edges between the nodes N . In the hyperbase, the nodes are
documents and the edges represent informational relations between the documents. For
6.3. A two-level hypermedia approach 149
instance, a textual document about \David Bowie" could be linked with some music
from one of his albums.
In Bruza's thesis [23] it is mentioned that nodes could be descriptors of the documents
such as keywords or index-expressions, or the nodes could be elements of a thesaurus.
Edges could then represent associative links, hierarchical links, renements, or enlarge-
ments.
In Kheirbek & Chiaramella's work [78, 79] there are two dierent hyperindices, one
with nodes representing types of concepts, the other with nodes representing types of
conceptual relations.
Other than in a query language where the user enters a query by typing in a number
of keywords, a two-level hypermedia approach allows a user to perform a search-action
by travelling through the hyperindex along the edges until she is satised with a node.
This frees the user from having to know the system's concepts (as represented by the
nodes) in advance. For each step in the hyperindex, she chooses a node that is more
likely to represent her information need than the current node. This process is called
query-by-navigation (QBN) [13, 14, 16, 17, 29]. In short, QBN is the process whereby
the user (as a searcher) constructs a query by travelling through the Hyperindex along
the edges. The sequence of decisions taken during this travel is called a search path.
After nishing a search action the user wants to be informed about her constructed
query. With a beam-down operation the user goes from the hyperindex to the hyperbase.
The documents that are about a query q are accessible for the user. In a simple approach,
q will be the last node of the search path. In more advanced approaches the search path
of the user can be used as a context for constructing an expanded query q.
After reading, listing, or viewing some documents and following some document-
links, the user possibly wants to perform another search action from the perspective of
the current document. A beam-up operation will take the user from the hyperbase back
to the hyperindex. In a simple approach the accessible node will be the one that is the
representation of the current document.
A well-known phenomenon concerning the hypermedia paradigm is the so-called feel-
ing of getting lost in Hyperspace. This occurs when a searcher loses track of the original
information need as a result of the large amount of steps taken through the hypertext.
Even though some information in the document base may be non-relevant, in many cases
a user cannot resist the temptation of `just taking a quick look'. This often leads to a
departure from the concepts which were originally searched for.
The problem for the builders of a hypermedia-system is how to prevent a user from
the feeling of getting lost. Based on the work of Berger [13, 14, 16, 17], one should aim
to prevent the user from becoming lost in Hyperspace by examining a user's behaviour
and making a statement concerning the areas of the document base in which the user
might be interested. During the search for information, one can try to guide the user
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towards the areas in which she might be interested. The word `guide' is emphasised,
since under no circumstance should the retrieval system automatically place the user
in the hypothetical search target. The user is allowed to make the decision in which
direction the search is to be continued.
So far we presented the aspects we want to formalise in our framework. First we
present the hypermedia paradigm in terms of our framework.
6.3.2 The two-level hypermedia situated paradigm
There are several approaches to use the two-level hypermedia paradigm for modelling a
retrieval system, dependent on whether the focus is on the user [14, 16], on the domain
knowledge [78, 79] or on the task domain [97, 98].
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, our focus will obviously be the
aboutness relation as it occurs in the paradigm. One can distinguish four components:
the hyperbase: a graph B = hN
b
; E
b
i with N
b
= D, the document-base. The edges E
are links between the documents;
the hyperindex: a graph I = hN
i
; E
i
i with N
i
= S the set of descriptor-sets. The edges
E are links between descriptor-sets;
the beam-down operator: an operator that searches for documents which are about a
descriptor-set (possibly given a certain search path);
the beam-up operator: an operator that presents the document representation (set of
descriptors) of a given document.
We have now presented four components, based on which we formalise the two-level
hypermedia approach. Next we consider each component individually and formalise it
in terms of the framework.
The hyperbase
As usual, a document carries information. Information in one document could be re-
lated to information in another document. In terms of this thesis the relatedness is an
aboutness relation. Information in one document is about information in another docu-
ment. One can connect these two documents using links. Whether two documents are
informationally related to each other or not, is hard to determine automatically. The
problems, mentioned in Chapter 3, that arise in the formalisation of relevance also arise
when trying to formalise information links.
So-called multi-media authoring systems (see for instance [59]) are helping an author
to create hypermedia applications, but those systems are never automatically creating
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information links. We dene a hyperbase to be a tuple B = hD; E
b
i with E
b
a set of pairs
such that if (d
i
; d
j
) 2 E
b
then there is an informational link from document d
i
to the
document d
j
. We call it the set of the document-links. For the rest of this section, we
assume that the set of documents is xed and that document-links are manually created.
The hyperindex
The hyperindex is a graph I = hN
i
; E
i
i. In contrast to the document-links of the hy-
perbase, the links in the hyperindex are often created automatically. As mentioned
in Chapter 3, the representation of a document d consists of a set (d) of descrip-
tors. In Chapter 4 we transformed each descriptor set into an abstract situation. Here
we assume that  is a function that maps each document directly to a set of infons.
Given the representation functions 
o
of Chapter 4, one can easily transform the intro-
duced representation functions (for instance the one of the index-expressions) as follows:
(d) = map(
o
(d)) with map the corresponding map-function. Then, given a document
from the document-base, the indexing process  directly delivers an abstract situation
representing the information of the document.
The infon set I will be f' j ' 2 (d) and d 2 Dg, and as a consequence in our
aboutness language the set of abstract situations will be the powerset }(I) of I. One
could consider each element of }(I) (which is a set of infons, or stated dierently, which is
an abstract situation) to be a node of the hyperindex. In this approach abstract situations
representing no information at all are also elements of the powerset and consequently
a node of the graph. We limit the set of abstract situations N
i
in the hyperindex to
only those situations that are equivalent to or that are a subset of a representation of a
document. More formally, N
i
= fS j S  (d) and d 2 Dg. Hence, in this approach the
nodes of the hyperindex are abstract situations. We have one nal remark to make about
the abstract situations as to how they are used as nodes of the hyperindex. Set equivalent
situations should occur in the hyperindex as one single node. These situations represent
the same information. Therefore we assume the rule Set Equivalence to be implicit for all
aboutness proof systems intended for hyperindices.
One can generate links between the nodes using an aboutness proof system. Given
an aboutness proof system A
ps
, if `
A
ps
S  T then (T; S) 2 E
i
. In words, if S is about
T then the user can travel from node T to S, as the information present at node T is
also about the information present at node S. Note that we do not assume beforehand
that also (S; T ) 2 E
i
since symmetry could be an undesirable property of an hyperindex
link.
Now we can dene a corresponding hyperindex as follows:
Denition 6.10 Given an aboutness proof systemA
ps
= hL;Ax ;Rulei, the correspond-
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ing hyperindex I is dened to be the tuple hN
i
; E
i
i with N
i
= fS j S  (d) and d 2 Dg
and E
i
= f(T; S) 2 N
i
N
i
j `
A
ps
S  Tg.
Furthermore, we call A
ps
the corresponding aboutness proof system of the hyperindex
I if it satises the requirement: if (T; S) 2 E
i
then `
A
ps
S  T .
Various aboutness proof systems can be proposed for constructing hyperindex-links.
Important with respect to the aboutness proof system is that a hyperindex is used for a
query-by-navigation process of the user. As a consequence, aboutness decisions between
nodes should be taken in small steps, as big steps easily confuse the user. For this reason
the axiom S [ T  S would not be appropriate. For, by adopting this axiom a user
can travel in one step from node f
1
g to node f
1
; 
2
g, or with the same ease travel
towards the node f
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
100
g. Transitivity is also an undesired property of the
hyperindex. Given that (T; S) 2 E
i
and (U; T ) 2 E
i
then (U; S) 2 E
i
would lead to
the possibility of big steps and an overload of edges. Therefore we want to avoid the
property of transitivity. Reexive links allow the user to travel without leaving the node.
Therefore, one should also avoid to propose links in the hyperindex that are reexive.
Of great benet will be the property that each link can be dened with one specic
postulate. Given this property one can label each link with a particular postulate. The
search path of a user can then be modelled as a sequence of logical steps of the user. We
call this property uniqueness that is dened as follows:
Denition 6.11 Let an aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL;Ax ;Rulei and a correspond-
ing hyperindex I = hN
i
; E
i
i be given. The aboutness relation of A
ps
is called unique if
it satises exactly one of the following requirements:
(i) if (T; S) 2 E
i
then S  T 2 Ax and Rule = ;,
(ii) if (T; S) 2 E
i
then S  T is the conclusion of exactly one rule R 2 Rule.
In words, a unique aboutness relation presents a hyperindex where each edge cor-
responds to a unique axiom or rule in the hyperindex logic. Then we can state about
each link exactly which axiom or rule it corresponds to and which property it reects.
Note that if there is an aboutness theorem in Ax then the set Rule is empty. Con-
sequently if S  T is the conclusion of a rule, in the premises of this rule there are
no aboutness theorems. This uniqueness property `protects' us from cases in which we
can derive undesirable links by a combination of axioms and rules. We dene a func-
tion corr which, given an aboutness proof system and two situations connected with
an edge, returns a new aboutness proof system that contains the corresponding unique
axiom or rule of the aboutness proof system. For instance, given a hyperindex I with an
edge (T; S) 2 E and a corresponding aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL;Ax ;Rulei, then
corr(A
ps
; T; S) = hL; fAg; fRgi if `
A
ps
S  T , S  T 62 Ax and the only way we could
prove S  T is by applying rule R using premise A.
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An aboutness proof systemA
ps
that is used for constructing a hyperindex and meeting
all the requirements mentioned above, is called a hyperindex logic (HIL). The require-
ments of such a logic can be formalised as follows:
Denition 6.12 Given a hyperindex I and a corresponding aboutness proof system
A
ps
. The aboutness proof system A
ps
is a hyperindex logic if and only if the aboutness
relation of A
ps
is irreexive, not transitive and unique.
Proposition 6.2 The aboutness proof systems introduced in Chapter 4 are not hyper-
index logics.
Proof This follows directly from the fact that all aboutness proof systems presented in
Chapter 4 have a reexive aboutness decision.

Next we inspect some axioms and rules which are suitable to build a hyperindex logic.
The rst intuitive hypertext-link one may want to formalise is a so-called renement
link. By means of this link the user can travel from a node S to a node S
0
by extending
node S to S
0
. Modelling the fact that a user wants to make her request more specic,
the node S
0
contains more infons, and therefore covers more information than node S.
This link can be formalised by the Left Singleton Monotonic Union rule:
Left Singleton Monotonic Union (LSMU)
S 6 S [ f'g
S [ f'g S
Note that given an aboutness proof system which contains this rule, one could con-
clude that fhhBrutusii,hhCaesariig  fhhBrutusiig. The premise of the rule is needed
in order to avoid reexivity. If the premise was not required one could conclude that
f'g [ f'g f'g, which results in a reexive edge.
Using this particular rule, the conclusion f';  ; !g f!g is not allowed. If we want
to derive the last aboutness decision one should adopt the axiom S [ T  S. However,
besides reexivity this axiom causes transitivity, which is an undesired property of the
hyperindex logic.
The opposite of renement is called enlargement. In this case the user wants to
generalise the representation of the node where she is at the moment. This link is
formalised by the Right Singleton Monotonic Union rule:
Right Singleton Monotonic Union (RSMU)
S 6 S [ f'g
S  S [ f'g
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Using these two rules we allow the user to construct a query by travelling through
the Hyperindex, meanwhile rening or enlarging the nodes.
As Bruza suggested [23] a thesaurus could be useful for creating a hyperindex. In
case we want to adopt the information available in a thesaurus the following containment
rule could be useful:
Left Singleton Containment (LSC)
'! S 6 S [ f';  g
S [ f'g S [ f g
Here, information in a thesaurus is transformed as a kind of information containment.
Note, that S 6 S [ f';  g is required in order to avoid the conclusion S  S. Remark
also that here the ! is not exactly an information containment relation, as one should
avoid the case wherein '!', because this causes reexivity. For this reasons, we do
not refer to ! as the information containment relation, but as a thesaurus containment
relation. A thesaurus containment relation is irreexivity. We assume that the thesaurus
information is represented as a set K of axioms.
If Left Singleton Containment is a rule of A
ps
then the information that hhBrutusii
!hhRomanii 2 K results in an edge (fhhRomaniig; fhhBrutusiig) of the corresponding
hyperindex. Note that the rule Union Containment, as introduced on page 51, can not be
adopted. Adopting this rule one cannot travel from the node fhhRomaniigg to the node
fhhBrutusiigg as the reexivity axiom (; ;) is not an axiom of a hyperindex logic.
The consequence of using the thesaurus containment relation in a hyperindex logic
are twofold. Firstly, we require that the containment relation is irreexive, in or-
der to forestall reexive links. Secondly, in case one uses a thesaurus, an update
of the set N
i
of nodes is needed. For instance, if fhhBrutusii; hhCaesariig is an el-
ement of N
i
, then given the information that hhBrutusii!hhRomanii one should ex-
tend N
i
with the node fhhRomanii; hhCaesariig. More formally, in case a thesaurus
is used, the set N
i
of nodes is dened to be the set fS j S  (d) and d 2 Dg [
fS j S  f
1
; : : : ; 
k
; '
1
; : : : ; '
n
g and S
0
 f
1
; : : : ; 
k
; '
0
1
; : : : ; '
0
n
g and for all 1  i 
n ('
0
i
!'
i
or '
i
!'
0
i
) and S
0
 (d) and d 2 D and k  0 and n  1g.
Example 6.3 Given the singleton set of document descriptors ffa; bgg, and a!c, then
N
i
= ffag; fbg; fcg; fa; bg; fc; bgg.
In order to make it possible to travel from the node fhhBrutusiig to the node fhhRomaniig
one could adopt the rule Right Singleton Containment:
Right Singleton Containment (RSC)
'! S 6 S [ f';  g
S [ f g S [ f'g
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So far we presented four rules: Left Singleton Monotonic Union, Right Singleton Monotonic
Union, Left Singleton Containment, Right Singleton Containment.
Theorem 6.2 Given K a set of axioms with elements of the type '! representing the-
saurus information, the aboutness proof system A
ps
= hL; K; f Left Singleton Monotonic
Union, Right Singleton Monotonic Union, Left Singleton Containment, Right Singleton Con-
tainmentgi is a hyperindex logic.
Proof Let I = hN
i
; E
i
i be the corresponding hyperindex of the aboutness proof system
A
ps
. We show successively show that A
ps
meets all three requirements of a hyperindex
logic.
(i) The aboutness relation of A
ps
is irreexive. We have to show that, for all S 2
N
i
: (S; S) 62 E
i
, or stated dierently that for all S 2 N
i
: S  S is not an about-
ness theorem. Note that the axioms are not aboutness theorems. The premises
of the four rules do not contain aboutness relations and since the conclusion of
each rule is an aboutness theorem, we may conclude that an aboutness theorem
is the result of applying one rule. Inspecting the four rules one can see that for
Left Singleton Monotonic Union we have that if S  T then S  T and consequently
T 6= S. For Right Singleton Monotonic Union we have that S  T and the conclu-
sion that T 6= S holds. For Left Singleton Containment we have that if S  T by
using the knowledge '! then ' 2 S and  2 T with ' 6=  (since the the-
saurus containment relation is irreexive), the conclusion that T 6= S is valid.
The proof for Right Singleton Containment is completely analogous to the proof of
Left Singleton Containment. This proves that the aboutness relation of A
ps
is ir-
reexive.
(ii) To prove that the aboutness relation of A
ps
is not transitive, i.e., there is a S  T
and T  U and S 6 U , we give a case in which this happens. Take for example
the following three situations: S = f 
1
;  
2
;  
3
g, T = f 
1
;  
2
g, and U = f 
1
g. Then
S  T , T  U but S 6 U .
(iii) Finally we have to prove that for each link there is a unique axiom or a unique rule
of A
ps
, i.e., S  T can only be a conclusion using one specic axiom or rule. In
the proof of item (i) we already concluded that an aboutness theorem is the result
of applying one rule, since the axioms are not aboutness theorems. We have to
show that an aboutness theorem is derived by only one rule. Inspecting the four
rules one can easily verify that this is the case. This proves that the uniqueness of
the aboutness relation.

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Beam-down operator
The beam-down operator provides a link from a node of the hyperindex (an abstract
situation) to a node of the hyperbase (a document). Or, in more advanced applications,
the operator provides a link from one node of the hyperindex to several nodes of the
hyperbase, where the latter collection of nodes could be displayed as an ordered list. In
the formalisation of the hyperindex and the hyperbase the beam-down operator provides
a link from an abstract situation to a document or a set of documents. We have presented
in Chapter 4 several aboutness proof systems that decide whether S  T , or in words, is
situation S about situation T . This proof system was a model of an IR model that decides
whether a document representation (d) is about a query q. Here we have to inspect
whether a situation T is about a document d. We can easily use adopt the aboutness
proof systems of Chapter 4 as the beam-down operator, although now one does not have
to prove that map((d)) map(q) because q is already a situation. Here we have to
prove whether map((d)) T with T a node of the hyperindex and d a node of the
hyperbase. We refer to an aboutness proof system formalising the beam-down operator
as a beam-down logic (BML).
Denition 6.13 Let I = hN
i
; E
i
i be a hyperindex and B = hN
b
; E
b
i be a hyperbase.
Furthermore, let B
ps
be a beam-down logic. Then the result of a beam-down action from
node T of the hyperindex I will be a set of nodes D of the hyperbase B with D dened
as:
fd 2 N
b
j `
B
ps
S  T and S = (d) and S; T 2 N
i
g:
Note that dierent aboutness proof systems can be selected, resulting in dierent
beam-down logics. The choice of a proof system could depend on the type of user, her
information need, the followed search path, and so on.
Performing the beam-down operator and travelling from one node T of the hyper-
index to a node d of the hyperbase is denoted by T 5 d. Note that the situation T in
Denition 6.13 could be the last node of the search path. However, as mentioned in the
introduction of this section, one of the advantages of the query-by-navigation process is
that one could also take into account the previous steps of the user's search path. We
will return to this subject in Section 6.3.2.
Beam-up operator
Next we introduce the beam-up operator. This operator provides a link from a node of
the hyperbase to a node of the hyperindex. For simplicity, we consider this operator to
be the index function . In terms of the presented formalisation, given a document node
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d of the hyperbase, the beam-up operator delivers a node S (an abstract situation) of
the hyperindex. Here S represents the information inherent in the document d.
Denition 6.14 Let B = hN
b
; E
b
i be a hyperbase and I = hN
i
; E
i
i be a hyperindex.
Furthermore, let  : N
b
!N
i
be a representation function. Then the result of a beam-up
action from node d of the hyperbase B will be the node S of the hyperindex I with
S = (d).
The beam-up action from d to S is denoted by d4 S.
Let us summarise the notions introduced thus far with an example.
Example 6.4 Let the hyperbase B consist of the graph hfd
1
; d
2
; d
3
g; f(d
1
; d
2
); (d
1
; d
3
);
(d
3
; d
2
)g, and let the representation function  be such that the result of the indexing
process is given by (d
1
) = fa; bg, (d
2
) = fc; dg, and (d
3
) = fcg.
Furthermore, let K = fa!dg. Given the hyperindex logic A
ps
= hL; K; f Left
Singleton Monotonic Union, Right Singleton Monotonic Union, Left Singleton Containment,
Right Singleton Containmentgi and the beam-down logic SC
ps
as presented in Chapter 4,
the result is depicted in the following gure:
Union
Thesaurus
d2d1 d3
b
cd
ab
c
a ac
db d
Beam
down
Beam
up
documents
descriptors
Note that there is a huge dierence in beam-down links if we would add the rule
Union Containment to the beam-down logic. Then the knowledge-base K could also be
used for retrieval purposes (and not only for providing links in the hyperindex).
To conclude we have four dierent aboutness relations:
1. a hyperindex logic A
ps
, formalising the aboutness relation between the nodes of
the hyperindex;
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2. a given set of aboutness relations between the nodes of the hyperbase;
3. a beam-down logic B
ps
, formalising the aboutness relation between a node of the
hyperindex and a set of nodes of the hyperbase;
4. a representation function , formalising the aboutness relation between a node of
the hyperbase and a node of the hyperindex.
As an attentive reader may have noticed, we have introduced two logics so far, the
aboutness proof systems A
ps
and B
ps
. We propose that the search path of the user is the
third logic involved in the paradigm. The formalisation of the search path will be the
topic of the next section.
Search path
Query-by-navigation is the process whereby the searcher constructs a representation of
her information need by travelling through the hyperindex along the links. A search path
is a sequence of followed links by the user. We denote a search path by S
1
 S
2
 : : : S
k
,
which presents us the information that the user travelled from S
1
to S
2
, and from S
2
to
S
3
etc. Finally the user arrived at node S
k
. Formally,
Denition 6.15 Given a hyperindex I = hN
i
; E
i
i. A search path of length k is a
sequence of k linked nodes S
1
 : : : S
k
such that for all S
i
; S
i+1
with 1  i and i+1  k,
(S
i
; S
i+1
) 2 E
i
.
In our approach, the edges of the hyperindex are formalised by postulates of a hyperindex
logic. Each edge can be identied with one postulate of the hyperindex logic, and
consequently each step of the search path can be labelled with one aboutness proof
system. For identication we can use the function corr(A
ps
; S
i
; S
i+1
). Given a search
path, one can transform this path into a set of aboutness proof systems. One can
compose the aboutness proof systems into a single one by taking all the axioms and
rules of the several aboutness proof systems together. All the axioms and rules of the
aboutness proof systems occurring in the search path are members of the new aboutness
proof system. An aboutness proof system that is constructed in this way given a search
path is termed a search path logic (SPL).
Denition 6.16 Let a hyperindex I = hN
i
; E
i
i and a corresponding hyperindex logic
A
ps
= hL;Ax ;Rulei and a search path P of length k be given. Then a search path
logic is the aboutness proof system hL;Ax
0
;Rule
0
i with Ax
0
=
S
1ik 1
Ax
00
and Rule
0
=
S
1ik 1
Rule
00
where hL;Ax
00
;Rule
00
i = corr(A
ps
; S
i
; S
i+1
) for S
i
 S
i+1
2 P .
Example 6.5 The arrows in the gure below represent a user's search path P in the
hyperindex of the previous example. The search path logic is hL; fa!dg; fLeft Singleton
Monotonic Union;Right Singleton Containmentgi.
6.3. A two-level hypermedia approach 159
a
c
abb
d
descriptors
db
ac
cd
One might wonder in which way the search path should inuence the beam-down
operator. It would be very useful if one can distill an aboutness logic B
ps
from the search
path logic and afterwards use this logic as input for the beam-down logic. For instance,
assume a user who uses Left Singleton Monotonic Union derivation steps only. The search
path logic could be used as an important factor for choosing a Right Monotonic Union
oriented aboutness proof system as the beam-down logic.
Another possibility of using the search path is not to work towards the logic B
ps
but
towards the nal query. For instance, consider the situation in which the user ends up at
node S and she wants to beam-down. Using Denition 6.13 all the documents of which
the representations are about S are considered to be relevant. Maybe one can add extra
information to S based on the covered route through the hyperindex.
Our claim is that one can use the search path logic of a user for a better retrieval
performance. What has to be done is to nd a correlation between the dierent sorts
of aboutness proof systems. Here the work presented in Chapter 5 can be used. In the
next section we will go into detail about these aspects.
6.3.3 Relating aboutness proof systems
Usually it is hard to nd the logic behind a certain search behaviour. For example, if a
searcher visits a node that was visited before during the search, does this imply that she
is lost in hyperspace? Or is she just sure about the information represented by this node
and not about the next one? So far three dierent kinds of logics were introduced, the
logic associated with the beam-down operator (the BDL), the associated logic with the
way the hyperindex is created (the HIL), and the associated logic with the search path
of a user (the SPL). In this section we show how these three logics are related.
If one would take the beam-down logic to be identical to the search path logic, the
beam-down logic would not be very useful. For the search path logic is a subset of the hy-
perindex logic, and consequently, aboutness is not transitive and irreexive. In Chapter 3
we claimed that these properties are desirable for an aboutness proof system that is used
to determine aboutness between a document and a request. Therefore we need for each
link in the hyperindex an aboutness proof system representation that allows us to derive
documents. We present a function SP
ps
that maps a search path logic onto an aboutness
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proof system. The function is dened by SP
ps
(hL
a
;Ax
a
;Rule
a
i) = hL
b
;Ax ;Rule
b
i where
for each possible search path logic there is a corresponding aboutness proof system. For
instance one could suggest the following instantiations:
 If Ax
a
= ; and Rule
a
= fLeft Singleton Monotonic Uniong then Ax
b
= fReexivityg
and Rule
b
= fLeft Monotonic Union;Cut; Set Equivalenceg.
 If Ax
a
= ; and Rule
a
= fLeft Singleton Monotonic Union;Right Singleton Monotonic
Uniong then Ax
b
= fSingleton Reexivityg and Rule
b
= fLeft Monotonic Union; Sym-
metry; Strict Composition; Set Equivalenceg.
 If Ax
a
= K and Rule
a
= fRight Singleton Monotonic Union; Left Singleton Contain-
mentg then Ax
b
= fSingleton Reexivityg [K and Rule
b
= fRight Montonic Union;
Left Containmentg.
The rst item maps a search path logic of a user who has only used the links created by the
rule Left Singleton Monotonic Union onto an aboutness proof system that is based on the
strict-coordinate model. At the second item we propose that a search path logic of a user
with Left Singleton Monotonic Union and Right Singleton Monotonic Union rules should be
mapped into an aboutness proof system that is based on the coordinate model. A user
did not only rene the nodes but also made some generalisation steps, therefore, the
aboutness of this user could be based on an overlap. This kind of choices are subjective,
and could only be proposed after an in-depth investigation of user behaviours.
As we noticed in the previous section we can also use the search path logic for an
extension of the query q rather than changing the beam-down operator. In this case the
beam-down operator is a xed logic B
ps
. We can extend the query q as follows:
Denition 6.17 Given a search path S
1
 : : : S
k
and a corresponding search path
logic A
ps
then the expanded query S
q
is dened as:
S
q
=
[
fT j `
A
ps
T  S
k
g:
In words, the expanded query is the union of all T which are about the last node of
the search path, in terms of the search path logic. For instance, if the search path logic
is hL; ;; fLeft Singleton Monotonic Uniongi and S
k
the last node of the search path then
S
q
= S
k
[ f j S
k
[ fg 2 N
i
g.
In the following section we will be less strict in proposing one unique aboutness proof
system or one single end situation S
q
. We postulate that the ordering techniques of
Section 6.2 could be used to propose an ordering on aboutness aboutness proof systems
obtained from the search path. This ordering is based on the way in which the user
follows the links through the hyperindex.
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6.3.4 Ordering of aboutness proof systems
In this section we show that given a search path we are able to infer a preference relation
over aboutness proof systems in the way it is presented in Section 6.2. Here we propose
that given a search path we can infer a set of aboutness proof systems and an ordering
function  over this set. As there are several logics involved, we may consider various
ordering functions. Let us start with the most obvious one, the beam-down logic as it is
created after inspecting the search path. We will dene a function SPS
ps
that given a
search path results in a set of aboutness proof systems.
Denition 6.18 Let P be a search path S
1
 : : : S
k
. The function SPS
ps
is dened
as follows: SPS
ps
(P ) = [SP
ps
(A
1
); : : : ;SP
ps
(A
k 1
)] with A
i
the search path logic of the
search path S
k i
 S
k+1 i
.
Here  can be dened by (i) = i. Let us explain the intuition behind this denition.
A search path is evaluated under the assumption that the last steps are more important
than the rst steps. Then the corresponding aboutness proof system of the last step
is more important than the corresponding aboutness proof system of the last two steps
etc. The resulting preference states that documents retrieved with an aboutness proof
system of the last step are preferred over the documents retrieved with an aboutness
proof system of the last two steps.
For instance, if the last step was based on thesaurus information, a document that
is retrieved using a thesaurus for the nal query is preferred over, for instance, more
specic document representation.
In the work of Berger [13, 14, 16, 17] another use of evaluating the search path is
suggested, the so-called search support. Such a navigation aid should make suggestions
to the user as to which of the nodes of the hyperindex will most likely lead to the search
target. In our framework we propose a ranked list of situations. On top of this list is the
situation which covers the information where the user is searching for probably better
than the lower ones.
The story is similar to the ordering function of the beam-down derivation postulates.
Given a user arrived at node S
k
after she travelled by search path P . All the situations
which are about S
k
, using the rst aboutness proof system of the list SPS
ps
(P ) are
presented above the list of new reachable nodes. Then followed by all situations which
are about S
k
using the second aboutness proof system of the list SPS
ps
(P ), and so on.
The user is guided as the system delivers her an ordering based on her previous search
actions, after every search action the preferences of the next nodes changes.
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6.3.5 Defaults in a query-by-navigation process
In Chapter 5 we introduced the user's defaults which, if available, could be of great help
in order to increase precision. Let us consider the example given in Chapter 5 were
we used the query \programs" and two documents \computer programs" and \television
programs". In a hypertext environment the user starts at the node fhhProgramsiig. At
this point she can decide to choose the computer- or the television-interpretation. If
she wishes to be informed about \computer programs", she probably chooses the node
fhhProgramsii; hhComputeriig and by travelling through the hyperindex never reaches
nodes related to television-aspects. We can derive a default that most likely the in-
formation need of the user is not related to television.
Denition 6.19 Given a hypertext I = hN
i
; E
i
i and a corresponding hypertext logic
A
ps
. Furthermore let a search path P be given. If S
j
 S
j
[ f'g is a part of the search
path then the beam-down logic B
ps
can be extended with the axiom  ?' if and only if
for all situations S
i
in search path P ,  62 S
i
and S
i
[ f g 2 N
i
.
In our example, the user went from the node fhhProgramsiig to the node fhhProgramsii;
hhComputeriig, although she might as well have walked to the node fhhProgramsii;
hhTelevisioniig. If she does not considers a node with the profon hhTelevisionii then we
can on the basis of this information adopt the default that information about computers
precludes information about televisions. Note that this kind of defaults are purely based
on the user's actions, not on statistical information, neither on general defaults.
6.3.6 Conclusion
One of the advantages of a theoretical approach for modelling an integrated information
retrieval hypermedia model is that one can study aboutness decisions as they occur in
the model. We formalised three dierent kinds of logics, a hyperindex logic, a beam-
down logic, and a search path logic. In our approach the construction of these three
logics could be dependent of each other. A search path logic could be used to inuence
the beam-down operator or for query expansion. The way a user travelled through the
hyperindex could be used to propose an ordering of nodes of the hyperbase as well as of
the hyperindex. Finally we presented briey that the search path logic could be used to
generate some defaults which can be used for improving the representation of the user's
information need.
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6.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we have presented the impact of our framework for studying information
retrieval by proposing some properties, techniques, and ideas for combining and ordering
aboutness proof systems. There are many avenues for further research. To begin with,
a further investigation of useful concepts, denitions, and theorems is needed. The
denitions of ltering, ordering and so on given in this chapter are just a rst start
of the theoretical study of IR models. Detailed investigation of more denitions and
theorems are needed in order to describe a complete information retrieval theory. Such
a complete information retrieval theory must accurately predict the results of possible
IR models or combinations of it.
Furthermore, this section presented a formalisation of a two-level hypermedia ap-
proach, include a so-called query-by-navigation process. The framework is based on
our information retrieval theory in which it is possible to study `hyperindex modelling'-
related questions. The ordering of the documents is inuenced by the way the user
follows links to the hyperindex. Certain decisions have certain consequences. In our
proposed framework, we are able to express the decisions and their consequences for the
ordering of the documents. The user is no longer a `to be forgotten' object. She can
play a pivotal role in the ordering of documents using the query-by-navigation process.
Of course there are interesting aspects we did not study closely. Pertinent questions
include: `what is the role of the information links between documents in the document-
base' and `how can we use the proles of dierent users with the same style'. What we
did show was that it is possible to infer what the consequences are of certain decisions.
This can be useful for those who want to build new hypermedia systems or extended
existing ones or those who want to compare dierent systems based on the way the links
in the systems are dened.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
I may be wrong and you may be right,
and by an eort, we may get nearer to the truth.
K.R. Popper, `The Open Society and Its Enemies'.
In this nal chapter we start with a discussion of the main results and achievements
of this thesis. We also point out some opportunities for future research provided by
the axiomatic theory proposed in the preceding chapters. The chapter ends with some
sketches for more general practical and theoretical research, as it could be carried out in
information retrieval as well as in other areas.
7.1 Overview
In Chapter 1 we sketched the information retrieval paradigm. We showed the dierent
approaches for modelling and studying information retrieval. Next, in Chapter 2 the rea-
sons and consequences of proposing an information theory are given. Situation Theory as
a meta-language is introduced in Chapter 3, which furthermore contains the formalisation
of aboutness proof systems. In Chapter 4 we investigated several common information
retrieval models as proposed in the academic world. By mapping these models into our
framework, we were able in Chapter 5 to analyse and compare them theoretically. In
Chapter 6 three elaborate examples are given that show how our framework can be used.
The rst example shows how IR systems can be combined based on qualitative grounds.
In the second example it is shown how the output of an IR system can be ordered based
on a preference based on axiomatic denitions of aboutness. In the third example, a
two-level hypermedia application is proposed in a theoretically well-founded way.
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7.2 Achievements
In this thesis we have presented a framework that allows us to model various kinds of IR
models. We showed that one can prove that the theoretical models are indeed correct
representations of the IR models, by proving appropriate soundness and completeness
theorems. The fact that many important IR models can be characterised by means of
(sound and complete) aboutness proof systems allowed us to compare the models the-
oretically instead of experimentally. We showed equivalence and embedding relations
between IR models. These results allow us to sidestep the controversies surrounding the
experimental comparison of IR models. We also showed that some models are mono-
tonic whereas others are not. In case of monotonicity of an IR model, we were able to
make qualitative statements about the recall values obtained by the model. Since some
information retrieval researchers argue that IR models should display a non-monotonic
character, we presented some rules that transfer a monotonic aboutness proof system
into a non-monotonic one. Furthermore, we gave an extensive list of postulates useful
for information retrieval.
7.3 Future research
7.3.1 Information retrieval
The rst extension would be the mapping of several other models. We believe that
every IR model deriving aboutness in a more or less logical sense can be translated to
an aboutness proof system in our framework. Another extension could be to create
a method which makes it possible to build a cognitively acceptable aboutness relation
from a given set of postulates. Although the expressive power of the framework has been
demonstrated, we did not pay attention to aspects related to computational complexity.
Another problem to pursue concerns extensions to the formalisation of anti-aboutness.
Suitable extensions could be used for information ltering. At rst, an aboutness proof
system derives all documents which are about the query. With a detailed formalisation
of anti-aboutness, it is possible to transfer anti-aboutness information on the retrieved
set of documents. This last step could be viewed as an information ltering process.
7.3.2 Situation Theory
In the axiomatic theory the representatives of the information content of both the doc-
ument and of the information need are situations. The presented IR models are us-
ing a rather simplistic representation of information in which features such as context-
representation, nested information, and backgrounds are lacking (for an overview of some
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essential features an information retrieval representation should have see [85]). Therefore
the full expressive power of Situation Theory for information retrieval is neither used nor
shown in this thesis. However, in her thesis [84] Lalmas showed that Situation Theory
covers all these features.
A more complex representation of documents and queries in combination with the
axiomatic theory could lead us to a better understanding of the nature of information in
information retrieval (see [69] where this conviction is explained more comprehensively).
The nature of information is manifold and can be studied from dierent perspectives.
For example, in future research, we plan to look at the nature of user modelling and
its inuence on the notion of aboutness. A correct representation of the user's (mental)
intention will probably generate better retrieval.
We also want to study some aspects of information modelling that involve logical
problems, like inconsistency, paradoxes, and tautologies. Situation Theory allows us to
tackle these (see for example [7] in which Barwise & Etchemendy are modelling paradoxes
using Situation Theory). The use of a situation-theoretical representation of information
in combination with our axiomatic theory of aboutness is an interesting avenue for further
investigation.
Another issue is an extension of the set of postulates in such a way that the notion of
aboutness becomes context-dependent. The representation of contexts, which recently
has reached higher prominence in information retrieval, will be investigated using Sit-
uation Theory. For example, with network information retrieval (or any distributed
database) it is necessary to represent the fact that retrieval is with respect to a spe-
cic site (a context). Moreover, two sites (contexts) may be involved in an aboutness
derivation and the information retrieved from them must be aggregated. Using Situation
Theory it is possible to capture this notion of context using situations and background
conditions.
Finally, we want to look at the possibility of using Channel Theory. In [127], an
IR model is developed based on Channel Theory, a novel approach based on Situation
Theory [5, 6] in which the nature of the information ow can be dened by constraints
between pairs of situations. The information ow is said to be carried by a channel.
In the Channel-theoretic approach, the document and the query are represented by
situations. Determining the relevance of a document is to nd the channel, together
with its nature, that led from the situation modelling the document to the situation
containing the information being sought. The channel could be build as the (sequential
and/or parallel) combination of more primitive channels. The synthesis of this approach
with ours is considered by Lalmas [83] as follows:
We believe that the use of channels presents the most potential for IR mod-
elling. For example, a dierent use of channels is one where a channel models
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a retrieval method. Indeed, one can dene several types of ows, one for each
type of information retrieval methods (Boolean, probabilistic, vector space or
logical). A method can be used separately (i.e., one channel is involved) or
can be combined with one or more other methods (i.e., parallel channels are
involved). The document that is retrieved by many methods can be consid-
ered to be highly relevant to the information need. Obviously, it is necessary
to dene what a Boolean or a vector space ow is. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that, as well as being able to model dierent IR methods, the model
can be used to compare them formally. The properties of the corresponding
ows might lead to interesting results.
In this light we could see our work as a study of the ow of information, or aboutness,
which can be modelled as a channel. Then, an R-system could be represented as a typical
channel, as well as a C-system, or a vector-space aboutness proof system, and so on.
Further research is necessary to analyse the approach in more detail.
7.3.3 Databases
In Chapter 1, we summarised the dierence between data retrieval and information
retrieval. The theory presented in this thesis could possibly be a step towards an inte-
gration of database systems and IR systems. In database systems, aboutness is dened
in terms of an R-system in which a fact is about another fact if both facts are the same.
To extend this denition in order to allow plausible inference, some of the postulates
presented in Chapter 3 can be chosen.
7.3.4 Articial Intelligence
As mentioned in Chapter 1, research in information retrieval and research in articial in-
telligence are more and more converging. From the point of view of information retrieval,
people are interested in all types of non-monotonic reasoning. Furthermore, knowledge
representation languages developed in AI (for example Conceptual Graphs [34] and Ter-
minological Logic [101]) are inspected for their possible use in information retrieval.
Meanwhile, theoretical research in AI is searching for a so-called `killer application'
that could show the usefulness of a specic theory/formalism/language/approach. Infor-
mation retrieval is often considered to be a possible area of practical application of such
theoretical approaches, since the fundamentals of information retrieval and AI, such as
information, inference, uncertainty, and so on, are very close related.
The theory presented in this thesis was based on the meta-theory of Kraus, Lehman
& Magidor [81]. The main interest of Kraus, Lehman & Magidor was to study non-
monotonic relations, whereas our interest is the study of aboutness relations. It would
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be interesting to compare these two meta-theories in order to see where they dier and
whether these dierences are intuitively acceptable and explainable. Or stated dierently,
are there some typical aboutness properties which are not reasoning properties and vice
versa and more importantly, can we formulate an explanation for these dierences in
terms of our concept of aboutness. This analysis could lead to an improvement of our
theory of aboutness.
Finally we hope that information retrieval researchers can benet from the theory in
such a way that the theory can describe relevance decisions in a cognitively acceptable
way and that it can be used to predict the change in behaviour due to a modication of
the logical essence of an IR model.
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Samenvatting
Systemen die aan de hand van een vraagstelling relevante informatie opleveren worden
information retrieval (IR) systemen genoemd. Deze systemen spelen een steeds belang-
rijker rol in de informatievoorziening, zeker gezien de toenemende mate waarin docu-
menten met ongestructureerde informatie (zoals rapporten, memo's, verslagen, foto's en
video's) voor nader gebruik worden opgeslagen en het toenemend gebruik van digitale
bibliotheken voor dit doel. Helaas komt het maar al te vaak voor dat opgeslagen rele-
vante informatie, indien nodig, niet meer terug te vinden is. Dit is een gevolg van het
feit dat het heel lastig is om te bepalen of een document relevant is voor een gegeven
vraagstelling. Het terugvinden van relevante informatie, met uitsluiting van irrelevante
informatie, wordt bovendien bemoeilijkt door het feit dat informatie niet meer in een
statisch informatiedomein staat opgeslagen maar, mede door de opkomst van het digitale
wegennet (Internet), zich kan bevinden in diverse, over de wereld verspreide, dynamische
informatiedomeinen.
De essentie van het zoeken naar relevante informatie kan als volgt omschreven worden:
`Op welke wijze kan men relevante informatie onderscheiden van niet-relevante
informatie met betrekking tot een zekere informatiebehoefte.'
Naarmate een informatiedomein meer informatie bevat en er meer informatiedomeinen
moeten worden doorzocht, wordt de rol van een IR-systeem belangrijker. Handmatige
controle van het resultaat -is alle relevante informatie nu wel gevonden?- is onmogelijk
geworden. Het wordt zodoende steeds belangrijker om op een verantwoorde wijze een
IR-systeem, of een combinatie van meerdere IR-systemen, te selecteren.
Om te helpen bij het maken van een verantwoorde keuze wordt in dit proefschrift
een theoretisch raamwerk voor IR-systemen gepresenteerd. In dit raamwerk wordt vooral
gekeken naar de wijze waarop in een IR-systeem een relevantie-beslissing tot stand komt.
Aan de hand van deze studie zijn we in staat kwalitatieve uitspraken te doen over de
relevantie-beslissingen van verschillende IR-systemen en kunnen we op deze manier ko-
men tot een vergelijking van hun doelmatigheid.
Als uitgangspunt geldt dat ieder IR-systeem een bepaalde methode heeft om te beslis-
sen of een document relevant is gegeven een vraagstelling. Deze methode is afgeleid aan
de hand van een model. Een IR-model is gebaseerd op de volgende drie fundamenten:
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(i) de documentrepresentatie
voor de meeste IR-modellen is dit gewoon een verzameling representatieve tref-
woorden (keywords) maar steeds vaker gebruikt men tegenwoordig meer complexe
representaties die de inhoud van een document preciezer omschrijven.
(ii) de vraagstelling
deze wordt meestal zo samengesteld dat deze direct passend is op de documentre-
presentatie van het model. In veel modellen kan een vraagstelling worden samen-
gesteld met behulp van connectoren zoals `en', `of', en `niet'.
(iii) de matchingfunctie
deze functie bepaalt of een documentrepresentatie relevant geacht kan worden ge-
geven de vraagstelling. Sommige modellen maken hierbij gebruik van opgeslagen
kennis zoals die bijvoorbeeld aanwezig is in een thesaurus. Een matchingfunctie
kan in plaats van relevant of niet relevant ook gradaties aangeven door middel van
een rankingproces.
Information retrieval onderzoekers voeren vele discussies of de aanpak in model X beter
is dan de aanpak in model Y. In deze discussie kiest men vaak positie aan de hand van
toetsen die plaats vinden op grote, speciaal geprepareerde testcollecties (bijvoorbeeld de
TREC testcollectie die meer dan 3 gigabyte aan informatie bevat). In zogenaamde recall
en precision-berekeningen worden de resultaten van de toetsen omgezet in statistische
waarden, die aangeven hoe doortastend en accuraat een bepaald IR-systeem is. De
recallwaarde geeft aan hoeveel relevante documenten door het systeem zijn opgeleverd
ten opzichte van de in het informatiedomein aanwezige relevante documenten. Precision
geeft aan hoeveel opgeleverde documenten daadwerkelijk relevant zijn. Een hoge recall
geeft dus aan dat het IR-systeem min of meer alles gevonden heeft wat relevant is, een
hoge precision geeft aan dat alles wat door het systeem gevonden is, ook relevant is.
In dit proefschrift wordt, in plaats van een experimentele, een theoretische vergelij-
kingsmethode voor IR-systemen gepresenteerd. Omdat elk IR-model gebaseerd is op een
geschikt begrip van `relevantie', wordt eerst onderzocht hoe dit begrip kan worden ge-
formaliseerd. In 1971 introduceerde Cooper een objectieve notie van relevantie genaamd
`logisch relevant'. Deze notie plaatst het begrip relevantie in een logische context, en
onttrekt het aan subjectieve interpretaties. Bij logische relevantie gaat het erom of men
op een logische wijze een relevantie-beslissing kan aeiden. Om verwarring tussen de be-
grippen `relevant' en `logisch relevant' te vermijden, gebruiken we de term omtrentheid
(in het engels `aboutness') om aan te duiden dat informatie omtrent andere informatie
is. In 1986 presenteerde Van Rijsbergen het idee om te onderzoeken of er een logica,
dus een taal en een formeel bewijssysteem, bestaat die de omtrentheid-relatie kan de-
ni

eren. In dit proefschrift wordt aangetoond dat dit mogelijk is. Dit is vervolgens het
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uitgangspunt van onze vergelijkingsmethode: stel dat omtrentheid is te karakteriseren in
termen van een logica, dan kan van ieder IR-model een bewijssysteem van omtrentheid
gegeven worden. Zo kunnen we dus IR-modellen aan de hand van hun bewijssystemen
gaan vergelijken.
In dit proefschrift worden de omtrentheidsbeslissingen van een aantal bekende IR-
modellen onderzocht en vervolgens vergeleken. Daarvoor wordt eerst in hoofdstuk 3
een theoretisch raamwerk samengesteld, waarin de fundamenten van de IR-systemen
uitgedrukt kunnen worden. Binnen dit raamwerk wordt een taal geformuleerd waarin
representaties van documenten en vraagstellingen beschreven kunnen worden. Deze taal
is gebaseerd op de zogenaamde Situation Theory. De representaties van documenten en
de vraagstellingen worden vertaald naar situaties. Rest de vraag wanneer een bepaalde
situatie omtrent een andere situatie is.
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden presenteren we een aantal axioma's en aeidingsre-
gels (tezamen postulaten genoemd). Deze postulaten drukken bepaalde karakteristieke
eigenschappen van `omtrentheid' uit. Zo is er bijvoorbeeld de regel Symmetry. Deze regel
stelt dat er geen enkel verschil bestaat tussen concluderen dat situatie S omtrent situatie
T is en concluderen dat situatie T omtrent situatie S is. Met behulp van een taal en een
keuze uit de axioma's en de regels, kan een bewijssysteem voor omtrentheid gecre

eerd
worden. In dit systeem kunnen we dan stapsgewijs, gegeven een aantal feitelijkheden
(de axioma's) en bepaalde regels, aeiden of een situatie omtrent een andere situatie is.
Deze manier van redeneren kunnen we op IR-modellen toepassen.
In hoofdstuk 4 postuleren we zes bekende IR-modellen vanuit deze invalshoek. Na de
presentatie van elk model worden de taal van situaties, de axioma's en de aeidingsregels
gegeven die horen bij het model. Om aan te kunnen tonen dat het bewijssysteem ook
inderdaad het IR-model representeert, worden gezondheid en volledigheid theorema's be-
wezen. Is een bewijssysteem gezond ten opzichte van het model dan betekent dit dat alles
wat in het bewijssysteem bewezen kan worden ook inderdaad een omtrentheidsbeslissing
van het model is. Volledigheid stelt het omgekeerde: alle omtrentheidsbeslissingen van
het model kunnen ook bewezen worden met het voorgestelde systeem.
In hoofdstuk 5 gebruiken we de theorie om IR-systemen te vergelijken. We vergelijken
IR-modellen op basis van hun bewijssystemen. Sommige systemen zijn `bevat' in andere
systemen. Een systeem A is bevat in een systeem B als iedere omtrentheidsbeslissing
van A ook een omtrentheidsbeslissing van B is en als bovendien de taal van A een
deelverzameling van de taal van B is. In hoofdstuk 5 deni

eren we verschillende niveaus
van bevat zijn, om vervolgens tot een overzicht te komen op welke wijze de zes modellen
aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn.
Men kan zich nu richten op de vraag wat het voor een relevantie-beslissing van een
IR-model A ten opzichte van de relevantie-beslissing van model B betekent dat het
corresponderend bewijssysteem van A bevat is in het bewijssysteem van B. Het is dan
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mogelijk om kwalitatieve uitspraken te doen over kwantitatieve grootheden zoals recall
en precision. Zo wordt in hoofdstuk 5 bewezen dat als een omtrentheidsrelatie monotoon
1
is, een uitbreiding van de documentrepresentatie (zoals het toevoegen van woorden aan
de beschrijving van het een document) nooit zal leiden tot een verlaging van de recall.
Bovendien kunnen we uitspraken doen over de recall-waarde, en in enkele gevallen over
de precision-waarde, van de gepresenteerde modellen ten opzichte van elkaar.
In hoofdstuk 6 presenteren we drie door ons onderzochte mogelijke toepassingen van
de theorie. Allereerst gebruiken we de theorie om te analyseren op welke wijze men IR-
systemen met elkaar kan combineren. De aandachtspunten zijn dan welke systemen aan
elkaar gekoppeld kunnen worden, en op welke wijze, en of dit inderdaad leidt tot een beter
resultaat. Vervolgens geven we aan dat een ordening op bewijssystemen kan leiden tot
een preferenti

ele ordening van documenten. Bovendien kan men, gegeven een gewenste
ordening op bewijssystemen, het rankingproces van IR-systemen inspecteren. Tenslotte
wordt in hoofdstuk 6 getoond op welke wijze men de meta-theorie kan toepassen als
modelleringsmethode voor IR ge-ori

enteerde hypermedia toepassingen.
Samenvattend, met behulp van de theorie die in dit proefschrift wordt opgebouwd,
kan men analyseren op welke wijze IR-systemen besluiten dat een document relevant is
gegeven een vraagstelling. Deze analyse kan men op velerlei manieren toepassen. Het
is mogelijk om de beslisstappen te vergelijken, te verbeteren en te koppelen. De theorie
is ook toepasbaar om andere aspecten, zoals ordening van documenten en hypermedia-
toepassingen, te bestuderen.
1
Monotoon betekent hier: als voor iedere situatie S; T en U geldt dat: als S omtrent T is dan is S
verenigd met U omtrent T .
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